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INTRODUCTION 
Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. 
For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply dis­
tinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and 
criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these 
three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of 
the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers 
routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting ques­
tions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single com­
partment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the 
lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, 
but relatively neglected, area that lies at the intersection of evi­
dence, the Constitution, and crime. 
For more than three decades, the Supreme Court has recognized 
a constitutional right on the part of criminal defendants to present 
witnesses.1 Although this right is not set forth explicitly in the text 
of the Constitution itself, the Court correctly has regarded it as a 
necessary implication of the Compulsory Process Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment.2 As such, the right is an integral part of the 
constitutional guarantees that a criminal defendant may invoke to 
override the ordinary rules of evidence, whether in the form of stat­
utes or common law decisions - in essence, to tum a dispute 
within the law of evidence into a constitutional case.3 
The right to present witnesses, however, tends to slip through 
the cracks of the conventional curriculum. Given its limitation to 
criminal trials, the right does not come up in standard constitutional 
1. The first explicit articulation of the right in these terms appears in Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 
2. In pertinent part, the Sixth Amendment provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor." U. S. CoNST. amend. VI. On the derivation of the right to present witnesses from the 
right to compulsory process, see infra section I.A. At various times, the Court also has 
pointed to other sources for the right to present witnesses, including implications from the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination (at least when the witness in question con· 
sists of the defendant herself) and notions of adversarial fairness implicit in the Due Process 
Clause. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 51-53 (1987). 
On the possible distinction between the defendant-as-witness and third-party defense wit· 
nesses, see infra section I.C.1.b (rejecting such a distinction). On due process, see infra sec· 
tion II.C. 1.b (arguing that due process adds nothing to the content of the right to present 
witnesses but, instead, serves simply as the vehicle for incorporation of that right against the 
states). 
3. The other significant constitutional override is the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right .. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."). On the lessons to be 
drawn from the Confrontation Clause for the proper parameters of the right to present wit· 
nesses, see infra section 11.B. 
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law courses; nor, given its evidentiary overlay, does it arise in stan­
dard criminal procedure courses. Even within the realm of evi­
dence pedagogy, the right barely achieves mention. With rare 
exception, the editors of the leading evidence casebooks do not dis­
cuss the major Supreme Court decisions on the right as a distinct 
line of analysis.4 They typically content themselves, instead, to in­
clude a single decision in the line and, even then, to focus largely 
upon the particular kind of testimony in dispute.5 This omission is 
one of many that results from the curricular compartmentalization 
of the Constitution and that, in turn, carries over into the world of 
legal scholarship.6 This article seeks, if nothing else, to build the 
case to rectify this omission. 
It comes as no surprise that the Court has invoked the right in 
order to strike down the application of evidence rules that pecu­
liarly disadvantage criminal defendants with regard to the presenta­
tion of witness testimony.7 More surprisingly, the Court also has 
invoked the right to invalidate, as applied to criminal defendants, at 
least some rules of evidence that are generally applicable - that is, 
rules that restrict the admission of a particular type of witness testi­
mony, whether offered by the prosecution or the defense.8 Under 
the Court's current approach, evidence rules that operate to pre-
4. One notable exception is RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATER­
IALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 849-71 (4th ed. 1997). 
5. Several recent casebooks include Rock, but the editors do so simply as part of a discus­
sion of witness competency. See, e.g., Eruc D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESsON, PROBLEMS, 
CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 388 (2d ed. 1994); CHruSTOPHER B. MUELLER & 
LAIRD C. KlRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RUJ.ES 541 (3d ed. 1996); JoHN F. SurroN, 
JR. & OLIN GuY WELLBORN III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 404 (8th ed. 1996); 
JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL, EVIDENCE 256 (9th ed. 1997). One casebook goes a small step 
further by also including Chambers v. Mississipp� 410 U.S. 284 (1973), concerning statements 
contrary to penal interest, but the editors do so as part of a separate section on the constitu­
tional grounds for the admission of hearsay. See MUELLER & KlRKPATRICK, supra, at 451. 
Another recent casebook mentions only Chambers in a similar light. See RONALD J. ALLEN 
ET AL, EVIDENCE: Tmcr, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 322 (2d ed. 1997). 
6. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1131 (1991); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary - The Canons of Constitutional 
Law, 111 HARv. L. REv. 963, 1012 (1998); Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The 
Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 295, 327-31 (1981). 
7. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.14, 16 (1967) (striking down state evidence rule that 
disqualified accomplices as witnesses for defense, but not as witnesses for prosecution). 
8. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (striking down per se prohibition upon 
hypnotically-enhanced testimony, as applied to bar defendant herself from testifying); Cham­
bers, 410 U.S. at 299 (striking down hearsay exception for statements against interest that 
permitted statements against pecuniary interest but not those against penal interest, as ap­
plied to bar third-party defense witnesses). But see United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261 
{1998) {upholding per se prohibition upon expert scientific testimony concerning polygraph 
examination). 
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vent the presentation of defense witnesses "may not be arbitrary or 
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."9 
This constitutional override to the ordinary rules of evidence 
has assumed even greater significance in recent years, as 
rulemakers have grappled increasingly with new forms of witness 
testimony that stem from developments in modem science. The 
Court's two most recent decisions on the right, for example, focused 
upon rules that categorically excluded, respectively, hypnotically­
enhanced testimony10 and expert scientific testimony concerning 
the results of polygraph examinations.11 In these cases, the Court 
reached starkly divergent results, striking down the former rule as 
applied to a criminal defendant, but upholding the latter. Whatever 
its content, the right to present witnesses undoubtedly will play a 
key role in the disputes that are bound to arise from the science and 
technology of witness testimony in the twenty-first century. 
The prospect of confronting the evidence disputes of the future 
within the parameters of the Court's current case law is not auspi­
cious. As I explain, the Court's decisions in the area - especially 
when read in light of the Court's most recent decision, from last 
Term, in United States v. Scheffer12 - form an incoherent, contra­
dictory body of law. That, in itself, would be reason enough for 
commentators to concern themselves with the subject, which sur­
prisingly has garnered little fresh attention in recent years. The 
mid-1970s saw substantial articles by two leading commentators -
Peter Westen and Robert Clinton - on the then-developing right 
to present witnesses.13 Indeed, the authors of a subsequent treatise 
on exculpatory evidence describe their work as "essentially an ex­
tended footnote to" the Westen and Clinton articles.14 No com­
mentator in the past two decades, however, has sought to question 
the conventional understanding of the right as a matter of first prin­
ciples. Nor has anyone sought to integrate the Court's recent think-
9. Rock, 483 U.S. at 56; see also Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1264. 
10. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 61. 
11. See Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1265·66. 
12. 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998). 
13. See Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71 (1974) [here· 
inafter Westen, Compulsory Process l]; Peter Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MICH. L. 
REv. 191 (1975) [hereinafter Westen, Compulsory Process 11]; Robert N. Clinton, The Right 
to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. 
REv. 711 (1976); see also Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified 
Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HAR.v. L. REv. 567 (1978) [hereinafter Westen, 
Unified Theory]. 
14. See EDWARD J. lMwINKELRIED & NoRMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
xiii (2d ed. 1996). 
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ing on the subject with contemporary scholarship on other, 
conceptually similar questions of constitutional law that lie outside 
the compartments of evidence and criminal procedure.15 These are 
the objectives of this article. 
To that end, I contend that the Court's "arbitrary or dispropor­
tionate" standard is not simply flawed in application but that the 
standard fundamentally misconceives the nature of the right to 
present witnesses. Under the Court's current approach - indeed, 
in the view of all modem commentators - the right consists of an 
entitlement to exceptions from generally applicable rules of evi­
dence, though the actual availability of an exception in a given in­
stance has tended to tum recently upon ad hoc judgments by the 
Court itself. 
One should not dismiss the ad hoc nature of the Court's recent 
jurisprudence simply as a sign of sloppy judging or ideological 
sleight-of-hand; rather, one should see it as a symptom of a much 
deeper and well-founded discomfort on the part of the Court with 
the implications that an "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard 
would have for the law of evidence, if taken seriously. The concep­
tion of a constitutional right as an entitlement to exceptions from 
generally applicable rules raises what one commentator aptly de­
scribes, in other constitutional contexts, as "the floodgates prob­
lem":16 namely, the challenge of articulating some principled 
stopping point for the recognition of exceptions in order to avoid 
tearing apart the system of rules itself. It is this problem, I submit, 
that best accounts for - though it does not justify - the Court's ad 
hoc reasoning on the right to present witnesses. An exception­
based view of the right to present witnesses, in particular, would 
throw into doubt such familiar features of evidence law as the rule 
against hearsay, limitations upon the use of extrinsic evidence for 
purposes of witness impeachment, and rules of privilege. 
In describing the Court's recent output in these terms, I seek to 
highlight still another kind of compartmentalization - one within 
15. Akhil Amar takes on such an enterprise with respect to most of the· constitutional 
rights that deal with matters of criminal procedure. See AKmL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITU­
TION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997). Even his otherwise sweeping 
treatment, however, devotes precious little attention to the right to present witnesses specifi­
cally, see id. at 136, though he does make several important points with regard to the meaning 
of the Compulsory Process Clause. The portions of Amar's book that discuss the Clause 
repeat, essentially verbatim, the analysis presented in an earlier article. See Akhil Reed 
Amar, Foreword - Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. LJ. 641, 698 (1996). For ease 
of reference, I shall cite hereafter only to the book. 
16. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 l!ARv. L. REv. 
1175, 1180 (1996). 
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the realm of constitutional law. Many of the rights protected by the 
Constitution consist of either entitlements to exceptions or de­
mands for equal treatment. To take a well-settled example, the 
holding of Washington v. Davis11 is that a generally applicable law 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it has 
a disproportionate impact upon the members of a racial minority -
there, African Americans. This is so because the content of the 
constitutional right - as its name suggests - is itself equality­
based, not exception-based. What compartment one is in thus has 
tremendous significance for the application of the Constitution. It 
is not surprising, then, that one of the most controversial constitu­
tional decisions in recent years - the Court's 1990 decision in Em­
ployment Division v. Smith18 on the Free Exercise Clause -
consists, at bottom, of a determination to switch a constitutional 
right from one compartment to the other. The upshot of Smith is to 
reject the preexisting understanding of the Free Exercise Clause as 
an entitlement to exceptions for religious practice19 in favor of a 
view that makes religious practitioners subject to generally applica­
ble laws -· there, a criminal prohibition upon possession of the 
drug peyote.20 
The switch effected by Smith understandably has elicited a 
wealth of academic commentary21 - not to mention an unsuccess­
ful congressional effort to switch back, by statute, to an exception­
based view.22 But scholars have devoted comparatively little atten­
tion to the even more provocative project of identifying areas in 
17. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
19. I refer here to the Court's rhetoric in framing the constitutional standard for free 
exercise cases prior to Smith in terms of a demand for a compelling state interest. See Sher­
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). As noted by commentators on both sides of the free 
exercise debate, in terms of actual application, even the pre-Smith Court rarely gave this 
exacting standard real bite. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congres­
sional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 79, 99-
102; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 1109, 1127 (1990). 
20. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
21. This vast literature is beyond the scope of the present article. For thoughtful defenses 
of Smith, see, for example, Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 19; Christopher L. Eisgruber & 
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting 
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245 (1994); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith 
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308 (1991). For thoughtful criticism of 
Smith, see, for example, Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 
YALE LJ. 1611 (1993); McConnell, supra note 19. 
22. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (striking down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act-which would have restored the compelling interest test for gov­
ernment-imposed burdens upon religious exercise-as in excess of the remedial power 
granted to Congress by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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which the Court has erroneously declined to switch a constitutional 
right from the exception to the equality compartment. The right to 
present witnesses, I submit, is a striking example of such an error. 
Specifically, I argue that a wide array of sources - the historical 
context of the Compulsory Process Clause, recent learning on the 
closely related Confrontation Clause, considerations of institutional 
structure, the Court's approach to conceptually similar problems of 
constitutional law, and sheer practical concern for the protection of 
criminal defendants as a whole - together form a compelling case 
to reconceive the right as one of equal treatment. Under the ap­
proach set forth here, the Court should apply strict scrutiny - in 
the familiar sense of a demand for a compelling governmental inter­
est - with respect to evidence rules that peculiarly disadvantage 
criminal defendants. By contrast, when the rule in question is an 
evenhanded one - when the government, as rulemaker, has deter­
mined to restrict the presentation of witness testimony by the gov­
ernment itself as prosecutor in the same manner as it limits the 
defense at trial - the Court generally should apply the far more 
deferential standard of ordinary rationality review. 
The analysis in support of this view proceeds in three parts. Part 
I presents an overview of the current landscape, explaining initially 
how a right to compulsory process under the terms of the Sixth 
Amendment necessarily implies a right to present witnesses. Draw­
ing upon the leading Supreme Court cases in the area, this Part 
then details how the Court has come to understand the right to 
present witnesses as an entitlement to exceptions from generally 
applicable evidence rules. Part I finally focuses upon the Court's 
latest decision, in United States v. Scheffer. I contend that, although 
the Court is correct to regard a per se ban on polygraph evidence as 
constitutionally permissible - if not necessarily wise evidence pol­
icy - the Court's reasoning amounts to an ad hoc,judgment that is 
not only contrary to precedent but also unsupportable by reference 
to any of the three substantive propositions relied upon in the opin­
ion. This ad hoc quality, as suggested earlier, is explicable as part of 
a justified fear that an "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard, if 
applied seriously, would require a radical rethinking of many set­
tled principles of evidence law. The disappointment of Scheffer lies 
in the Court's apparent willingness to act upon this genuine concern 
without questioning explicitly the underlying conception of the 
right that has given it life. 
Part II sets forth the affirmative case for reeonceiving the right 
to present witnesses as a right to equal treatment. Focusing upon 
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the historical context of the Compulsory Process Clause, this Part 
initially concurs with the view of modern commentators that the 
forerunners of the Clause in state constitutions and in the proposals 
advanced for the Bill of Rights - though somewhat illuminating -
do not point squarely in favor of either an exception-based or an 
equality-based view. Both modern commentators and the Supreme 
Court, however, have overlooked a crucial feature of the historical 
context: In the late eighteenth century, it was uniformly the law, 
both in the various states and in English criminal trials, that crimi­
nal defendants were disqualified from testifying under oath as wit­
nesses in their own defense. 
This feature of then-contemporary evidence law - shocking to 
the modern eye - sheds considerable light upon the proper con­
ception of the right to present witnesses. Specifically, it indicates 
that the most egregious sort of violation, under an exception-based 
view of the right, actually was the prevailing practice at the time 
that the Bill of Rights was ratified and for several decades after­
ward. The disqualification of criminal defendants, however, did not 
arise as a way peculiarly to disadvantage such persons. Instead, this 
limitation was part of a generally applicable disqualification of all 
interested persons to appear as witnesses, whether for the prosecu­
tion or the defense. The only way to explain the uniformity of this 
practice at the time of the Bill of Rights - indeed, the only way to 
account for the conspicuous lack of the slightest indication that the 
Bill was thought by its contemporaries to require a change in pre­
vailing evidence practice - is to understand the right to present 
witnesses as a right to equal treatment. 
This is, most definitely, not to say that the Constitution freezes 
into place the eighteenth century law of evidence. Quite to the con­
trary, the historical record strongly supports the view that the 
Founding generation23 left considerable room for an evolving law of 
evidence, receptive to change and adaptation in light of modern 
thinking and conditions. What makes the disqualification of crimi­
nal defendants violative of the right to present witnesses is that the 
common law of evidence subsequently, in the nineteenth century, 
removed virtually all disqualifications of witnesses. At that point, 
the Supreme Court rightly found a constitutional violation with re­
spect to the one state that persisted in barring defendants as wit­
nesses, notwithstanding its lifting of virtually all other limitations 
23. I use the term "Founding generation" rather than the more common "Founders," for 
I speak here not just of those who drafted the Constitution itself but, more generally, of the 
generation contemporaneous to the establishment of the Constitution. 
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upon witness qualification.24 But the source of the violation lies in 
the structure of the state rule, not in judicial application of a free­
standing notion of arbitrariness. 
Part II further explains that, apart from historical context, an 
equality-based conception of the right to present witnesses dove­
tails with recent learning on the Confrontation Clause and is consis­
tent with the Court's decisions on the Due Process Clause as a 
guarantee of adversarial fairness in criminal trials. This Part then 
presents two additional justifications for an equality-based view, 
one institutional and the other practical. An important institutional 
consequence of such a view is to enable the makers of evidence 
rules - today, typically legislatures - to deploy their comparative 
advantage in culling through information for the making of com­
plex empirical judgments, especially with respect to controversial 
new forms of witness testimony on the cutting edge of science. 
Courts, by contrast, can deploy their comparative advantage in en­
suring that the decisionmaking process by which judgments of evi­
dence policy are made gives criminal defendants a fair shake -
specifically, by insisting that, whatever the rule selected, it must be 
evenhanded, absent a compelling justification otherwise. There is 
good reason to believe that the government is acting out of a genu­
ine policy concern - not simply to advantage its own prosecutors 
vis-a-vis criminal defendants - when the government itself is pre­
pared to disavow completely the use of a particular type of witness 
testimony. 
This insight, in tum, distinguishes the switch advocated here -
from an exception-based to an equality-based conception of the 
right to present witnesses - from the more controversial switch of 
the same sort effected by Smith for the Free Exercise Clause. 
There, a demand for generally applicable rules is far more suscepti­
ble to criticism, for such rules - like the criminal prohibition upon 
peyote in Smith itself - typically will have little practical bite for 
the vast majority of the public. Generally applicable evidence rules, 
virtually by definition, restrict the prosecution in the same manner 
as they do the defense. 
One need not take a rosy view of evidence policymaking, how­
ever, to embrace an equality-based view. Simply as a practical mat­
ter, wholly apart from the niceties of constitutional doctrine, the 
more one distrusts the ability of policymakers to accord appropriate 
weight to the interests of criminal defendants, the less attractive the 
24. See infra section I.B.1 (discussing Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961)). 
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current, exception-based view becomes. If anything, as I explain, 
the practical consequences of current law may be to make it all the 
more difficult to detect the tilting of the playing field against de­
fendants, insofar as the Court's stance encourages the making of 
admissibility determinations on a case-by-case basis. Such a view 
leaves policymakers free - indeed, it encourages them -· to de­
cline to enact per se exclusionary rules that, in many of their appli­
cations, would be highly protective of criminal defendants. Simply 
as a matter of whose ox is gored, it is impossible to defend the sta­
tus quo on the ground that it makes defendants as a whole better 
off. 
Part III applies the right to present witnesses, understood as a 
demand for equal treatment, to the Court's existing case law. I then 
discuss the constitutionality of some familiar features of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence that are conspicuously not evenhanded. 
I. THE CuRRENT LANDSCAPE 
For nearly two centuries after its enactment, the Compulsory 
Process Clause elicited little attention. "Until 1967 the Supreme 
Court addressed it only five times, twice in dictum and three times 
while declining to construe it."25 Since then, the Court has taken 
two significant analytical steps. The first consists of reading the 
Clause not only to bear upon "compulsory process" in the literal 
sense of bringing witnesses to court under the compulsion of law, 
but also to concern the admissibility of witness testimony - includ­
ing the testimony of persons who need no legal compulsion to ap­
pear. This first step is correct. The second step, however, consists 
of reading the Clause to confer upon criminal defendants an entitle­
ment to the admission of witness testimony, even in the face of gen­
erally applicable evidence rules. This second step, I argue, is in 
error; and the consequences of that error become glaringly appar­
ent when one considers the Court's most recent effort to under­
stand the right to present witnesses. 
A. From Compulsion to Admissibility 
The Compulsory Process Clause, at the very least, requires the 
government to permit criminal defendants to avail themselves of 
the same rules of process - in the literal sense of service of process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in court - as are available to 
the prosecution. Oddly enough, notions of compulsory process in 
25. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 108 (citing cases). 
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this most obvious sense initially developed in England not as a 
means by which to secure the testimony of recalcitrant witnesses 
but, instead, to protect persons who were entirely willing to testify. 
Absent legal compulsion to testify, persons other than parties or 
counsel were vulnerable to lawsuits for "maintenance" by the party 
against whom they testified26 - in colloquial terms, a cause of ac­
tion for being a busybody. 
Under the reign of Elizabeth I in the sixteenth century, Parlia­
ment sought to rectify the problem by providing that witnesses do 
not simply have a duty to respond to compulsory process in civil 
actions but, more importantly, that they have a "right to come and 
to testify, unmolested by the apprehension of maintenance­
proceedings."27 When English law subsequently extended notions 
of compulsory process for the benefit of criminal defendants, that 
move came simply as a way to apply the same set of ground rules as 
between the prosecution and the defense. As John Henry Wigmore 
explained in his famous treatise on the common law of evidence: 
In criminal causes, the date when process began to be issued for the 
Crown's witnesses does not appear; though presumably it preceded 
the time of Elizabeth's statute. But the accused in a criminal cause 
was not allowed to have witnesses at all, - much less to have compul­
sory process for them. By the early 1600s this disqualification began 
to disappear, and the accused was occasionally allowed to put on wit­
nesses, who spoke without oath. After two generations, and by 1679, 
under the Restoration, the judges began to grant him, by special or­
der, compulsory process to bring them; and finally, at slow intervals, 
in 1695 and in 1701, he was guaranteed this right by general statutes. 
This guarantee was afterwards embodied in most of the constitutions 
of the [various states within] the United States.2s 
Wigmore found the reference to "compulsory process" in the Sixth 
Amendment to "provide[ ] nothing new or exceptional"; it merely 
"gave solid sanction, in the special case of accused persons, to the 
26. See 3 JoHN HENRY W1GMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW § 2190, at 2960 (1st ed. 1904) ("[A]nybody who was not somehow con­
cerned as a party or a counsel in the cause ran the risk, if he came forward to testify to the 
jury, of being afterwards sued for maintenance by the party against whom he had spoken."). 
I cite thloughout to the first edition of Wigmore's treatise, rather than to its more recent 
descendants, because the first edition contains the most detailed exposition of the co=on 
law of evidence - particularly as it stood at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. 
27. Id. § 2190, at 2962 (emphasis in original). 
28. Id. § 2190, at 2963 (footnotes omitted); see also id. § 2191, at 2964 ("[T]he purpose of 
the [English] statutes was merely to cure the defect of the co=on law by giving to parties 
defendant in criminal cases the co=on right which was al!eady in custom possessed both by 
parties in civil cases and by the prosecution in criminal cases."). For a similar account of the 
history behind the Compulsory Process Clause, see 3 JosEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1786, at 662-66 (New York, Da Capo Press 1970) 
(1833). 
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procedure ordinarily practised and recognized for witnesses in gen­
eral. "29 Apparently speaking only to the process for obtaining wit­
nesses, Wigmore added that the Compulsory Process Clause "does 
not override and abolish such exemptions and privileges as may be 
otherwise recognized by common law or statute"30 - that is, "ex­
emptions and privileges" that would prevent even the prosecution 
from compelling a given witness to appear in court. 
On its face, the Compulsory Process Clause does not speak spe­
cifically to the admissibility of witness testimony. But both the 
Supreme Court and modem commentators have correctly under­
stood the Clause to bear upon questions of admissibility as well as 
the bringing of witnesses into court under compulsion of law. The 
Court logically observes that it would be odd "to commit the futile 
act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of 
witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use."31 To label such 
an act as completely "futile" is something of an overstatement, for 
the defense might use compulsory process simply to make contact 
with a recalcitrant individual and then to use the information 
gleaned therefrom to identify admissible testimony from other wit­
nesses. The Court is correct, however, that such a limited notion of 
compulsory process would make little sense. The Compulsory Pro­
cess Clause itself refers to the obtaining of "witnesses" - a term 
that, in ordinary parlance, refers to persons who testify in court, not 
to those whom a party might contact simply for the purpose of pre­
trial investigation. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment as a whole 
speaks to the procedures for criminal trials, not to pre-trial 
investigation. 
Along similar lines, Akhil Amar reasons that: 
[i]f the accused, in order to show his innocence, is generally empow­
ered to drag a human being, against her will, into the courtroom to 
tell the truth, surely he must also enjoy the lesser-included rights to 
present other truthful evidence that in no way infringes on another 
human being's autonomy. These lesser-included rights are plainly 
presupposed by the compulsory process clause.32 
The primary repository of these rights "presupposed" by the Clause 
is the law of evidence. 
Based upon history and the implications from the constitutional 
text, two propositions thus emerge as starting points: First, the 
29. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 2191, at 2965. 
30. Id. (emphasis in original). 
31. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967). 
32. AMAR, supra note 15, at 132. 
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Compulsory Process Clause necessarily assumes that criminal de­
fendants have some set of rights with respect to the admissibility of 
witness testimony; and, second, given the development of compul­
sory process as a means to protect willing witnesses as well as to 
coerce unwilling ones, it is not appropriate to distinguish between 
the two sorts of witnesses for purposes of admissibility. A crucial 
question remains: Given the recognition that the Clause bears not 
only upon the process of witness compulsion but also upon issues of 
admissibility, should the Supreme Court apply to the latter category 
of questions the same principle of equality that governs with respect 
to the former? As I now explain, the Court has consciously de­
clined to do so. 
B. From Equality to Exception 
The Court's current framework for the right to present wit­
nesses focuses not upon the evenhandedness of the evidence rule in 
dispute but, instead, upon whether application of the rule -
whatever its structure - would be "arbitrary or disproportionate" 
in light of its justi:fication.33 The Court arrived at this approach 
through a circuitous route, however. 
1. Discriminatory Rules 
The cases in which the Court first began to intimate the exist­
ence of a constitutional right to present witnesses - Ferguson v. 
Georgia34 and Washington v. Texas35 - dealt with evidence rules 
that were flagrantly discriminatory as to criminal defendants. The 
Court nonetheless did not ground its analysis upon this feature of 
the rules, and the consequences of the Court's refusal have become 
increasingly apparent in more recent decisions. 
Ferguson concerned, albeit indirectly, a Georgia statute that dis­
qualified criminal defendants from testifying under oath in their de­
fense. 36 Although Georgia had "in 1866 abolished by statute the 
common-law rules of incompetency for most other persons," the 
state had the curious distinction of being "the only jurisdiction in 
the common-law world," as of 1961, to retain a disqualification for 
defendants.37 In an effort to mitigate the harshness of this remain-
33. See supra note 9. 
34. 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
35. 388 U.S. 14 {1967). 
36. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 573. 
37. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 570. In a narrow, technical respect, this disqualification might 
seem evenhanded, in the sense that the defendant is disqualified from testifying under oath 
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ing disqualification, the state permitted the defendant to make an 
unswom statement to the jury, although defense counsel could not 
help to elicit such a statement through prompting or examination. 38 
Even this meager concession was not given evenhandedly. If the 
unswom statement referred to facts that tended to suggest guilt, 
"the prosecution [would be] relieved of the necessity of proving 
[those facts] by evidence of its own"; but if the statement was help­
ful to the defense, the trial judge could "sua sponte instruct the jury 
to treat the accused's explanation as not presenting a defense in 
law."39 
Ferguson would be a very straightforward case today. Indeed, it 
is hard to imagine a more egregious violation of the right to present 
witnesses, irrespective of whether one takes an exception-based or 
an equality-based view. The Court, however, reversed the defend­
ant's conviction as a violation not of the right to present witnesses 
but, rather, of the right to counsel. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Brennan said simply that the state "could not .. . deny [the defend­
ant] the right to have his counsel question him to elicit his [un­
swom] statement. "40 
Considered in retrospect, this seemingly odd choice of paths 
stems ·from the state of constitutional law at the time that the Court 
decided Ferguson. In the early 1960s, the Court was in the midst of 
its now-famous enterprise of incorporation, which ultimately would 
apply virtually all of the protections in the Bill of Rights to the 
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 
At the time that Ferguson arose, however, the Court had yet to 
deem the Compulsory Process Clause applicable to the states.42 It 
thus is not surprising that defense counsel in Ferguson litigated the 
for either side. Such a view would, however, elevate form over substance. In any criminal 
trial - that is, any time that the defendant does not admit to the crime but, instead, is 
contesting some aspect thereof - it is the defense alone that would want to call the defend­
ant as a witness. The prosecution, of course, could not compel the defendant to testify 
against herself. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. And the prosecution hardly would want to call 
the defendant to testify for herself. The crux of the Georgia disqualification rule, then, is to 
disadvantage peculiarly the defense. 
38. See 365 U.S. at 571. 
39. 365 U.S. at 590. Georgia law provided that the defendant's unswom statement" 'shall 
have such force only as the jury may think right to give it."' 365 U.S. at 571 (quoting disqual­
ification statute). 
40. 365 U.S. at 596. 
41. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SuLLIV AN, CONSTITUTI ONAL LAW 441 {13th 
ed. 1997). 
42. A holding squarely on this point did not come until six years later. See Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 {1967). The Court did not deploy the incorporation doctrine to 
make applicable to the states the related Sixth Amendment right of confrontation until 1965. 
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 {1965). 
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case simply as a violation of the right to counsel,43 that right having 
been incorporated by the Court in capital cases nearly three de­
cades earlier.44 
The recognition that Ferguson would signal the welcome demise 
of the Georgia disqualification statute as a practical matter was not 
lost upon the Justices. In their concurring opinions in Ferguson, 
Justices Frankfurter and Clark, respectively, deemed it "meaning­
less " and "not even intelligible "  to address the lack of assistance 
from counsel with respect to the defendant's unswom statement 
without also explicitly invalidating the underlying disqualification 
statute.45 Modem commentators have concurred in that assess­
ment,4 6 as has the Court itself when referring to the result in 
Ferguson in the post-incorporation era.47 
Though not cast in terms of a constitutional right to present wit­
nesses, Ferguson nonetheless contains important intimations of 
things to come. The Court devoted no less than ten pages of its 
opinion to an extended account of the rise and fall of witness dis­
qualification rules,48 including an explicit observation that a general 
"[ d]isqualification for interest was ... extensive in the common law 
when this Nation was formed. "49 The Court's opinion, however, 
contains no recognition that this history might have any significance 
for the meaning of the Constitution. The upshot of the historical 
record for the Court was simply that "decades ago the considered 
consensus of the English-speaking world came to be that there was 
no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn testimony of the 
accused. "50 The transition from a law of evidence with widespread, 
generally applicable witness disqualification rules to one with few 
such limitations thus was noteworthy only insofar as it undercut the 
weightiness of the governmental interest behind the rule in ques-
43. In fact, the defendant "did not offer himself to be sworn as a witness," 365 U.S. at 572 
n.1, such as would be necessary to raise the constitutionality of the Georgia disqualification 
statute itself. 
44. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); cf. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 571 (noting 
that Ferguson "was under sentence of death"). 
45. 365 U.S. at 599 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 365 U.S. at 602 (Clark, J., concurring). 
46. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 110-11 ("Ferguson was 'not a 
right-to-counsel case.' The defendant was fully assisted by counsel in preparing his unswom 
statement . .. .  The essential defect from the defendant's viewpoint, rather, was that the state­
ment was unswom, not that it was unassisted.'' (quoting 365 U.S. at 599 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring))); see also Clinton, supra note 13, at 760. 
47. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 50 & n.7 (1987). 
48. See 365 U.S. at 572-82. 
49. 365 U.S. at 574. 
50. 365 U.S. at 582 (emphasis added). 
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tion. Although the Court noted the lack of evenhandedness in the 
Georgia disqualification statute,51 that structural observation had 
significance only as it served to accentuate the arbitrariness of the 
state's position. 
Six years later, in Washington v. Texas,52 the Court further con­
flated notions of evenhandedness (focused upon the structure of 
the rule in question) and notions of arbitrariness (focused upon the 
weightiness of the interests behind the application of the rule in a 
given case). With Washington, the right to present witnesses began 
to take its present form. In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the 
Court initially dispelled any doubts on the incorporation question 
by holding explicitly that the Compulsory Process Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment applies to the states as a "fundamental element 
of due process of law."53 In addition, the Court correctly reasoned 
that the right to compulsory process for the obtaining of witnesses 
necessarily implies a right to admit witness testimony.s4 
Turning to the merits, the Court again confronted a state evi­
dence rule that discriminated between prosecution and defense. As 
summarized by the Court, Texas statutes provided that "persons 
charged or convicted as coparticipants in the same crime could not 
testify for one another, although there was no bar to their testifying 
for the State"55 - in essence, a one-way rule for criminal accom­
plices. Like the Georgia disqualification rule in Ferguson, the Texas 
rule for accomplices in Washington was unique in the world of then­
existing state evidence law.56 The Court struck down the Texas rule 
as applied at trial to exclude the testimony of a witness offered by 
the defense in a murder prosecution - a witness previously con­
victed, apparently on an accomplice theory, in connection with the 
same shooting.57 Defense counsel had sought to use the witness to 
enhance the credibility of the defendant's own testimony - admit­
ted at trial - to the effect that it was the witness himself, not the 
defendant, who actually fired the shots that killed the victim.58 
51. See 365 U.S. at 570. 
52. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
53. See 388 U.S. at 19. 
54. See 388 U.S. at 19, 23; see also supra section I.A (defending this inference). 
55. 388 U.S. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted). 
56. See 388 U.S. at 17 n.4 ("Counsel have cited no statutes from other jurisdictions, and 
we have found none, that flatly disqualify coparticipants in a crime from testifying for each 
other regardless of whether they are tried jointly or separately."). 
57. See 388 U.S. at 16. 
58. The prosecution's theory was that the defendant, joined by several other boys includ­
ing Charles Fuller, initially threw bricks at the house where the victim lived. Most of the 
boys then ran back to a nearby car, leaving only the defendant and Fuller in front of the 
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Under the circumstances of the disputed shooting, the proffered 
witness "was the only person other than [the defendant] who knew 
exactly who had fired the shotgun and whether [the defendant] had 
at the last minute attempted to prevent the shooting."59 
The Court, however, did not strike down the application of the 
Texas accomplice rule due to its lack of evenhandedness. Nor does 
that refusal appear inadvertent; in fact, Justice Harlan wrote sepa­
rately, concurring for himself alone, to say that it was the "discrimi­
nation between the prosecution and the defense " that doomed the 
rule.60 The Court instead reasoned that the defendant "was denied 
his right to ... compulsory process ... because the State arbitrarily 
denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physi­
cally and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had per­
sonally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant 
and material to the defense." 61 Again, the touchstone was arbitrar­
iness, not the lack of evenhandedness in itself - although the 
Court did regard the latter as an indication of the former. 
The results in Ferguson and Washington make eminent sense, 
and the approach that I sketch out later would not change them.62 
Simply as a matter of enlightened evidence policy, the rules struck 
down in the two cases are among the most bizarre to survive to 
relatively recent times. In giving those rules a justly-deserved bur-
house. To support a charge of murder, the prosecution contended that the defendant shot 
and killed the victim when she rushed outside to investigate the commotion. See 388 U.S. at 
15. 
The trial judge permitted the defendant to testify that it was Fuller who fired the fatal 
shot - indeed, that the defendant had sought to dissuade Fuller from shooting at all. The 
defense then sought to call Fuller as a witness to support the credibility of the defendant's 
testimony on these two factual points. Fuller, however, had previously been convicted in 
connection with the same shooting - apparently as an accomplice. {Thus, under the prose­
cution's theory of events, there was nothing inconsistent about seeking to convict the defend­
ant for murder, based upon the premise that he had done the actual shooting.) Pointing to 
the Texas prohibition upon the admission of accomplice testimony for the defense, the trial 
judge excluded Fuller's testimony, and the defendant was convicted. See 388 U.S. at 16. 
59. 388 U.S. at 16; see also 388 U.S. at 16 (characterizing accomplice's testimony as "vital" 
to the defense). 
60. See 388 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan based his view not upon 
the Compulsory Process Clause - which he did not consider to be incorporated against the 
states - but, instead, upon the Due Process Clause. See 388 U.S. at 24-25. I agree with 
Justice Harlan's focus upon the lack of evenhandedness in the Texas rule, though I would 
ground that focus specifically upon the Compulsory Process Clause, as incorporated against 
the states per the Court in Washington. 
61. 388 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added). To this sentence, the Court appended a footnote to 
indicate that "[n]othing in th[e] opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial 
privileges ... which are based on entirely different considerations from those underlying the 
common-law disqualifications for interest" or "nonarbitrary state rules that disqualify as wit­
nesses persons who, because of mental infirmity or infancy, are incapable of observing events 
or testifying about them." 388 U.S. at 23 n.21. 
62. See infra section III.A. 
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ial, however, the Court left implications that would prove problem­
atic. Peter Westen, a leading commentator on the right to present 
witnesses, reads Washington with understandable breadth. Accord­
ing to Westen: 
by the use of the term "arbitrary" the Court was referring to the fact 
that the Texas rule imposed an unnecessary burden on the defendant's 
right to present witnesses because the rule wholly excluded evidence 
that might have been reliable instead of permitting it to be heard, 
weighed, and judged by the fact-finder.63 
In effect, as Westen accurately observes, the Washington Court's 
reasoning amounts to the application of a constitutional standard of 
review much like the compelling interest test used for intrusions 
upon other constitutional rights.64 Whatever the doctrinal label, 
however, the Court put forward this approach not as one triggered 
by the discriminatory structure of the Texas rule but, rather, as a 
free-standing constitutional inquiry capable of extension to gener­
ally applicable rules. As I now explain, the Court made precisely 
this extension after Washington. 
2. Generally Applicable Rules 
Six years later, in Chambers v. Mississippi, 65 the Court ad­
dressed a Mississippi evidence rule different in structure from those 
struck down as applied in Ferguson and Washington. Pursuant to 
their common law powers, the Mississippi courts had permitted the 
admission of out-of-court statements against interest as an excep­
tion to the rule against hearsay, but the same courts had extended 
this hearsay exception only to statements against the declarant's pe­
cuniary interest. Statements against penal interest - that is, state­
ments that tend to implicate the declarant in a crime - were 
deemed outside the exception and, hence, inadmissible under the 
rule against hearsay.66 Unlike the discriminatory rules in Ferguson 
63. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 200 (emphasis in original). 
64. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 115 ("Without so stating, the 
Court implied that the state had no 'compelling interest' in using disqualification as a means 
for avoiding perjury."). 
65. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In the years between Washington and Chambers, the Court de­
cided one case on the right to present witnesses that did not implicate rules of evidence per 
se. In Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972), the Court reversed a criminal conviction on the 
ground that the remarks of the trial judge had effectively denied the defendant the right to 
present a witness. The witness in Webb - the only one offered by the defense at trial - had 
declined to testify "only after the (trial) judge's lengthy and intimidating warning" for the 
witness to avoid perjury. See 409 U.S. at 97. The Court noted, in passing, that the judge had 
"gratuitously singled out this one [defense] witness"; "none of the witnesses for the State had 
been so admonished." 409 U.S. at 97, 96. 
66. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299. I use the word "declarant" in the sense recognized in 
evidence law: namely, to refer to the person who actually made the out-of-court statement in 
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and Washington, the Mississippi hearsay exception in Chambers was 
evenhanded on its face in the sense that it did not exempt out-of­
court statements against penal interest, irrespective of whether the 
offering party was the prosecution or the defense.67 In this respect, 
the position of the Mississippi courts was hardly anomalous. To the 
contrary, the Court acknowledged that "[t]his materialistic limita­
tion on the declaration-against-interest hearsay exception appears 
to be accepted by most States in their criminal trial processes. "68 
The Court nonetheless struck down the Mississippi rule, as applied 
at trial to exclude the testimony of defense witnesses. The defense 
had offered the witnesses to recount three out-of-court statements 
in which another man, Gable McDonald, had confessed to the 
shooting of a police officer of which the defendant Chambers stood 
accused. 
Chambers, in some respects, stands as the Court's broadest rec­
ognition of a constitutional override to state restrictions on the 
presentation of witnesses. The excluded witnesses were far from 
the only avenue open to the defense to raise the possibility that the 
prosecution had misidentified the defendant as the shooter.69 
Rather, the defense wished to use the excluded witnesses to rein­
force the credibility of other evidence already admitted. In particu­
lar, the trial court had permitted the defense not only to call 
McDonald himself as a witness, but also to read to the jury the tran­
script of yet another out-of-court confession that McDonald had 
question, as distinct from the witness who recounts that statement in the form of hearsay at 
trial. See FED. R. Evm. 80l{b). 
67. As discussed at greater length in section III.A, infra, I contend that the Mississippi 
hearsay exception is not evenhanded where the declarant of the statement against penal in­
terest also could be considered a coconspirator of the defendant. In that situation - one 
different from the circumstances of Chambers itself - the prosecution would not need to 
rely upon the hearsay exception for statements against interest in order to admit an out-of­
court statement that would incriminate both the declarant and the defendant. The prosecu­
tion, instead, may admit such evidence as a statement of a coconspirator of a party opponent. 
68. 410 U.S. at 299. 
69. Chambers arose from a confrontation between police officers and a hostile crowd at a 
bar. The officers arrived at the scene with a warrant for the arrest of one man whom they, in 
fact, located at the bar. When the officers attempted to make the arrest, however, members 
of the crowd intervened. Several gunshots were fired at the officers from an alley; one struck 
and ultimately killed Officer Sonny Liberty. Before he died, however, Officer Liberty man­
aged to fire back into the alley. His first shot was wild and simply scattered the crowd stand­
ing nearby. According to various witnesses, Officer Liberty "appeared . . . to take more 
deliberate aim" before firing a second shot that struck but did not kill the defendant, Cham­
bers. The prosecution charged the defendant with murder on the theory that Officer Liberty 
had chosen to shoot back at the person who initially had fired upon him. As reinforcement 
of this theory, the prosecution relied upon a surviving officer at the scene, who testified 
specifically that he saw Chambers shoot Officer Liberty. See 410 U.S. at 285-86. 
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made in the offices of defense counsel.7° Upon cross-examination 
by the prosecution, however, McDonald repudiated that particular 
confession. At that point, the trial court barred the defense from 
using the disputed witnesses to inform the jury of the three addi­
tional confessions by McDonald on the ground that those state­
ments were not within the Mississippi hearsay exception for 
statements against interest.71 
Unable to point to any discrimination on the face of the Missis­
sippi hearsay exception itself, the Court still struck down its appli­
cation. The problem, said Justice Powell for the Court, was that: 
The testimony rejected by the trial court . . .  bore persuasive assur­
ances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale 
of the exception for declarations against interest. That testimony also 
was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where con­
stitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are impli­
cated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat 
the ends of justice. 12 
As one commentator tellingly observes, the Court's core holding 
that "the defendant had a constitutional right to introduce evidence 
deemed inadmissible under [generally applicable] state hearsay 
rules was unprecedented. "73 Indeed, this holding comes as even 
more of a surprise, given that the Court itself, several decades ear­
lier in United States v. Donnelly, 74 had upheld the exclusion in fed­
eral criminal trials of statements against penal interest. In fact, the 
Court had done so under circumstances wherein the disputed state-
70. See 410 U.S. at 291. The trial court also had permitted the defense to put on testi· 
mony from two persons at the scene of the shooting: one testified that he actually "saw 
McDonald shoot [the officer]," and the other "testified that he saw McDonald immediately 
after the shooting with a pistol in his hand." 410 U.S. at 289. 
71. See 410 U.S. at 291-92. Apart from its ruling on the admissibility of the three addi· 
tional confessions, the trial court also barred the defense from recalling McDonald to the 
stand on the ground that Mississippi law prohibited a party from impeaching its own witness 
- a limitation known as the "voucher" rule. In a separate discussion, the Supreme Court 
held that this too was constitutional error, though not under the right to present witnesses. 
Noting that the state "ha[d) not sought to defend the [voucher] rule or explain its underlying 
rationale," the Court struck down its application as a violation of the defendant's right "to 
confront and to cross-examine those who give damaging testimony" against him - a right 
that the Court considered applicable regardless of "whether the witness was initially put on 
the stand by the [defense) or by the State." 410 U.S. at 297-98. On the relationship between 
the right of confrontation and the right to present witnesses, see infra section Il.B. 
72. 410 U.S. at 302. According to the Court, these "persuasive assurances of trustworthi­
ness" were three: McDonald made each of the additional confessions "spontaneously to a 
close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred." Each "was corroborated by some 
other evidence" - namely, the evidence that the trial court had permitted the defense to 
admit. And, finally, the additional confessions were "in a very real sense self-incriminatory 
and unquestionably against interest." See 410 U.S. at 301. 
73. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 152. 
74. 228 U.S. 243 (1913). 
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ments appeared at least as reliable and as crucial to the defense as 
those in Chambers.75 To avoid overruling Donnelly, the Court of­
fered nothing more than a feeble distinction based upon the availa­
bility of the declarant in Chambers to be examined by the defense 
at trial.76 If anything, longstanding principles of evidence law hold 
that the availability of the declarant is a fact that cuts against the 
admission of out-of-court statements against interest, not one that 
supports a constitutional imperative to admit them.77 
75. In Donnelly, the Court upheld a conviction for murder on an Indian reservation, 
notwithstanding the district court's refusal to admit the testimony of a defense witness pre­
pared to recount an out-of-court confession to the crime by another man, Joe Dick, who died 
prior to trial. The Court recognized that the prosecution's own evidence "strongly tended to 
exclude the theory that more than one person participated in the shooting" - the implica­
tion being that "the Dick confession, if admi[tted], would have directly tended to exculpate 
[the defendant]." 228 U.S. at 272. In fact, in its unsuccessful effort to build a foundation for 
admission of the confession, the defense had pointed to a set of "human tracks upon a sand 
bar at the scene of the crime [that] led in the direction of an acorn camp where Dick was 
stopping at the time, rather than in the direction of the home of [the defendant]." 228 U.S. at 
272. The defense also noted that "beside the track there was at one point an impression as of 
a person sitting down" - a detail that defense counsel took to indicate "a stop caused by 
shortness of breath, which would have been natural to Dick, who was shown to be a sufferer 
from consumption." 228 U.S. at 272. 
Unlike the situation in Chambers, the defense in Donnelly was unable to bring to the 
attention of the jury in any other way the existence of an outright confession by a third 
person. The net loss of exculpatory information thus was far greater in Donnelly than in 
Chambers. The Donnelly Court nonetheless upheld the exclusion of hearsay testimony to 
recount Dick's confession, relying exclusively upon the "practically unanimous weight of au­
thority" at the time that regarded statements against penal interest as simply too unreliable 
to be admitted. 228 U.S. at 273. 
76. The Court stated that "[t]he availability of McDonald significantly distinguishe[d]" 
the situation in Chambers "from the Donnelly-type situation," where "the declarant [Dick] 
was unavailable at the time of trial" due to death. 410 U.S. at 301 (footnote omitted). 
77. It is a fundamental tenet of evidence law that the applicability of the hearsay excep­
tion for statements against interest - whether or not understood to encompass statements 
against penal interest - turns upon an initial determination that the declarant is unavailable 
to testify at trial. See TAYLOR H. McELROY, MISSISSIPPI EVIDENCE § 46 (1955) (discussing 
Mississippi hearsay exception for declarations of deceased against interest); see also 2 
WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1476, at 1834 (discussing common law basis for unavailability 
requirement). The exception for statements against interest, in other words, is a rule that 
prefers to admit hearsay when the alternative is to leave the jury unaware of the declarant's 
statement, but not when the declarant is available to be called as a witness and thereby 
confronted with his earlier remarks. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPAT­
RICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE § 8.53, at 1327 (1995). As a result, the 
unavailability of the declarant in Donnelly, if anything, is a fact that tends to help rather than 
hinder an argument for admission of the Dick confession. To put the point the opposite way: 
the availability of the declarant at the time of trial should be an additional reason - indeed, 
a conclusive reason as far as the evidence rules are concerned - to keep out hearsay testi­
mony from other persons about the declarant's remarks, not a source of support for a consti­
tutional command to let it in. 
The one factual detail that might salvage the outcome in Chambers specifically is that the 
trial court there not only had deemed the disputed witness testimony to be inadmissible hear­
say, but also had prevented the defense from recalling McDonald to the stand in order to 
impeach him with the three additional confessions. Cf. supra note 71 (explaining that the 
Chambers Court struck down this "voucher" rule in a separate portion of its opinion, based 
not upon the right to present witnesses, but upon the right of confrontation). But that is an 
anomaly attributable to the peculiar confluence of the Mississippi hearsay exception and the 
1084 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1063 
In an extensive scholarly treatment of the Chambers litigation, 
defense counsel understood the Court to recognize that "the ac­
cused in a criminal proceeding ha� a constitutional right to intro­
duce any exculpatory evidence, unless the state can demonstrate 
that it is so inherently unreliable as to leave the trier of fact no 
rational basis for evaluating its truth. "78 The Court's analysis cer­
tainly marks the decoupling of a free-standing judicial standard of 
arbitrariness from any structural notions of evenhandedness. 
Even the Chambers Court itself, however, was not entirely at 
ease with this move; rather, the Court sprinkled its opinion with 
hedges and caveats to suggest that its arbitrariness standard might 
not be all that it seemed. Upon noting emphatically that "[f]ew 
rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present wit­
nesses in his own defense," the Court immediately added that, "[i]n 
the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, 
must comply with established rules of : . .  evidence designed to as­
sure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and 
innocence."79 Later, in a passage bordering upon the disingenuous, 
the Court announced its conclusion on the merits but quickly added 
that, "[i]n reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of 
constitutional law" nor otherwise "signal any diminution in the re­
spect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and 
implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. "80 
The Court's apparent concern to cabin the reach of its reasoning 
in Chambers extends, most obviously, to future cases. Specifically, 
the hedging in Chambers stands as an attempt to avoid "the flood­
gates problem," on which I elaborate later in this Part.81 As one 
commentator has observed, some lower courts in the years after 
Chambers drew upon the Supreme Court's equivocal dicta to slow 
the application of the right to present witnesses. 82 
stat e's s eparat e  pro hibitio n upon the impeachment o f  witness es by the party who calls t hem 
at trial. It is not a po int of distinctio n that o ne may generalize, much less co nstitutio nalize, as 
the Chambers Co urt attempted to do in o rder to avo id the o verruling o f  Donnelly. 
78. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra not e  13, at 151-52 (emphas is in o riginal). See 
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 285 (identifyin g  Westen as co uns el fo r the defendant before the 
Supreme Court). 
79. 410 U.S. at 302. 
80. 410 U.S. at 302-03. 
81. See infra s ect io n I.C.2 . 
82. See Steven G. Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Progeny of 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BuLL. 131, 137-38 (1983) (des cribing reactio n o f  lo wer 
co urts as " ambivalent" and " clearly mixed" ). 
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After Chambers, the Court itself left the right essentially un­
touched for two decades,83 until 1987, when it began to apply it in 
the context of generally applicable restrictions upon newly emerg­
ing forms of witness testimony. In Rock v. Arkansas, 84 the Court 
struck down a per se prohibition upon the admission of 
hypnotically-enhanced testimony, as applied at trial to prevent a 
criminal defendant herself from testifying about the circumstances 
of a homicide. The dispute in Rock centered upon the events that 
led to the shooting death of the defendant's husband. Interviewed 
by the police at the scene, the defendant stated that the shooting 
occurred in the course of a scuffle, after her husband had severely 
battered her; but the defendant "could not remember the precise 
details of the shooting."85 After undergoing two hypnosis sessions 
at the suggestion of her attorney, the defendant recalled that she 
had not held her finger on the trigger of the gun; instead, she said, 
"the gun had discharged [accidentally] when her husband grabbed 
her arm during the scuffie."86 In a trial for manslaughter, the prose­
cution objected to the admission of this testimony from the defend­
ant as the product of hypnotic enhancement. 
As in Chambers, the disputed testimony in Rock was not the 
only means open to the defense to present its version of the facts -
here, to raise the possibility that the defendant did not cause the 
gun to discharge. Prompted by the details newly recalled by the 
defendant, her attorney arranged for a handgun expert to examine 
the particular weapon in the case, and the trial court ultimately per­
mitted the expert to testify "that the gun was defective and prone to 
fire, when hit or dropped, without the trigger's being pulled."87 The 
trial court ruled, however, that the defendant herself could not tes­
tify about her post-hypnotic recollections of the shooting, and the 
jury returned a conviction for manslaughter. 
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, using its 
common law authority to deem hypnotically-enhanced testimony 
83. During this period, the Court applied its analysis in Chambers to vacate a death sen­
tence where the trial court, in the sentencing phase, had excluded as inadmissible hearsay 
under state evidence law a statement against penal interest offered by the defense. See 
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 (1979). Tue Court also overturned a conviction where 
the trial court had excluded testimony bearing upon the voluntariness of a confession by the 
defendant. Tue trial court's ruling violated earlier Court precedents allocating to the jury the 
ultimate determination of whether a given confession is voluntary. See Crane v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 683, 688-89 (1986). 
84. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
85. 483 U.S. at 46. 
86. 483 U.S. at 47. 
87. 483 U.S. at 47. 
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inadmissible per se.88 Rock thus was not a case in which the state 
sought to apply a per se ban formulated long ago, in factually dis­
similar circumstances. Arkansas's stance was far from anomalous 
amongst the states to have considered hypnotically-enhanced testi­
mony. A few states had deemed such evidence generally admissi­
ble, and a few others were willing to admit it upon the use of certain 
safeguards; but a plurality of jurisdictions had found hypnotically­
enhanced testimony to be "so unreliable" as to be categorically 
inadmissible in criminal trials,89 though the cases did not specifically 
involve testimony from the defendant.90 Sifting through these dif­
ferent perspectives, the Arkansas court credited the view of the 
leading law review article on the subject at the time, written by a 
prominent clinical psychiatrist, who pointedly stated that '"[a]fter 
hypnosis the subject cannot differentiate between a true recollec­
tion and a fantasy or a suggested detail' " and that even experts in 
hypnosis could not discern the difference upon observation of the 
subject.91 The court went on to note that the safeguards identified 
by some other states did "not even address[ ] "  the prospect that the 
subject might "confus[ e] actual recall with confabulation" or might 
gain "unwarranted confidence in the validity of his ensuing 
recollection. "92 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. Writing for 
the Court, Justice Blackmun started with the unassailable observa­
tion that the right to present witnesses is "incomplete if [the de­
fendant] may not present himself as a witness."93 The Court 
professed no desire to opine about "the admissibility of testimony 
of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal def end­
ants. "94 But the Court nonetheless invoked its earlier decisions on 
the presentation of third-party witnesses to say that, "fj]ust as a 
88. See Rock v. State, 708 S.W.2d 78 (Ark. 1986). 
89. See 708 S.W.2d at 79 (citing earlier decisions from Arizona, California, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, and New York flatly barring hypnotically-enhanced testimony). 
90. See 483 U.S. at 57 ("States that have adopted an exclusionary rule . . .  have done so 
for the testimony of witnesses, not for the testimony of a defendant." (emphasis in original)). 
Cf. infra section I.C.1.b (contending that there is no principled distinction, for constitutional 
purposes, between a criminal defendant's right to testify herself and her right to present 
third-party witnesses). 
91. See 708 S.W.2d at 80 (quoting Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of 
Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REv. 313, 314 (1980)). 
92. 708 S.W.2d at 82-83 n.2. 
93. 483 U.S. at 52. In addition to treating the testimony of the defendant herself in Rock 
as an aspect of the right to present witnesses, the Court also noted that a defendant's prerog­
ative to testify is "a necessary corollary" to the defendant's Filth Amendment right to refuse 
to testify. 483 U.S. at 52. 
94. See 483 U.S. at 58 n.15. 
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State may not apply an arbitrary rule of competence to exclude a 
material defense witness from taking the stand, it also may not ap­
ply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the stand, but 
arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony."95 Here 
again, per Chambers, is the inquiry for arbitrariness divorced from 
the examination of structure. 
The Court readily characterized hypnotic enhancement as "con­
troversial," adding that experts had developed "no generally ac­
cepted theory to explain the phenomenon" of hypnosis itself and 
that "the current medical and legal view of its appropriate role is 
unsettled. "96 Indeed, the Court added that "scientific understand­
ing of the phenomenon and of the means to control the effects of 
hypnosis is still in its infancy."97 Rock thus does not tum so much 
upon specific findings about the state of scientific knowledge about 
hypnosis - a slippery ground upon which to base constitutional 
analysis, in any event - but, more deeply, upon the apparent rigor 
of the Court's legal standard that limitations upon the right to pres­
ent witnesses "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the pur­
poses they are designed to serve. "98 
The Rock opinion contains rhetoric that would lead one to think 
that this "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard is especially 
tough stuff, approximating the strict scrutiny that the Court regu­
larly deploys in other areas involving intrusions upon constitutional 
rights. The Court stated emphatically that "[w]holesale inadmissi­
bility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the 
right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudi­
ating the validity of all post-hypnotic recollections."99 In explaining 
why the Arkansas per se rule did not satisfy this test, the Court 
stated that at least some of the risks associated with hypnotically­
enhanced testimony "can be reduced, although perhaps not elimi­
nated, by the use of procedural safeguards" in the hypnosis process 
itself1°0 - an observation akin to a statement that the state had 
available less restrictive means by which to advance at least some of 
its objectives. 
As an institutional matter, the application of such a demanding 
standard of review - even to a rule barring both prosecution and 
95. 483 U.S. at 55. 
96. 483 U.S. at 59. 
97. 483 U.S. at 61. 
98. See 483 U.S. at 56. 
99. 483 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added). 
100. 483 U.S. at 60. 
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defense alike from using a hotly-disputed type of witness testimony 
- reveals a profound level of distrust for the rulemaker. In fact, 
the four dissenting Justices in Rock focused primarily upon notions 
of institutional competency, arguing that deference to common law 
policymaking by state courts in the field of evidence should be "at 
its highest . . .  where, as the Court concedes, 'scientific understand­
ing . . .  is still in its infancy.' "101 Even the dissenters in Rock, how­
ever, did not confront head-on the majority's fundamental 
conception of the right to present witnesses as an entitlement to 
exceptions. 
Given the case law from Ferguson to Rock, one might have 
thought that the Court, in its most recent Term, would have had 
very little trouble striking down a per se prohibition upon the ad­
mission of expert scientific testimony concerning the results of poly­
graph examinations102 - particularly as applied to an examination 
of the defendant himself in a proceeding that turned upon the cred­
ibility of his testimony. This, however, did not happen. That a lop­
sided majority of not less than eight Justices would uphold precisely 
such a rule in United States v. Scheffer103 is strong evidence that 
something important is afoot for the right to present witnesses. As 
such, it is worthwhile to parse closely the Court's most recent expo­
sition of the right. 
C. The Arbitrariness of an "Arbitrary or 
Disproportionate" Standard 
In Part Ill, I ultimately conclude that the result in Scheffer is 
right as a matter of first principles. For present purposes, however, 
I take the Court on its own terms in order to ask whether it is possi­
ble to maintain the existing "arbitrary or disproportionate" stan­
dard, perhaps with a few caveats, exceptions, or minor repairs. I 
conclude that it is not. 
As I explain here, the Court's constitutional reasoning in Schef­
fer is indefensible, either as a matter of precedent or in terms of the 
101. 483 U.S. at 65 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 483 U.S. at 61). 
102. Tue co=on form of polygraph test measures a variety of physiological responses 
to a set of questions asked by the examiner, who then interprets these physiological 
correlates of anxiety and offers an opinion to the jury about whether the witness -
often, as in this case, the accused - was deceptive in answering the questions about the 
very matters at issue in the trial. 
United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1267 (1998). 
103. 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998). For an early and largely critical assessment of Scheffer, di­
rected to its likely effect upon the admissibility of polygraph evidence in particular, see Lloyd 
C. Peeples, III et al., Exculpatory Polygraphs in the Courtroom: How the Truth May Not Set 
You Free, 28 CUMB. L. REv. 77 (1998). 
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three substantive propositions that the Court sought to draw there­
from. It would be one thing if an observer could dismiss the analyt­
ical flaws of Scheffer as anomalous. Justice Thomas's opinion for 
the Court, however, raises more fundamental doubts about the via­
bility of the "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard. One may 
best understand Scheffer as the product of a deep and well-founded 
concern on the part of the Court over the potential of such a stan­
dard - if applied in the manner of earlier cases - to necessitate a 
radical rethinking of many settled principles of evidence law. The 
Scheffer Court, however, did the law a disservice by attempting to 
give wing to those legitimate concerns within its current analytical 
framework rather than by taking a fresh look at that framework 
itself. In fairness to the Court, one should note that counsel did not 
litigate the case as a vehicle for such a rethinking of the right to 
present witnesses.104 My goal is to initiate that debate. 
1. The Court on Its Own Terms 
The circumstances in Scheffer would seem virtually to invite a 
replay for polygraph evidence of the debate in Rock over hypnosis. 
Although the dispute in Scheffer arose in the context of a military 
court martial, the Court effectively treated the case as if it had in­
volved the presentation of witnesses in an ordinary criminal trial.ms 
As such, the practical consequence of the Court's decision has been 
to uphold the constitutional permissibility of per se prohibitions 
upon polygraph evidence in some twenty-seven states.106 
There are other parallels as well: the defense in Scheffer sought 
to use the disputed expert testimony concerning the defendant's 
polygraph examination to lend credibility to the defendant's own 
104. The Solicitor General, for example, did not call upon the Court to overrule Rock, 
much less to understand the right to present witnesses generally as a right of equal treatment 
See Brief for United States, Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998) (No. 96-1133), available at 
LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs 1133. By contrast, the absence of briefing on whether to make a 
fundamental switch from an exception-based to an equality-based understanding of the Free 
Exercise Clause did not stop the Court from doing just that in Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990). See McConnell, supra note 19, at 1113-14 (criticizing the Court for not 
requesting additional briefing on this question before rendering decision). 
105. The Court, for instance, did not decide the case based upon some notion of special 
presidential authority with regard to the making of evidence rules for the military context. 
For the sake of clarity, I shall use the terminology of criminal trials - prosecution, defend­
ant, etc. - when describing the circumstances in Scheffer. 
106. See Peeples et al, supra note 103, at 96 n.135 (citing state decisions). Although there 
is no prohibition in the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically directed to polygraph evi­
dence, some federal circuits have excluded such evidence per se upon application of the gen­
eral framework for expert scientific testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 
192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming its preexisting ban after reconsideration in light of 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). 
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testimony at his court-martial. Based upon the results of a urinal­
ysis that the defendant Scheffer voluntarily had undergone while 
working for the Air Force as an informant in drug investigations, 
the Air Force had charged him with use of methamphetamines.107 
At his court martial, Scheffer denied that he knowingly had in­
gested the drug and testified in such a manner as to suggest that a 
suspected dealer may have surreptitiously drugged him in the 
course of an undercover operation.108 
To lend credibility to this account, defense counsel sought to in­
form the jury that - before the results of the urinalysis were 
known and as part of routine Air Force procedure for its drug infor­
mants - Scheffer voluntarily had taken a government-adminis­
tered polygraph examination. "In the opinion of the examiner, the 
test 'indicated no deception' when [Scheffer] denied using drugs 
since joining the [military]."109 The court martial excluded the ex­
pert's testimony pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 707, which 
flatly bars the admission of polygraph evidence.110 As in Rock, 
then, the testimony at issue in Scheffer lay at the heart of an ongo­
ing scientific controversy.111 Military Rule 707 itself is not an 
archaic holdover from the earliest stages of that debate; rather, the 
President issued it in 1991, in response to a military court decision 
that purported to open the door to polygraph evidence for both 
107. Periodic urinalysis, not surprisingly, is part of the standard procedures for infor­
mants in drug investigations under the auspices of the Air Force Office of Special Investiga­
tions. See 118 S. Ct. at 1263. 
108. See 118 S. Ct. at 1261. Scheffer recalled that he had visited the house of a suspected 
drug dealer and, thereafter, had begun driving back to the Air Force base. "The next thing 
he remembered was waking up the next morning in his car in a remote area, not knowing 
how he got there." United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 444 (C.M.A. 1996). This is not to 
say that Scheffer necessarily is a case of factual innocence. Had Scheffer, in fact, blacked out 
shortly after his contact with the suspected drug dealer, his flat denial of drug usage just three 
days later during his polygraph examination would seem quite odd. One would think that he 
would have had every reason at least to mention his blackout at that juncture. In addition, 
the other charges of which Scheffer was convicted - passing 17 bad checks and being absent 
without leave from his military post for 13 days, see 118 S. Ct. at 1263 - are at least consis­
tent with the behavior of a person with a drug problem. In short, the notion that some 
subjects may be able to "fool" a polygraph is not merely a theoretical concern on the facts of 
Scheffer, though the Court treated it as such. See 118 S. Ct. at 1265 n.6. 
109. 118 S. Ct. at 1263. 
110. In pertinent part, this rule provides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the 
opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or 
taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence. 
Mn.. R. EVID. 707(a). 
111. See infra section I.C.1.a (discussing the Court's reliance upon the lack of scientific 
consensus as the central justification for the upholding of Military Rule 707). 
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sides in courts martial, at least under some circumstances.112 One 
easily can imagine the same sort of response from a state legisla­
ture, or indeed from Congress, with regard to controversial new 
types of witness testimony that may arise in the years ahead. 
In light of what came before, the reasoning used by the Court to 
uphold the per se prohibition upon polygraph evidence in Scheffer 
is full of surprises. Specifically, the Court rested its holding upon 
three central propositions that warrant close attention,113 not only 
to ascertain the correctness of Scheffer itself, but also, more signifi­
cantly, as possible constitutional principles by which to cabin an 
exception-based view of the right to present witnesses. Wholesale 
reconception of the right would not be necessary if it were possible 
to take an exception-based view without thereby calling into doubt 
a vast array of familiar evidence principles. 
The first proposition appears in the Court's account of the justi­
fications behind the per se rule. Here, the Court identifies what it 
considers the crucial rationale for the permissibility of a per se rule: 
"There is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable. 
To this day, the scientific community remains extremely polarized 
about the reliability of polygraph techniques. "114 In the face of this 
112. See Exec. Order No. 12,767, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,284 (1991) (responding to United States 
v. Gipson, 24 MJ. 246 (C.M.A. 1987)). 
113. I focus here upon those propositions with which the eight-member majority of the 
Court agreed: namely, those stated in Parts II-A and II-D of Justice Thomas's opinion for 
the Court. In Parts 11-B and 11-C, Justice Thomas set forth two additional reasons for the 
upholding of the per se ban on polygraph evidence - concern over interference with jury 
functions and over collateral litigation - but only a plurality of Justices agreed. See 118 S. 
Ct. at 1269-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) 
(considering it unnecessary to reach these two additional grounds for the rule and, in any 
event, disagreeing with Justice Thomas's analysis of jury functions). 
114. 118 S. Ct. at 1265 (citing treatises on scientific evidence); see also 118 S. Ct. at 1269 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The continuing, good-faith disagreement among experts and 
courts on the subject of polygraph reliability counsels against our invalidating a per se exclu­
sion of polygraph results."). 
Given the ongoing rancor about the polygraph, it is worthwhile to take special care to 
identify the precise source of uncertainty here. The Court readily acknowledged the defend­
ant's observation that "current research shows polygraph testing is reliable more than 90 
percent of the time." 118 S. Ct. at 1265 n.6. Similarly, Justice Stevens pointed out, in dissent, 
that "[t]here are a host of studies that place the reliability of polygraph tests at 85% to 90%." 
118 S. Ct. at 1276 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Although the point is not articulated clearly in the Court's opinion, the lingering sense of 
uncertainty troubling the Court appears to center not upon aggregate estimates of reliability 
based upon experimental research but, instead, upon the more difficult question of whether 
one can ascertain the reliability of polygraph evidence in a particular instance. This seems to 
be what the Court is getting at when it states that, "[a]lthough the degree of reliability of 
polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety of identifiable factors, there is simply no way 
to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner's conclusion is accurate . . . .  " 118 
S. Ct. at 1266 (emphasis added). Likewise, immediately after acknowledging the defendant's 
aggregate estimate of reliability, the Court hastened to add that, "[e]ven if the basic debate 
about the reliability of polygraph technology itself were resolved, . . .  there would still be 
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uncertainty, the Court could not say that a per se prohibition was 
"arbitrary." 
The second and third propositions come later in the opinion, 
where the Court seeks to distinguish its holding from those in ear­
lier cases - all of which held in favor of the defendant asserting the 
right to present witnesses. The Court sought to distinguish Rock on 
the ground that the trial court there had applied a per se rule 
against hypnotically-enhanced testimony so as "to infringe[ ] upon 
the accused's interest in testifying in her own defense."115 In addi­
tion to this proffered distinction between testimony by the defend­
ant herself and testimony of other defense witnesses, the Court 
went on to suggest that the expert testimony excluded in Scheffer 
did not present the jury with additional firsthand information con­
cerning the events in question.116 Rather, the court martial "heard 
all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective 
of the accused" - namely, through Scheffer's own testimony.111 
The ban on polygraph evidence "merely" prevented Scheffer from 
introducing the polygraph examiner, in essence, as a form of cumu­
lative evidence - merely to "bolster" the credibility of the testi­
mony that Scheffer himself already had given.118 The Court then 
declared that the per se prohibition upon polygraph evidence did 
"not implicate any significant interest of the accused"119 - a state-
controversy over the efficacy of countermeasures, or deliberately adopted strategies that a 
polygraph examinee can employ to provoke physiological responses that will obscure accu­
rate readings and thus 'fool' the polygraph machine and the examiner." 118 S. Ct. at 1265 
n.6.; cf. supra note 108 (noting reasons to suspect that Scheffer might have "fool[ed]" the 
polygraph in this instance). It does one little good to know that polygraphs are reliable "90 
percent of the time," in other words, if one cannot reliably ascertain whether the particular 
polygraph evidence in the case at hand falls in the 90 percent that are reliable or the 10 
percent that are not. The Court thus does not seem to be insisting that polygraphs must be 
100 percent accurate. Instead, the Court's concern seems to focus upon a perceived lack of 
extrinsic means - i.e., aside from the polygraph itself - by which to distinguish accurate 
from inaccurate polygraph results in particular instances. 
The Scheffer Court might have added a related point that data generated from experimen­
tal settings in which the underlying truth is known (and the experimenter simply wishes to 
determine how often the examiner, aided by the polygraph, can detect that the subject is 
lying) plainly is not the same enterprise as the selection of appropriate rules for a trial setting 
where, by definition, the truth is not known (and the process of witness testimony is itself the 
major vehicle for reconstructing the truth). 
115. See 118 S. Ct. at 1268. 
116. In the course of distinguishing Rock, for example, the Court emphasized that the 
exclusion of the disputed witness in that case "deprived the jury of the testimony of the only 
witness who was at the scene and had firsthand knowledge of the facts." 118 S. Ct. at 1268. 
117. See 118 S. Ct. at 1268. 
118. See 118 S. Ct. at 1268-69. 
119. See 118 S. Ct. at 1268. 
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ment that comes as a shock after the Court's earlier description of 
the right to present witnesses as a "fundamental" right.120 
As explained in the subsections that follow, all three of the pro­
positions underlying Scheffer are seriously flawed and, in particular, 
do not form plausible constitutional limits upon an exception-based 
view of the right to present witnesses.121 
a. Uncertainty as Justification. The claim that uncertainty is suf­
ficient to support the application of a categorical, per se rule is pro­
foundly at odds with the "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard 
set forth earlier by the Court and reiterated by the Scheffer major­
ity.122 In Rock, the Court struck down the application of the Ar­
kansas per se ban on hypnotically-enhanced testimony, 
notwithstanding the Court's own explicit acknowledgment that the 
reliability of that testimony was uncertain.123 In Chambers, too, 
there was divergence amongst the states over the appropriate treat­
ment of statements against penal interest.124 
Apart from precedent, the question of whether uncertainty 
should justify application of general evidence rules to restrict de­
fense testimony ultimately is a debate over the underlying standard 
of constitutional review. If the "arbitrary or disproportionate" 
standard really does amount to some form of heightened constitu­
tional scrutiny, then Rock surely is correct that uncertainty alone 
should not be sufficient to support a per se rule of inadmissibility. 
If, however, the standard actually is something more closely ap­
proximating ordinary rationality review, then uncertainty would be 
a sufficient justification. One conceivable reading of Scheffer, then, 
would see the case as an effort by the Court to water down, sub 
silentio, the underlying standard of constitutional review. The prob­
lem is that Scheffer, so understood, does its watering indiscrimi-
120. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also 118 S. Ct. at 1272 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("The Court's opinion barely acknowledges that a person accused of a crime has a 
constitutional right to present a defense."). 
121. The Scheffer Court alluded to the correct constitutional principle virtually by acci­
dent, mentioning in a fleeting footnote that the rule struck down in Washington v. Texas 
"burdened only the defense and not the prosecution." 118 S. Ct. at 1268 n.12. 
122. See 118 S. Ct. at 1264. 
123. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text; see also lMwJNKELRIED & GARLAND, 
supra note 14, § 2-4, at 51 (noting that the reliability of hypnotically-enhanced testimony like 
that in Rock "was and still is highly debatable"); cf. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra 
note 13, at 203 (reading the pre-Rock case law as establishing that "the defendant has a 
constitutional right to produce any witness whose ability to give reliable evidence is some­
thing about which reasonable people can differ" (emphasis omitted)); id. at 207 (stating simi­
lar standard). 
124. See supra note 68 and accompanying text 
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nately, shedding doubt upon the rigor of constitutional review even 
for rules that are not evenhanded. 
For its part, the Scheffer Court itself did not say explicitly that it 
was seeking to make any change in the underlying standard of re­
view. The Court, instead, sought to limit its earlier cases by way of 
distinction. But, as I now explain, neither of the Court's distinc­
tions are plausible as a matter of precedent or sound constitutional 
principle. 
b. The Defendant as Witness. In an effort to distinguish Rock, 
the Scheffer Court suggested that the right to present witnesses car­
ries greater constitutional weight when the proffered witness con­
sists of the defendant herself, as distinct from a third-party witness. 
This proposition is decidedly out of step with the Court's previous 
opinions in the area, which strongly suggest that there is no distinc­
tion, from a constitutional standpoint, between situations in which 
exculpatory evidence comes from the defendant's own recollection 
or from the memory of a third party. 
As a textual matter, "the compulsory process clause draws no 
distinction between the defendant and other 'witnesses in his 
favor.' "125 Moreover, as a doctrinal matter, there is no basis to 
draw such a distinction when the Court already has deemed the 
right to present third-party witnesses to be among the "fundamen­
tal" aspects of a criminal trial.126 In the Court's current constitu­
tional lexicon, there is no category of "super-fundamental" rights. 
In Rock, the Court did note that it was faced with a situation in 
which the defendant herself wished to testify; and, in a footnote, the 
Rock Court eschewed any desire to speak specifically to "the ad­
missibility of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other 
than criminal defendants."127 Rhetoric aside, however, the logic of 
Rock is not so confined. To the contrary, the Rock Court intermin­
gled its discussion of the defendant's right to testify with an exposi­
tion of the general right to present witnesses;12s and commentators 
125. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 119. 
126. By declaring, in Chambers, that "[fjew rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense," the Court clearly spoke of third-party wit­
nesses. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 
U.S. 400, 408 (1988) (pre-Scheffer case, reiterating the "fundamental" nature of the right to 
present witnesses and adding that it is "an essential attribute of the adversary system itself'' 
in the course of holding that trial courts nonetheless may sanction defendants for violations 
of discovery rules concerning the pretrial disclosure of witnesses). 
127. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58 n.15 (1987). 
128. See 483 U.S. at 51-52. Moreover, to acknowledge, as Rock does, that the right of the 
defendant herself to testify finds additional support as "a necessary corollary to the Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony" is not to draw any distinction as to 
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prior to Scheffer properly had understood the reasoning in Rock to 
extend to witnesses other than the defendant herself.129 
Precedent aside, the pre-Scheffer case law is right as a matter of 
first principles in its refusal to distinguish between the defendant's 
own testimony and that of a third-party witness. H the right to pre­
sent witnesses really does consist of an entitlement to exceptions 
from generally applicable evidence rules as necessary to bring to 
the jury's attention exculpatory testimony, then it makes no sense 
to draw such a distinction. Whether exculpatory testimony comes 
from the defendant herself or from a third party is likely to depend 
upon little more than pure chance: for example, whether a third 
party happened to be at the scene of the crime at the relevant time. 
Indeed, a distinction between testimony by defendants and testi­
mony by third parties would tend, as a practical matter, to make the 
right to present witnesses depend upon the particular criminal ele­
ment in dispute in a given case. The major issue in Rock turned 
upon causation: whether the defendant's actions had caused the 
gun to discharge.13o A defendant will be in a position to testify in a 
case focused upon causation (if she can remember what happened), 
and the same is likely to be true in a case that centers upon the 
defendant's mental state at the time of the criminal act. By con­
trast, a defendant may not be in a position to provide the crucial 
testimony when her defense centers upon misidentification. Here, 
the whole point of the defense is that the defendant did not commit 
the crime. In such a scenario, the viability of a misidentification 
defense is likely to turn not simply upon the defendant's own disa­
vowal of the crime but, more crucially, upon the testimony of some 
third person: someone thought by the defense to be the actual per­
petrator or, one step removed, someone who heard inculpatory re­
marks made by such a person, as in Chambers. Whatever one's 
conception of the right to present witnesses, its content surely 
should not turn upon fortuities or upon the particular criminal ele­
ments in dispute in a given case. 
One might well expect the jury, as a general matter, to discount 
more readily the testimony of a defendant on grounds of self­
interest than the jury might discount the account of a third party 
constitutional weight. See 483 U.S. at 52. Support in two places in the text, rather than just 
one, does not somehow double the protection to which the Constitution entitles the 
defendant. 
129. See IMwINKELRIEo & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 6-4, at 163 {"Although the Rock 
opinion does not explicitly resolve the issue, most commentators have concluded that Rock 
will ultimately be extended to defense witnesses other than the accused."). 
130. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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with no stake in the case. That observation, however, would be an 
odd justification for placing greater constitutional weight upon the 
right of the defendant herself to testify. If anything, the greater 
willingness of the jury to find credible the testimony given by a dis­
interested third party - in particular, the prospect that such testi­
mony may be more likely to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of 
the jury - should, if anything, make it more compelling for the 
defense to admit the testimony of such a person under an 
exception-based view, as compared to the potentially self-serving 
testimony of the defendant. But that is not the law, at least after 
Scheffer.131 
c. Firsthand Knowledge. The third proposition relied upon by 
the Scheffer Court fares no better. By definition, a polygraph ex­
amination that indicates a lack of deception serves merely to sug­
gest that the testimony of the test subject at trial is worthy of belief. 
In this sense, the Court is literally correct to say that expert testi­
mony concerning a polygraph examination.does not itself add to the 
''firsthand knowledge" conveyed to the jury about the disputed 
events in the case but, instead, serves simply to "bolster" the credi­
bility of what the test subject already has recounted directly in 
court.132 
This observation, however, is an implausible reed upon which to 
rest the application of a "fundamental" constitutional right. The 
Court's distinction draws far too fine a line between "firsthand 
knowledge" that merely makes more believable what a previous 
witness has said and information gleaned in other ways that may 
have even greater force, precisely because it makes more coherent 
131. One of the ironies of Scheffer is that the excluded defense expert witness was not 
merely a disinterested third party but actually an agent of the prosecuting government itself. 
Cf. United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1278 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is 
incongruous for the party that selected the examiner, the equipment, the testing procedures, 
and the questions asked of the defendant to complain about the examinee's burden of prov· 
ing that the test was properly conducted."). 
132. See 118 S. Ct. at 1268-69 (emphasis added). The strategic value of polygraph evi­
dence for the defense in a criminal case consists of its implications for the veracity of a test 
subject who serves as a witness, not in the ability of the examiner simply to testify - wholly 
apart from the polygraph - that the subject made a prior statement concerning the facts of 
the case. Thus, in Scheffer, the whole point of admitting the polygraph evidence was to sup­
port Scheffer's veracity, not to convey simply that Scheffer had made some prior statement to 
the government denying that he had used drugs. The terms of Military Rule 707 would seem 
to leave a defendant like Scheffer entirely free to testify himself about his making of such a 
prior statement in an effort to persuade the jury that he has been telling the same story all 
along. The defendant simply could not add that the statement was made in the course of a 
polygraph examination or that the examination indicated a lack of deception in the 
statement. 
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and credible what the jury already has heard.133 If anything, 
Chambers is precisely such a case. There, the disputed witnesses 
had no "firsthand knowledge" in the sense of personal observations 
made at the scene of the shooting in dispute. Insofar as they had 
any knowledge at all that bore upon disputed matters, it consisted 
of knowledge in a form that the law of evidence, at least presump­
tively, disfavors: namely, hearsay - albeit, hearsay purporting to 
consist of confessions by another man to the shooting.134 Indeed, as 
emphasized earlier, the trial court in Chambers already had permit­
ted the jury to hear other testimony - including from the pur­
ported shooter himself - that raised, with some plausibility, the 
prospect of misidentification.135 Chambers, in short, is a case of 
witnesses with only secondhand knowledge, offered simply to bol­
ster the credibility of other misidentification evidence admitted at 
trial. The Chambers Court nonetheless deemed the admission of 
those witnesses to be constitutionally required. It thus comes as no 
surprise that modem commentators plausibly have read Chambers 
as recognizing a constitutional right to present additional exculpa­
tory witnesses, "even when other witnesses have testified to the 
same facts, if the jury could reasonably conclude that [the addi­
tional witnesses'] testimony is more credible, or that the mere ac­
cumulation of testimony adds to its weight."136 
The Scheffer Court offered no principled answer to Chambers, 
stating merely that it had sought to "confine[ ] its [earlier] holding 
to the 'facts and circumstances' presented" and asserting flatly that 
Chambers "does not stand for the proposition that the accused is 
denied a fair opportunity to defend himself whenever a state or fed-
133. Writing outside the context of constitutional rights just one Term prior to Scheffer, 
the Supreme Court underscored the importance of permitting the prosecution to admit evi­
dence of a criminal defendant's prior bad acts - within the parameters of Rule 404 - as a 
way to enhance the narrative coherence of other evidence already introduced to prove the 
specific criminal conduct alleged of the defendant in the case at hand. See Old Chief v. 
United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 653 (1997) ("Evidence . . .  has force beyond any linear scheme 
of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum, with power not 
only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the [further] infer­
ences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict."). For a more extensive 
exposition of my views on Old Chief and its relationship to the cognitive psychological litera­
ture on jury decisionmaking, see Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminal­
ization of Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1121, 1168-71 (1998). 
134. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
136. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 225-26 (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted); see also Clinton, supra note 13, at 791-92 (observing that Chambers "clearly did 
break new constitutional ground" as "the first case in which the right to defend has been 
applied to arguably cumulative, albeit critical, defense testimony"); IMwINKELRIED & 
GARLAND, supra note 14, § 2-4, at 45 ("In Chambers, the hearsay evidence was technically 
cumulative." (footnote omitted)). 
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era! rule excludes favorable evidence."137 These are exceedingly 
weak grounds of distinction. Again, if the point of the Constitution 
really is to entitle defendants to exceptions from generally applica­
ble rules in order to admit exculpatory evidence - at least when 
that evidence appears "vital"138 or "critical"139 to the case at hand 
- then the expression of a constitutional preference for firsthand 
knowledge, or for testimony that will do something more than just 
bolster other evidence, is itself arbitrary. 
What could possibly be going on here? At the most superficial 
level, one might seek to attribute the Court's troublesome reason­
ing in Scheffer to nothing more than the changes in Court personnel 
in the decade since Rock.140 Simple judicial head-counting does not 
form a satisfying explanation, however, when one considers that the 
eight-member majority in Scheffer bridged the usual fissures of judi­
cial philosophy and interpretive methodology amongst the Justices. 
Nor can one casually dismiss Scheffer as an inartful application of 
the "arbitrary or disproportionate" standard, brought on by some 
anomalous visceral reaction against polygraphs specifically. 
Rather, there is language in Scheffer that is strikingly not new but 
that brings to the fore the hedges and caveats lurking in earlier de­
cisions, like Chambers itself. As I next discuss, it is this feature of 
Scheffer, more than its specific holding, that makes the case a pro­
vocative harbinger for the future. 
2. Exceptions and Floodgates 
In contrast to Scheffer's forebears, the Court's description of the 
right to present witnesses in Scheffer starts not with the venerable 
constitutional roots of that right but, instead, with its limits and 
qualifications. The Court states cryptically that the right "is not un­
limited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions."141 This lan­
guage is in keeping with the Court's prior statements, in otherwise 
expansive opinions, to the effect that "[t]he accused does not have 
an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privi-
137. 118 S. Ct. at 1268 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 303 (1973)). 
138. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967). 
139. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, SS (1987) (reiter­
ating that the witness testimony offered by Chambers was "critical to his defense"). 
140. Of the five Justices who voted to strike down the per se ban on hypnotically­
enhanced testimony in Rock, only one - Justice Stevens - remains on the current Court, 
and he was the lone dissenter in Scheffer. By contrast, three of the four dissenters in Rock -
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia - subsequently voted to uphold 
the per se rule in Scheffer. Compare Rock, 483 U.S. at 4S with Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1263. 
141. 118 S. Ct. at 1264. 
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leged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evi­
dence. "142 Insofar as one may discern from the Court's cases as a 
whole, however, the process of distinguishing permissible from im­
permissible applications of evidence rules is largely an ad hoc 
enterprise.143 
The Court's repeated expressions of hesitancy are not a feature 
unique to the cases on the right to present witnesses; rather, they 
relate to a pervasive problem for constitutional rights understood to 
consist of entitlements to exceptions from generally applicable 
rules. Michael Dorf describes this concern as "the floodgates prob­
lem":144 in essence, the struggle to define some principled limits 
upon the entitlement in order to avoid the need to compel wide­
spread exceptions that would tear apart the system of legal rules 
itself. This fear, I submit, not only is well-founded with respect to 
the right to present witness, but also provides the best explanation 
for the willingness of the Court in Scheffer to dust off the hedges 
and caveats from its earlier dicta in order to uphold a categorical 
rule of exclusion. 
The floodgates problem is not a farfetched, abstract, or remote 
concern in this context. Some constitutional slopes are considera­
bly more slippery than others. If anything, the leading academic 
treatments of the right to present witnesses revel in the bursting of 
floodgates. Without any apparent acknowledgment of this general 
phenomenon in constitutional decisionmaking, commentators in 
the area have argued vigorously for the Court to extend the right to 
its seemingly logical limits as an entitlement to exceptions from 
generally applicable evidence rules. Peter Westen, for instance, 
states that "the defendant has a constitutional right to produce any 
witnesses whose ability to give reliable evidence is something about 
142. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). Given that all of the Court's decisions on 
the right to present witnesses prior to Scheffer struck down the application of rules that pur­
ported to limit the admission of evidence, one might try to explain the quoted language from 
Taylor as an inadvertent overstatement. Taylor itself involved an issue tangentially related to 
the right to present witnesses. The Court there held that a trial judge may refuse to admit 
testimony as a sanction against defense counsel who "willful[ly]" fails to identify a witness, as 
part of the ordinary process of pre-trial preparation, for the purpose of "seeking a tactical 
advantage" vis-a-vis the prosecution. 484 U.S. at 417. The same rhetoric of limitation also 
appears, however, in cases that deal squarely with the right to present witnesses and that 
otherwise rule in favor of the defendant advancing the right. See supra notes 79-80 (discus­
sing similar language in Chambers); Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 n.11 ("Numerous state procedural 
and evidentiary rules control the presentation of evidence and do not offend the defendant's 
right to testify."). 
143. See generally IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 2-3, at 42 (observing that 
"[t]he 'fact-bound' character of [the Court's] as-applied holdings" in cases on the right to 
present witnesses tends to leave in doubt "the precedential value of th[ose] holdings"). 
144. See supra note 16. 
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which reasonable people can differ."145 The implication is that even 
nondiscriminatory rules generated through the ordinary process for 
evidence policymaking - a process that routinely involves the se­
lection of one from among many competing views of appropriate 
policy - would be constitutionally vulnerable. Defendants would 
merely need to identify some contrary viewpoint that a "reason­
able" person might hold - something that inevitably would be 
present with regard to controversial new forms of witness testi­
mony. In fact, the right to present witnesses, so conceived, would 
consist not merely of an entitlement to exceptions from the ordi­
nary system of evidence rules but, at bottom, an argument against 
the possibility of rules at all. 
Robert Clinton is only somewhat less sweeping in his contention 
that "the key to developing a coherent constitutional approach to 
the right to defend is the balancing of the constitutional values of 
fairness protected by the right to defend against the governmental 
interests expressed in the [pertinent] procedural or evidentiary rul­
ings."146 The Court, if anything, has taken this suggestion too much 
to heart in cases like Chambers, Rock, and Scheffer, striking bal­
ances on an ad hoc basis that cannot be reconciled by reference to 
any consistent constitutional principle. 
If one were to take seriously the Court's admonition against "ar­
bitrary" rules that operate to exclude testimony from defense wit­
nesses - as modern commentators do, to their credit - the right to 
present witnesses would cut a wide swath through the law of evi­
dence as we know it.147 Specifically, there are several longstanding, 
145. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 203 (emphasis omitted). 
146. Clinton, supra note 13, at 797 (emphasis in original). Clinton himself describes this 
as a " 'totality of the circumstances' approach." Id. at 800. Drawing upon this view, Edward 
Imwinkelried and Norman Garland describe the circumstances that may bear upon the con­
stitutional inquiry in a given case. See IMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, §§ 2-4 to 
2-6, at 43-65. The bulk of their treatise is a virtual celebration of the floodgates problem, 
pointing out how a balancing approach to the right to present witnesses would call into ques­
tion the gamut of familiar evidence rules. See generally id., chs. 4-14. If anything, in other 
writing, Imwinkelried goes even further than Clinton to suggest that the right to present 
witnesses should extend to civil parties. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Case for Recogniz· 
ing a New Constitutional Entitlement: The Right to Present Favorable Evidence in Civil Cases, 
1990 UTAH. L. RE.v. 1. Such a move would cut loose completely the right from its moorings 
in the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment for criminal trials specifically. Cf. infra section 
II.C.1.b (arguing that an exception-based view of the right cannot be justified by reference to 
general notions of due process independent from the specific guarantee of compulsory 
process). 
147. See IMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 1-2, at 8 (noting that the Court's 
decisions on the right have "the potential to revolutionize criminal evidence law"). I confine 
the ensuing discussion of the floodgates problem to generally applicable evidence rules. I am 
in accord with the position of Westen and Clinton, insofar as they posit that evidence rules 
that peculiarly disadvantage defendants should be subject to strict scrutiny. 
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bedrock rules of evidence that, in a given instance, might have the 
effect of preventing defense witnesses from testifying "on the basis 
of a priori categories. "148 
a. Ordinary Hearsay. One of the longest standing - though, 
admittedly, not necessarily the most coherent or logical - rules of 
evidence is the rule upon hearsay.149 The rule, of course, is rife with 
exceptions - both those that identify specific kinds of out-of-court 
statements thought sufficiently reliable to be admissible150 and, in 
its contemporary form, a residual exception designed to reach 
"rare[ ]" and "exceptional circumstances" where a particular state­
ment has "guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to or exceeding 
the guarantees reflected by the presently listed exceptions."151 But 
it remains true today, as it has for centuries, that ordinary hearsay 
- that is, hearsay not within any exception - is flatly inadmissible, 
at least as far as the rules of evidence are concemed.152 This is one 
of the most venerable "a priori categories" in all of evidence law. 
A constitutional right to present witnesses - if taken seriously 
as an entitlement to exceptions from generally applicable rules -
would shed doubt upon the categorical exclusion of ordinary hear­
say. In mandating the admission of the particular hearsay testi­
mony in Chambers, the Court repeatedly underscored that the 
circumstances surrounding the out-of-court statements in that case 
"provided considerable assurance of their reliability."153 Commen­
tators properly have questioned, however, whether there are any 
principled grounds upon which so to restrict the reach of Chambers. 
Clinton, for example, boldly states that "the admission of hearsay 
evidence with no extrinsic indicia of reliability might be constitu­
tionally compelled if the evidence is of critical importance to the 
accused."154 Westen qualifies this notion only modestly, conceding 
merely that the defense should have to show that the declarant is 
148. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967). For similar rhetoric, see Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1987). 
149. As a general matter, a witness may not testify to an out-of-court statement made by 
some other person, at least when the proponent of the witness is seeking thereby "to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted" in the statement itself. See FED. R. Evm. 801(c) (defining 
"hearsay"). 
150. See FED. R. Evm. 803 & 804(b ). 
151. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065 (com­
mentary on identically phrased predecessor provision to the current Rule 807). 
152. See FED. R. Evm. 802. On the lengthy history of the rule against hearsay, see 2 
WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1364, at 1680-95. 
153. 410 U.S. at 300; see also 410 U.S. at 302 ("The [hearsay) testimony rejected by the 
trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness . . . .  "). 
· 
154. Clinton, supra note 13, at 808-09 (emphasis added). 
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unavailable and that her out-of-court statement, at least, "is [not] so 
inherently unreliable that reasonable people . . .  could not ration­
ally rely on it."155 
Given the lineage of the rule against hearsay, one can under­
stand why the Court might deploy hedges and caveats of the sort in 
Chambers and later cases in an attempt to avoid casting itself upon 
such a path.156 The floodgates problem does not stop here, 
however. 
b. Extrinsic Evidence and Impeachment. All of the Supreme 
Court cases discussed in this Part concerned witnesses called in an 
effort to set forth affirmatively the defense account of the facts. 
The defense is not obligated to pursue such a strategy exclusively, 
however, but may instead - or in addition - attempt to use wit­
ness testimony to shed doubt upon the credibility of the crucial 
prosecution witnesses. There are, of course, many ways to attack 
the credibility of a witness, but one important way is to question the 
general character of the witness for truthfulness - in essence, to 
suggest that the witness is lying in her trial testimony, because she is 
the sort of person who lies generally.157 
For this kind of attack, there is a relatively well-established set 
of rules, designed to avoid turning the case at hand into a trial fo­
cused upon the unrelated prior behavior of a particular third-party 
witness.15s The attacking party may seek to call into doubt the wit­
ness's general character for truthfulness by presenting opinion or 
reputation testimony from other persons and may, in the discretion 
of the trial court, inquire on cross-examination into specific in­
stances of the witness's conduct short of a criminal convictiont59 -
155. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 304. 
156. See supra notes 79-80, 142 and accompanying text. Some commentators further sug­
gest that defendants might deploy similar reasoning to call into question the best evidence 
rule, which expresses a preference for original writings over other evidence attesting to the 
contents thereof in much the same way that the rule against hearsay expresses a preference 
for live testimony over out-of-court statements. See IMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 
14, § 13-3, at 413-15. 
157. See GREEN & NESSON, supra note 5, at 267-69 (distinguishing attacks upon the gen­
eral character of the witness for truthfulness from other, familiar kinds of attacks upon wit­
ness credibility). 
158. See 4 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 608.02[2], at 608-08 to 608-09 (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE] ("Real 
dangers of confusing the issues and protracting the trial may arise from side-excursions into 
the witness's past unrelated to the substantive issues being tried."); see also id. § 608.12[2], at 
608-27. 
159. See FED. R. Evro. 608(a) - (b). But cf. IMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, 
§ 8-5, at 212 & n.56 (noting that a few states do not permit even inquiry on cross-examination 
concerning prior untruthful acts of a witness, unless there was an actual criminal conviction). 
Apart from the rules of evidence, the Court has relied upon the Confrontation Clause to 
afford defense counsel broad flexibility with regard to the scope of cross-examination. See, 
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for example, a particular occasion on which the party believes that 
the witness lied. But the attacking party may not seek to prove the 
occurrence of those specific instances of conduct by putting on "ex­
trinsic evidence," such as the testimony of yet another witness who 
observed the conduct in question.160 
As the author of one leading treatise remarks: "Courts often 
summarize the no-extrinsic-evidence rule by stating that 'the exam­
iner must take his or her answer,' " in the sense that "the cross­
examiner may not call other witnesses to prove the misconduct af­
ter the witness's denial."161 From the defendant's standpoint, how­
ever, it may be quite important in a given instance to use extrinsic 
evidence in this prohibited manner - especially if the defense has 
strong reason to believe that a crucial prosecution witness has lied 
by denying outright, on cross-examination, that the disputed in­
stance of conduct ever occurred. The defense nonetheless is, and 
has long been, stuck with the witness's answer, just as the prosecu­
tor would be in any effort to impeach a witness for the defense. 
Indeed, the bar upon extrinsic evidence also would apply where 
the prosecution has attacked the general character of a defense wit­
ness for truthfulness, through cross-examination about a specific in­
stance of conduct. To rehabilitate its witness, the de(ense would be 
restricted to opinion or reputation testimony and, once again, could 
not put on extrinsic evidence - for example, another witness with 
knowledge that the disputed instance of conduct did not actually 
occur.162 The law of evidence thus limits witness rehabilitation in 
the same manner as witness impeachment. 
This is not to say that the prohibition upon extrinsic evidence as 
a technique of impeachment is a trap only for unwary defendants; 
again, it applies with equal force to the prosecution. A constitu-
e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (holding that defendant's right of confronta­
tion overrides state's interest in maintaining confidentiality of prosecution witness's status as 
juvenile offender on parole, where defense sought on cross-examination to suggest possible 
bias of witness to testify favorably for the prosecution due to fear of parole revocation). 
160. See FED. R EVID. 608(b). Although Rule 608 was an innovation insofar as it per­
mits the use of opinion testimony as a vehicle of attack in addition to reputation testimony, 
see 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 158, § 608.11[1], at 608-19, the flat bar upon extrin­
sic evidence of specific instances of conduct - the pertinent limitation here - has a lengthy 
pedigree at common law. See infra note 198; cf. 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 158, 
§ 608.12[3][a], at 608-28 ("Evidence is extrinsic if offered through other documents or wit­
nesses rather than through cross-examination of the witness himself or herself." (emphasis in 
original; footnote omitted)). 
161. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 158, § 608.12[3][b], at 608-28 to 608-29 (foot­
notes omitted). 
162. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (applying same limitation upon use of extrinsic evidence 
"for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility" (emphasis added)). 
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tional right on the part of defendants to present witnesses - if con­
ceived as an entitlement to exceptions from generally applicable 
rules - nonetheless would shed considerable doubt upon this fa­
miliar limitation.163 
Indeed, at least one commentator takes the point a substantial 
step further, by calling into doubt a related rule that does not ex­
clude any witnesses by its terms but that nonetheless might have the 
effect, at the margin, of discouraging the defense from calling a wit­
ness. It has long been the case that a party may impeach a witness 
with extrinsic evidence, if in the form of a prior criminal convic­
tion;164 and the prospect of such impeachment is a strategic consid­
eration long familiar to defense counsel in the determination of 
whether to put a given witness - the defendant herself, perhaps -
on the stand. Westen argues that courts should bar the prosecution 
from impeaching a defense witness in this manner, if the witness's 
prior conviction does not relate "significant[ly]" to her anticipated 
testimony and otherwise would discourage the defense from calling 
that witness.165 This �tep would take the right to present witnesses 
from an entitlement in favor of the defense to a limitation upon the 
prosecution's presentation of its own case. 
c. Rules of Privilege. Both Westen and Clinton further contend 
that an exception-based view, applied seriously, should lead the 
Court to question the application of general rules of privilege that 
otherwise would prevent a criminal defendant from obtaining the 
testimony of a third-party witness.166 Westen puts the point most 
emphatically when he states that " [n]o interest protected by a privi­
lege is sufficiently important to outweigh the defendant's right to 
establish his innocence through the presentation of clearly exculpa-
163. See Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 224 (observing that a right to 
present all witnesses that the jury might find exculpatory would call into doubt limitations 
upon evidence "to impeach a witness for the prosecution" (footnote omitted)). 
164. See FED. R. Evm. 609. This rule treats differently extrinsic evidence in the form of 
an actual conviction, for the attacking party easily may prove the occurrence of the specific 
instance of conduct with little sidetracking of the trial. See 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra 
note 158, § 608.12[2], at 608-27. 
165. See Westen, Compulsory Process [, supra note 13, at 149 (contending that the Com­
pulsory Process Clause "would not permit a defense witness to be impeached with evidence 
of prior crimes unless the state could demonstrate a significant link between the prior crimi­
nal conduct of a witness and his propensity to falsify testimony in an unrelated trial"). 
166. The Fifth Amendment, by its terms, provides a privilege against self-incrimination. 
See U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. Exercising common law authority with regard to matters of privi­
lege in the federal courts, the Supreme Court has recognized a wide variety of additional, 
non-constitutional privileges. For an overview thereof, see MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra 
note 77, §§ 5.8-5.37, at 357-496. 
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tory evidence."167 Under an "arbitrary or disproportionate" stan­
dard - understood as something akin to strict scrutiny in the 
manner of the pre-Scheffer case law - these "a priori categories" 
too would be open to doubt. Yet matters of privilege are one cor­
ner of evidence law that the Court has sought specifically and re­
peatedly to leave undisturbed by the right to present witnesses, 
even as the Court has ruled in favor of particular defendants assert­
ing that right.16s 
One of the most difficult areas in this regard centers upon the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In the crimi­
nal context - particularly when multiple persons may have been 
involved in the underlying criminal activity - it is not uncommon 
for a witness desired by the defense to refuse to testify based upon 
the Fifth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court has not spo­
ken directly to the question, "[t]he clear majority view [of the lower 
courts] is that the accused's constitutional right [to present wit­
nesses] cannot override a witness' Fifth Amendment privilege 
. . . .  "169 In the face of this prevailing view, both Westen and Clin­
ton argue that the prosecution may be constitutionally obligated to 
grant immunity to such a witness in order to enable the defense to 
167. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 161. But see lMwINKELRIED & 
GARLAND, supra note 14, § 10-5, at 301 (contending that Westen "is dogmatic to assume that 
the accused's interest must always prevail" in the face of a claim of privilege, and counseling 
instead in favor of case-by-case balancing). 
168. See, e.g., supra note 61 (discussing caveat on privilege in Washington); Rock v. Ar­
kansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 n.11 (1987) (repeating caveat from Washington). Various commenta­
tors have sought to develop frameworks to identify, either categorically or on a case-by-case 
basis, the situations in which the right to present witnesses should override witness claims of 
privilege. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Tria� 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1173, 
1190, 1196 (1980) (distinguishing between privileges held by private persons and those held 
by the government); Welsh S. White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitu­
tional Right to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CruM!NOLOGY 377, 397 (1989) (setting 
forth "three guiding principles" focused upon whether the privilege in question is "designed 
to assist the government in performing one of its essential functions," whether the privilege 
applies evenhandedly against the government as well as defendants, and whether the privi­
lege is asserted as an obstacle to cross-examination of the witness or to compulsion of the 
witness to testify at all); Robert Weisberg, Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confronta­
tion and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN. 
L. REv. 935, 991 (1978) (calling for "in camera hearing[s] in which the court may make a 
carefully structured sequence of inquiries into the relative weights of the witness and defense 
interests"). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's caveats, a handful of lower courts have 
suggested that a witness's assertion of at least some privileges must give way in the face of a 
demand from a criminal defendant to present testimony from the witness. See White, supra, 
at 382 n.31 (discussing cases). 
169. See lMwINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 11-4, at 345. The few contrary 
cases generally have involved misconduct by the prosecution, use by the prosecution of im­
munized testimony, or use of a prior statement by the particular witness whom the prosecu­
tion has refused to immunize for the benefit of the defense. See id. § 11-4, at 354-67. 
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obtain her testimony.170 Although it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to explore the subject of witness immunity in depth,171 there 
are some telling points that one may make with regard to the flood­
gates problem and the appropriate content of the right to present 
witnesses. 
The lower courts have not been kind to Westen and Clinton's 
view with regard to witness immunity. In fact, the leading treatise 
on exculpatory evidence observes that "there is unanimity among 
the courts that the accused is not even entitled to a 'missing witness' 
instruction when the prosecution fails to exercise its immunity 
power to make a witness's testimony available."172 Westen and 
Clinton nonetheless are on to something important when they high­
light the lack of parity in the ability of the prosecution and the de­
fense, under current law, to obtain testimony from a witness who 
resists based upon the privilege against self-incrimination. The 
prosecution has every incentive to exercise its immunity-granting 
power in order systematically to advantage itself in criminal trials. 
In light of this concern and notwithstanding notions of judicial def­
erence for prosecutorial discretion,173 Akhil Amar recently has sug­
gested that this lack of parity is quite troublesome given the core 
guarantee provided by the Compulsory Process Clause: namely, a 
right on the part of the defense to avail itself of the same compul­
sion techniques as are available to the prosecution for the "ob­
taining of witnesses."174 Even an equality-based conception of the 
Compulsory Process Clause thus, at the very least, would regard 
170. See Westen, Compulsory Process [, supra note 13, at 167 ("The government's pecu­
liar control over potentially exculpatory witnesses imposes a constitutional obligation on it to 
immunize them to obtain evidence in the defendant's favor."); see also Clinton, supra note 
13, at 825-26 ("Since a grant of immunity provides an alternative which impedes the right to 
defend less drastically than an unqualified recognition of the witness' right to claim privilege 
at the expense of the accused, the grant of immunity would seem constitutionally compelled 
under the balancing test suggested herein." (footnote omitted)). 
171. See IMwJNKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 14, § 11-4, at 342 & n.110 (citing exam­
ples of the "large volume of scholarly commentary" on witness immunity). 
172. Id. § 11-4, at 345. 
173. A prosecutor's decision on whether to grant immunity to a given witness is an aspect 
of the ultimate decision on whether to prosecute that individual. Even "use immunity" -
the assurance simply that the immunized testimony will not be used against the witness, not 
that the witness will be free entirely from any possibility of criminal charges - can cripple a 
subsequent criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 942 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (overturning the conviction of Oliver North in connection with the Iran-Contra 
scandal on the ground that the prosecution was unable to show that the testimony it offered 
at trial was not "shaped, directly or indirectly, by [North's earlier] compelled testimony [to a 
congressional committee], regardless of how or by whom [a given witness] was exposed to 
that compelled testimony" (emphasis omitted)). 
174. See AMAR, supra note 15, at 134-36; see also supra section I.A (discussing the core 
meaning of the Clause). 
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with skepticism the Court's studied reluctance to grapple seriously 
with witnesses foreclosed to the defense due to assertions of the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
The proposition that defendants generally should get the same 
tools of witness compulsion as prosecutors nonetheless is a far cry 
from the kind of free-standing entitlement that Westen and Clinton 
seek to derive from the Court's precedents. It would be one thing 
for the Court to embark upon the difficult job of articulating a set 
of constitutional principles to ensure a level playing field with re­
gard to witness immunity.175 It would be quite another thing - and 
a far more sweeping change in the law - to abandon entirely 
norms of prosecutorial discretion by mandating the exercise thereof 
to immunize witnesses whenever a defendant might consider their 
testimony helpful, even when the prosecution would regard immu­
nity in any form as too high a price to bear to obtain helpful testi­
mony for itself. 
I underscore the foregoing examples - the rule against hearsay, 
rules on witness impeachment, and rules of privilege - not to say 
that the upsetting of existing law is necessarily a reason, in itself, to 
interpret the Constitution so as to avoid that result. There are quite 
famous instances in which the Court has uprooted longstanding 
practices based upon a constitutional imperative.176 Even the view 
advanced here of the right to present witnesses as a right of equal 
treatment would necessitate a rethinking of existing case law.177 
But the observation that the Court's current "arbitrary or dispro­
portionate" standard, if applied in a principled manner, would call 
for a radical reorientation of preexisting evidence law - including 
rules that the Court itself has transmitted to Congress in the 
rulemaking process178 - certainly should stand as both a substan­
tial reason for caution and a powerful impetus for the seeking of 
some alternative approach that would not carry such sweeping con­
sequences. When viewed in this light, the Court's effort to engage 
in a constitutional high-wire act - seeking to give genuine content 
175. This enterprise might well lead to an increase in the formalization of criteria used by 
prosecutors with respect to the granting of immunity, if only to provide a baseline against 
which to evaluate refusals to exercise that power for the benefit of defendants. 
176. See, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for the leading 
illustration in the area of individual rights. 
177. Apart from the specific question of witness immunity to which I alluded earlier, see 
infra section III.A (revisiting the Court's case law under an equality-based view of the right 
to present witnesses). 
178. Virtually all of the current Federal Rules of Evidence are the product of a rulemak­
ing process that passes through the Court itself. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, 
at 4. 
1108 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1063 
to the right to present witnesses while, at the same time, trying to 
avoid the floodgates problem - is not surprising. What is disap­
pointing is the Court's unwillingness to deal directly with the fea­
tures of its own jurisprudence that have positioned it on a high-wire 
in the first place. 
It is possible to imagine a system of evidence law that would 
recognize a pervasive exception for the presentation of witnesses by 
the defense in criminal trials. Such a move would mark a funda­
mental shift from the current law of evidence. In the parlance of 
jurisprudence, the current law of evidence consists of a mixture of 
"rules" and "standards."179 Some features of current law are 
"rules" in that they dictate the exclusion of particular types of evi­
dence - hearsay, extrinsic evidence for the purpose of witness im­
peachment, and so forth - on a categorical basis. Once one is 
within the category described, the evidence is excluded. Other fea­
tures of current law are "standards" in that they merely inform, but 
do not dictate, the trial court's determination of admissibility in a 
given instance. Rule 403 - counseling the balancing of probative 
value against prejudicial effect - is the classic example of such a 
"standard."180 If taken seriously, an exception-based view of the 
right to present witnesses would mandate a shift from the current 
mixture of "rules" and "standards" to a system composed entirely 
of "standards" but no "rules" - at least with regard to witness tes­
timony offered by the defense in a criminal trial. Although such a 
system has never existed in this country or anywhere else insofar as 
I can discern, Congress and the makers of evidence policy at the 
state level are free to construct one. Contrary to the suggestion of 
all modern commentators, however, such a system is not mandated 
by the Constitution. Rather, as I show in the next Part, the right to 
present witnesses consists of the simple but profoundly powerful 
mandate that the government must do unto itself what it would do 
unto defendants, absent a compelling justification othenvise. 
II. FROM EXCEPTION TO EQUALITY 
In setting out the affirmative case for a conception of the right 
to present witnesses as a right of equal treatment, this Part draws 
179. On the distinction between "rules" and "standards" in the context of the Supreme 
Court's constitutional jurisprudence, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 
Tenn - Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 57-59 (1992). 
For a more detailed exposition of the distinction - cast as between "mandatory rules" and 
"rules of thumb" - see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 5-6 (1991). 
180. See FED. R. Evm. 403. 
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upon several modes of constitutional argumentation. Although 
there remains considerable debate over the binding force of history, 
in itself, as a basis for constitutional interpretation, it is common 
ground that history is at least relevant to the inquiry, if not determi­
native.181 As Laurence Tribe aptly observes: 
The cases are legion in which constitutional text is not completely free 
of ambiguity. Yet it is often the case that, although there may be 
more than one linguistically possible interpretation of a constitutional 
provision, one of those possible interpretations may be the most plau­
sible by a wide margin in light of structural considerations viewed 
against the backdrop of the history of the provision's adoption.182 
That is especially so here, given that - unlike many areas that to­
day are the subject of constitutional debate - the basic setting of 
the criminal trial was something quite familiar to those who drafted 
and ratified the Bill of �ghts. In fact, the Sixth Amendment as a 
whole stands as strong evidence that the Founding generation had 
many specific thoughts on the subject. Unlike previous treatments 
of the historical context of the Compulsory Process Clause, I focus 
not simply upon the forerunners of that provision but, more tell­
ingly, upon the contemporaneous law of evidence into which the 
Constitution cast that Clause. The only way to account for the 
then-widespread disqualification of all interested persons as wit­
nesses - let alone the complete absence of any contemporaneous 
recognition that the Bill of Rights would alter that practice - is to 
understand the right to present witness in equality-based terms. 
As part of my overall enterprise to question the compartmental­
ization of the Constitution by the legal academy, I go on to discuss 
several structural considerations that lend further support to an 
equality-based conception of the right. Specifically, I look not only 
to the right of confrontation recognized by the constitutional text 
most closely proximate to the Compulsory Process Clause, but also 
to two other matters not discussed by commentators in the area to 
date: namely, principles concerning the appropriate structure of 
rulemaking institutions and recent debate over exception- and 
equality-based views of other constitutional rights. Finally, I argue 
that, completely apart from doctrine, criminal defendants as a 
181. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 1409, 1415 (1990) ("[T]here is no need to presup­
pose agreement about an 'originalist' (or any other) theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Even opponents of originalism generally agree that the historical understanding [of the Con­
stitution] is relevant, if not dispositive. "). 
182. Laurence H. 'llibe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Fonn 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1221, 1278-79 (1995) (emphasis in 
original). 
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whole may well be better off in practical terms under an equality­
based view - especially so, the more skeptical one is about the 
willingness of evidence policymakers to weigh seriously the inter­
ests of criminal defendants. 
A. Historical Context 
Previous commentators on the right to present witnesses cer­
tainly have not ignored the historical antecedents of the Compul­
sory Process Clause, 183 though they generally regard them as not 
pointing absolutely in favor of an exception- or an equality-based 
view. One feature of the historical record is common ground, how­
ever: There was essentially no discussion of the Clause or its impli­
cations for then-existing law at the time of the Bill of Rights. 
Previous commentators have missed the significance of this datum 
in the historical record, largely because they overlook the context in 
which it occurred. The silence of observers at the time is a crucial 
piece of the puzzle, but only when one first recognizes the features 
of the contemporaneous law of evidence.184 
1. Textual Forerunners 
Prior to the Bill of Rights, only New Jersey referred explicitly in 
its constitution to notions of equality between prosecutors and de­
fendants with regard to witnesses.185 Most of the contemporary 
state constitutions that spoke to the subject, instead, conferred 
upon criminal defendants a right to "produce," "call for," or "ex­
amine" favorable "proofs" or "evidence," without explicit reference 
to principles of equality vis-a-vis the prosecution or, for that matter, 
183. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 728-39; Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, 
at 90-108. 
184. This would not be the first time that silence served as a crucial piece of evidence in 
the reconstruction of past events. The key datum that enables Sherlock Holmes to Unlock 
the mystery at the heart of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Silver Blaze consists of the silence of an 
otherwise fierce dog stationed in a stable. Holmes infers from the dog's silence that the 
unknown person who made his way into the barn on the night in question must have been 
someone very familiar to the animal, such that it did not respond by barking. See ARTHUR 
CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE CLASSIC MYSTERIES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 332, 336 
(Longmeadow Press 1992) (1892). The absence of any contemporaneous recognition that the 
Bill of Rights would dramatically reorient then-existing evidence law is, in the present con­
text, the equivalent of the dog that did not bark. 
185. See N.J. CONST. of 1776 art. XVI, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF Rrmrrs 408 
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter Cogan] ("[A]ll criminals shall be admitted to the same 
Privileges of Witnesses and Council, as their Prosecutors are or shall be entitled to." (empha­
sis added)); cf. N.Y. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1787 para. 6, reprinted in Cogan, supra, at 410 ("Writs 
and Process shall be granted freely and without Delay, to all Persons requiring the same."). 
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to any concept of "compulsory process" per se.186 In keeping with 
this language in their own constitutions, various state ratifying con­
ventions called for the addition to the original federal Constitution 
of a bill of rights to recognize, among other things, a right of crimi­
nal defendants to "produc[e]" or to "call for" "evidence" in their 
favor.187 Indeed, if read without regard to their historical con­
text,188 these forerunners of the Compulsory Process Clause might 
tend to suggest precisely the kind of free-standing right to present 
witnesses - that is, a right beyond parity or equality with the pros­
ecution - recognized by the Supreme Court today. 
186. See MAss. CONST. of 1780 pt. I, art. XVII, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 404 
("[E]very subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be favourable to 
him . • • .  "); N.H. CONST. of 1783 pt. I, art. XV, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 405 
("[E]very subject shall have a right to produce all proofs that may be favourable to him­
self."); PA. CoNST. of 1776 ch. I, art. IX, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 411 (right "to 
call for evidence in his favour"); VT. CoNsT. of 1777 ch. I, art. 10, reprinted in Cogan, supra 
note 185 at 413 (right "to call for Evidence in his Favor"); DEL. DECL. OF RIGHTS of 1776 
§ 14, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 402 (right "to examine evidence on oath in his 
favour"); VA. DEcL. OF RIGHTS of 1776 art VIII, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 413 
(right "to call for evidence in his favour"). It is unclear from the face of the state constitu­
tions whether the references to "proofs" carried with them generally applicable limitations 
upon the process of proof or, similarly, whether the references to "evidence" carried with 
them generally applicable limitations upon the types of evidence considered admissible at 
trial. But cf. infra section 11.A.2 (arguing that the state constitutional provisions remained 
subject to generally applicable limitations of evidence law, given the nature and extent of 
such limitations in contemporaneous common law). 
At least one state - Maryland - explicitly treated the process for the production of 
witnesses in a manner distinct from their examination at trial, conferring separate rights with 
respect to each. Mn. DECL. OF RIGHTS of 1776 art. 19, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 
403 (right "to have process for his witnesses [and] to examine the witnesses for and against 
him on oath"). Another state - North Carolina - provided simply that the accused shall 
have the right "to confront the Accusers and Witnesses with other Testimony." N.C. DECL. 
OF RIGHTS OF 1776 art. VII, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 410-11. No pertinent 
references appear in the constitutions of Georgia, Rhode Island, or South Carolina. 
187. The New York proposal stated specifically that "in all Criminal Prosecutions, the 
Accused ought . . .  to have the means of producing his Witnesses." N.Y. Proposal, July 26, 
1788, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 401. Other states proposed the addition of a 
right to "call for" favorable "evidence." See N.C. Proposal, Aug. 1, 1788, reprinted in Cogan, 
supra note 185, at 401 (right "to call for evidence"); Pa. Minority Proposal, Dec. 12, 1787, 
reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 402 (right "to call for evidence in his favor"); R.I. 
Proposal, May 29, 1790, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 402 (right "to call for evidence 
. . .  in his favour"); Va. Proposal, June 27, 1788, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 402 
(right "to call for evidence . . .  in his favor"); cf. Statement of Gov. Randolph at Va. Ratifying 
Convention, June 15, 1788, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 435 ("Calling of evidence in 
[the prisoner's] favor is coincident to his trial."); The Impartial Examiner, No. 1, VA. INDEP. 
ClmoN., Feb. 27 & Mar. 5, 1788, reprinted in Cogan, supra note 185, at 468 (criticizing the 
absence of a provision in the original federal Constitution that would prevent Congress from 
putting into force "a law that persons charged with capital crimes . . .  shall not . . .  call for 
evidence in their favor" (emphasis in original)). 
188. See infra section 11.A.2 (arguing that the pervasive disqualification of interested wit­
nesses at the time of these state constitutional provisions undercuts the inference that the 
quoted language recognized a free-standing right to present witnesses, as distinct from a right 
to equal treatment vis-a-vis the prosecution). 
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In drafting the Sixth Amendment, however, James Madison cu­
riously used none of these examples. In particular, he did not select 
language from the various states to refer explicitly to the calling of 
witnesses or the producing of evidence generally, opting instead for 
a right on the part of the accused simply "to have compulsory pro­
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor."189 If Madison's handi­
work and its forerunners were the extent of the historical record, 
then one would be hard pressed to come down distinctly in favor of 
either an exception- or an equality-based reading. There is more, 
however. 
Given the apparent uniqueness of Madison's wording in the 
Compulsory Process Clause, especially in light of the state constitu­
tions and proposals, one might have thought that there would have 
been considerable discussion of the Clause at the time. But, as pre­
vious commentators accurately observe, that was not so. In fact, 
during the consideration of the Bill of Rights in Congress and by 
the various states, there was essentially no discussion of the presen­
tation of witnesses.190 At the very least, if contemporary observers 
had understood the Bill of Rights to mandate sweeping change in 
the then-existing law of evidence, one would have expected them to 
say something. They did not. Writing of this puzzling silence, one 
commentator states that "[t]he sixth amendment was noncontrover­
sial (aside from the requirement that the jury be drawn from the 
district where the crime occurred) because its principles were al­
ready accepted at common law."191 But what was the contempora-
189. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 97 
(referring to "Madison's unique phrasing"). As Westen observes, Madison did not select 
wording to refer explicitly to notions of equality, notwithstanding the existence of New 
Jersey's formulation to that effect. See Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 256 
n.230; cf. supra note 185 (discussing New Jersey's formulation). It is a mistake, however, to 
draw from this observation the inference that "the framers of the compulsory process clause 
certainly knew how to formulate the clause on a principle of equality and, presumably, would 
have done so if they so desired." Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 256 n.230. 
That would prove far too much, for the same reasoning would shed doubt upon the funda­
mental notion that the Compulsory Process Clause extends not just literally to the "compul­
sory process" used to haul recalcitrant witnesses into court, but also to the admissibility of 
witness testimony. Cf. supra section I.A. Madison just as strikingly did not select a formula­
tion that would refer to the latter issue - again, notwithstanding the many state examples, 
see supra note 186, that pointed in that direction. 
Clinton reads Madison's word choice more evenhandedly, observing simply that: "No 
one suggested that the Massachusetts protection of the 'right to produce all proofs, that may 
be favorable to [the accused]' ought to be added. No one urged either the New Jersey lan­
guage, which guaranteed equality between prosecution and defense in regards to witnesses 
and counsel . . . .  " Clinton, supra note 13, at 736. 
190. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 735; Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 
98. 
191. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 77. 
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neous common law of evidence? It is to that central question that I 
now turn. 
2. Contemporaneous Evidence Law 
At the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the common 
law of evidence uniformly and categorically disqualified criminal 
defendants from testifying under oath in their own defense. This 
disqualification was not directed against criminal defendants specif­
ically but, instead, arose from a generally applicable disqualification 
of all interested persons as witnesses.192 Ironically enough, the 
Supreme Court's first case touching upon the relationship between 
the Constitution and the presentation of witnesses by criminal de­
fendants - Ferguson v. Georgia - contains its most detailed his­
torical treatment of witness disqualification at common law.193 
That a general rule disqualifying interested persons as witnesses 
was firmly and uniformly established at the time of the Bill of 
Rights is not, and cannot be, seriously disputed. Nor, as recounted 
above, is there disagreement among scholars as to the lack of any 
contemporaneous recognition that the Sixth Amendment, or the 
Bill of Rights generally, would necessitate drastic change in the 
common law of evidence concerning the presentation of witnesses 
in criminal trials. The problem, to put it bluntly, is that both the 
Court and academic commentators heretofore have failed to put 
two and two together. 
The only way to reconcile the notion of a constitutional right to 
present witnesses with the contemporaneous common law is to un­
derstand the right as one of equal treatment. If the Compulsory 
Process Clause, or the Bill of Rights more generally, really did af­
ford a free-standing right to admit exculpatory evidence notwith­
standing generally applicable evidence rules, then one surely would 
have expected someone at least to mention this tumultuous change 
192. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574 (1961) ("Disqualification for interest was 
. . .  extensive in the common law when this Nation was formed . . . .  Here, as in England, 
criminal defendants were deemed incompetent as witnesses."). 
193. See 365 U.S. at 573-82. As the Court explained, "the principal rationale of the rule" 
in the sixteenth century consisted of "the possible untrustworthiness of the party's testimony; 
for the same reason disqualification was applied in the seventeenth century to interested 
nonparty witnesses." 365 U.S. at 573; see also 365 U.S. at 574 (tracing the extension of this 
reasoning to the criminal context); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1892) ("It 
is familiar knowledge that the old common law carefully excluded from the witness stand 
parties to the record, and those who were interested in the result; and this rule extended to 
both civil and criminal cases. Fear of perjury was the reason for the rule."). For more exten­
sive discussion of witness disqualification for interest at common law, see 1 WIGMORE, supra 
note 26, § 575, at 688-98. 
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in then-existing practice. No such recognition appears in the histor­
ical record. 
If anything, the absence of any such reference is especially note­
worthy given the presence of language in contemporary state con­
stitutions that provided criminal defendants with the right to 
"produce" or to "call for" favorable evidence.194 The absence of 
outcry strongly suggests that even that language - more explicitly 
directed to the admissibility of witness testimony at trial than the 
reference to "compulsory process" that Madison ultimately in­
cluded in the Sixth Amendment - was not understood at the time 
to entitle defendants to exceptions from generally applicable evi­
dence rules. The states otherwise would have been unable to main­
tain for decades195 their categorical disqualification of all interested 
witnesses simply as a matter of state constitutional law, wholly 
apart from the federal Constitution. 
In fact, to the present day, some states among the original thir­
teen colonies have retained language in their respective state con­
stitutions that recognizes a right to "produce" or to "call for" 
favorable evidence.196 Surprisingly few courts within these states 
have had occasion to parse these provisions in recent years. But 
even those courts do not regard their respective state constitutions 
as affording a free-standing right to present witnesses in violation of 
generally applicable rules of evidence.191 
The restrictions that governed the qualification of witnesses in 
the eighteenth century are now archaic relics, but many other long­
standing, generally applicable restrictions remain. In recounting 
the history of the prohibition upon extrinsic evidence as a means of 
witness impeachment, for instance, Wigmore observes that 
194. See supra note 186. 
195. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 575 {observing that efforts to reform witness qualification 
rules did not begin until the nineteenth century). 
196. See Mo. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21; MAss. CoNST. pt. I, art. XII; N.H. CoNsT. pt. I, 
art. XV; VT. CoNST. ch. I, art. 10; VA. DECL OF RIGHTS art. I, § VIII. 
197. See State v. Newcomb, 663 A.2d 613, 618 (N.H. 1995) {"A defendant has the right, 
under . . .  the [New Hampshire] State Constitution, to produce all proofs favorable to his 
defense. This, however, does not entitle him to introduce evidence in violation of rules of 
evidence."); State v. Johnson, 465 A.2d 1366, 1368 {Vt. 1983) ("Defendant's argument that 
. . .  the Vermont Constitution gives him an independent right, totally divorced from any rules 
of evidence, . . .  is unfounded . . . .  [T]he 'evidence in his favor' must be otherwise admissible 
under the law of evidence . . . .  "). See generally Oliva v. Co=onwealth, 452 S.E.2d 877, 880 
{Va. Ct. App. 1995) (construing right "to call for evidence in [one's] favor" to mean that, "[i]f 
the evidence [that the defendant] presented and proffered clearly and directly pointed to • . •  
another person as the guilty party, the trial judge was required to admit that evidence which 
was relevant and material, provided that it was otherwise admissible"). 
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[t]owards the end of the 1600s appears a tendency to exclude it; and 
though the rule of exclusion did not become completely settled until 
the end of the next century, and though there are instances enough of 
its being ignored down to that time, nevertheless, it was always 
treated, from the beginning of the 1700s, as a rule that might be 
invoked.198 
The rule against hearsay, if anything, has even deeper roots in the 
common law of evidence.199 Again, had the Constitution mandated 
change to these generally applicable rules for witness testimony, 
one would have expected at least some intimation to that effect. 
Again, silence. 
This is most emphatically not to say that the law is stuck forever 
with the evidence rules prevalent in the late eighteenth century. 
Quite to the contrary, the generation that drafted and ratified the 
Constitution left open a wide vista for change and refinement - for 
an evolving law of evidence, so to speak - through the instrument 
of common law courts and, later, by way of evidence rules enacted 
by legislatures. It is no longer the case that interested persons are 
disqualified as witnesses, and that is a very good thing. But, given 
the historical record, it is folly to say that such a change was consti­
tutionally mandated, as distinct from being the product of what we 
today consider a more enlightened conception of evidence policy. 
The significance of the witness qualification rules of the eighteenth 
century lies not in any binding authority that they might have upon 
the present with regard to competency questions but, instead, in the 
way that those rules shed light upon the broader principle enshrined 
in the Constitution to constrain those who would revise evidence 
law in the centuries thereafter. 
Modern commentators err by treating arguments from history 
as straw men - in essence, by positing a false choice between blind 
adherence to the evidence rules of the eighteenth century and a 
dynamic, responsive law of evidence adapted to the conditions and 
thinking of the twentieth.200 My contention is that one can have the 
latter - indeed, plenty of it - while still looking to historical con­
text to discern the content of the constitutional constraints upon 
evidence reform. 
As of the late eighteenth century, it was thought perfectly ac­
ceptable for the law to prevent a criminal defendant from testifying 
198. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 979, at 1102. 
199. See supra note 152. 
200. See, e.g., Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 114 (applauding the Court 
for rejecting a "strictly historical test" based upon the "dead hand of the common-law rule of 
1789"). 
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under oath, at least as part of a generally applicable prohibition 
upon testimony by all interested persons. Several decades after the 
ratification of the Constitution, that view came under attack on pol­
icy grounds. As an illustration of the ordinary process of evidence 
reform at work, the Court itself has recounted that "[b ]roadside as­
saults upon the entire structure of disqualifications, particularly the 
disqualification for interest, were launched early in the nineteenth 
century in both England and America. "201 By the later part of the 
nineteenth century, "most of the States now comprising the Union" 
had dropped the disqualification of criminal defendants to testify 
under oath.202 From a constitutional standpoint, the problem 
comes only when particular jurisdictions drop the general disqualifi­
cation of witnesses for interest but still retain the disqualification 
for criminal defendants in particular. That is precisely the situation 
that the Court faced in Ferguson, and the Court was eminently cor­
rect to invalidate, in practical effect, the Georgia disqualification of 
defendants implicated in that case.203 
One sees the same process of evidence reform at work with re­
gard to the disqualification of accomplices as witnesses. As the 
Court recognized in Washington v. Texas, that rule also originated 
in the broader disqualification of interested persons and, as such, 
existed at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights.204 The 
constitutional problem arose in the nineteenth century, when the 
states dropped the general disqualification for interested persons -
indeed, when all but Georgia dropped the disqualification of crimi­
nal defendants as such - but Texas persisted in retaining a disqual­
ification specifically directed against the presentation of an 
accomplice as a witness for the defense.205 Again, the problem 
201. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 575 (1961). 
202. See 365 U.S. at 577. 
203. See supra section I.B.1. 
204. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1967). 
205. See 388 U.S. at 17 n.4 (noting that, apart from the law of Texas at the time of Wash· 
ington, "no statutes from other jurisdictions . . .  flatly disqualif[ied] coparticipants in a crime 
from testifying for each other regardless of whether they are tried jointly or separately"); cf. 1 
WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 580 at 714-16 (contending that, upon elimination by statute of the 
disqualification of defendants as witnesses, "[t]here ought to-day to be no further question 
. . .  that there is no limitation whatever on the qualification of a co-indictee or co-defendant 
to testify either for or against the accused"). 
Westen thus errs when he claims that, "[b]y invalidating a rule of competency that was 
well-established in 1791, the Court in Washington rejected the historical view of the compul­
sory process clause." Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 254. In 1791, it cer­
tainly was true that accomplices were incompetent to testify. That disqualification came not 
in the form of a rule that peculiarly disadvantaged criminal defendants but, rather, as part of 
a broader, evenhanded disqualification of interested persons. What the Court struck down in 
Washington was most assuredly not the "well-established" law as it existed in 1791 but, in-
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stems from the lack of evenhandedness, not from any binding con­
stitutional force that the eighteenth-century law of evidence may 
have upon modem times. 
3. The First Congress 
Apart from the contemporaneous law of evidence, the actions of 
the First Congress are consistent with an equality-based view of the 
right to present witnesses.206 The First Congress provided by stat­
ute that a person accused of treason - a federal crime -
shall be allowed and admitted in his said defence to make any proof 
that he or they can produce, by lawful witness or witnesses, and shall 
have like process of the court where he or they shall be tried, to com­
pel his or their witnesses to appear at his or their trial, as is usually 
granted to compel witnesses to appear on the prosecution against 
them.201 
The statute thus not only recognizes a right to "admit[ ]" witness 
testimony distinct from a right to compulsory process,2°8 it also ex­
plicitly limits the right to present witnesses by the word "lawful." 
That word choice suggests that the right is not a free-standing enti­
tlement to present all witnesses that the defense might consider 
helpful but, rather, an entitlement that remains subject to the con­
straints upon the presentation of witnesses enacted through the or­
dinary "law[ ]" making process.209 
stead, a variation that was anything but evenhanded - namely, a body of law that had arisen 
in Texas much later, in the nineteenth century, after the elimination of the general disqualifi­
cation for interested witnesses. 
206. As in other areas of constitutional debate, commentators on the right to present 
witnesses point to the actions of the Frrst Congress as evidence of contemporaneous under­
standing. See, e.g., Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 100-01. 
207. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (emphasis added). With only 
cosmetic modifications in pertinent part, this provision remains in force to the present day, 
though it now applies more broadly to all federal capital cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1994). 
208. That the Frrst Congress saw fit to enact into statute an assurance with regard to the 
"admi[ssion]" of "witness" testimony might suggest that such a guarantee did not already 
exist as part of the Constitution. It would not be unheard of, however, for Congress to rein­
force or to clarify by statute the content of preexisting law. In fact, with regard to the portion 
of the statute that concerns compulsory process for the obtaining of witnesses, Chief Justice 
John Marshall - riding circuit - remarked in passing that the statute "ought to be consid­
ered as declaratory of the common law in cases where th[e] constitutional right [to compul­
sory process under the Sixth Amendment] exists." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33 
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (granting subpoena to enable treason defendant Aaron Burr to obtain 
certain disputed letters and orders in the hands of the President). Cf. 25 F. Cas. at 33 (adding 
"that with respect to the means of compelling the attendance of witnesses to be furnished by 
the court, the prosecution and defence are placed by the law on equal ground" (emphasis 
added)). Chief Justice Marshall had no occasion, however, to construe specifically the por­
tion of the statute entitling persons accused of treason to "make any proof that he or they can 
produce by lawful witness or witnesses." 
209. Westen draws attention to the portion of the statute concerning "process of the 
court" but does not make anything of the portion that deals most directly with the presenta-
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This reading of the historical record draws additional support 
from further actions of the First Congress. In the Judiciary Act of 
1789, the First Congress provided that the federal courts shall use 
the common law of evidence.210 In so doing, Congress presumably 
did not regard the prominent features of the common law at the 
time to be contrary - at least, not in any stark or fundamental way 
- to the guarantees in the then-pending Bill of Rights. For the 
reasons set forth earlier, the common law of evidence in the eight­
eenth century strongly supports a view of the right to present wit­
nesses as a right to equal treatment. 
B. The Confrontation Clause 
In a sense, the choice between an equality-based and an 
exception-based view turns upon the plausibility of a further claim: 
namely, that the Constitution permits the making of categorical de­
terminations of admissibility that, as applied in a given instance, 
might restrict the presentation of defense witnesses in criminal tri­
als. Writing of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence as a whole, 
one commentator astutely observes that "[t]he recurring distinction 
in constitutional law between 'categorization' and 'balancing' is a 
version of the rules/standards distinction. Categorization corre­
sponds to rules, balancing to standards. Categorization is taxo­
nomic. B alancing weighs competing rights or interests."  211 
Rhetoric railing against the use of "a priori categories" certainly is a 
common feature of the Court's most expansive treatments of the 
right to present witnesses.212 
Whatever one might think of the Court's rhetoric as a matter of 
evidence policy, the foregoing historical account indicates that the 
early common law of evidence made categorical determinations 
with far greater frequency - and far, far more draconian effect -
than current law but that those determinations nonetheless were 
tion of "witness" testimony. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 100-01. As 
a result, Westen attributes no significance to the word "lawful," notwithstanding that it, at the 
very least, sheds doubt upon his conception of the constitutional right to present witnesses as 
an entitlement to exceptions from generally applicable rules of evidence. Indeed, wholly 
apart from the guarantees of the Constitution, the pertinent portion of the statute itself 
would appear to leave treason defendants entirely at the mercy of the applicable "law" con­
cerning "admi[ssibility]" - that is, insofar as the statute is concerned, to permit "law[s]" that 
are not evenhanded as between prosecution and defense. 
210. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. XX, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (providing that "the mode of proof 
by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court shall be the same in all the 
courts of the United States . . .  as of actions at co=on law"). 
211. Sullivan, supra note 179, at 59. 
212. See supra note 148. 
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not considered forbidden by the newly-enacted Bill of Rights. One 
need not rest exclusively upon history, however, for this inference. 
Rather, the Court's own analysis of the related guarantee of the 
Confrontation Clause213 - and, for that matter, the major compet­
ing view of the Clause found amongst the Justices themselves and 
recent academic commentary - strongly support the permissibility 
of categorical determinations with regard to the admission of wit­
ness testimony in criminal trials. 
It is fitting that the Compulsory Process Clause and the Con­
frontation Clause should be "textually adjoining" within the Sixth 
Amendment, each being the "fraternal twin" of the other.214 The 
Compulsory Process Clause "guarantees the accused a basis for in­
troducing evidence 'in his favor,' " and the Confrontation Clause 
"guarantees the accused a basis for challenging the evidence 
'against him' " through the confrontation of prosecution wit­
nesses.21s Both the Supreme Court itself216 and academic commen­
tators217 have remarked, in general terms, upon the connection 
between the two Clauses. To date, however, surprisingly few 
sources have attempted to draw upon the Confrontation Clause to 
inform our understanding of the right to present witnesses implicit 
in the Compulsory Process Clause.218 And none have done so in 
213. See U.S. CoNST. amend. VI {"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . .  to be confronted with the witnesses against him."). 
214. See Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor 
Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047 {1998). · 
215. Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 154-55; see also Westen, Compul­
sory Process II, supra note 13, at 280 (describing the Confrontation and Compulsory Process 
Clauses as "parallel provisions for securing the attendance of witnesses in criminal cases"). 
216. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 {1967) ("Just as an aecused has the right to 
confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has 
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense."). 
217. See supra notes 214-15. 
218. Westen is noteworthy in his recognition of this connection. In his view, the signifi-
cance of the two Clauses, understood together, is simply to 
allocate[ ] between the prosecution and the defense the burden of taking the initiative in 
identifying the witnesses to be produced - placing on the prosecution the burden of 
confronting the defendant with witnesses "against" him, and placing on the defendant 
the burden of identifying and requesting the production of witnesses "in his favor." 
Westen, Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 602. In this observation, Westen is correct. He 
justifies his exception-based reading of the right to present witnesses, however, with an im­
plausibly broad interpretation of the prosecution's obligations under the Confrontation 
Clause. 
Drawing largely upon a position embraced at one time by Justice Harlan, Westen reads 
the Confrontation Clause to forbid the prosecution from using hearsay statements from any 
witness who remains available to testify. See Peter Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 11 
MrCH. L. REv. 1185, 1188-89 (1979) [hereinafter Westen, Future of Confrontation]; see also 
Westen, Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 582. The Court as a whole, and Justice Harlan in 
particular, specifically have repudiated such a position for it would, among other things, 
deem unconstitutional the many longstanding hearsay exceptions that do not depend upon a 
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light of the significant developments in the Court's confrontation 
jurisprudence in recent years. As I now explain, a view of the right 
to present witnesses as a right of equal treatment would bring that 
right more closely into line with the Court's current approach to 
confrontation. 
The major challenge facing the Court in the confrontation area 
is not unlike the one that arises under the right to present witnesses: 
namely, how to reconcile a constitutional guarantee with longstand­
ing features of the common law of evidence. In the confrontation 
context, the challenge has centered upon the exceptions to the rule 
against hearsay, the whole point of which is to make admissible cer­
tain kinds of hearsay in lieu of in-court testimony by the declarant 
- that is, testimony that would be subject to confrontation by way 
of cross-examination at trial. 
Here, the Court has shown itself fully prepared to embrace evi­
dence rules that identify, on a categorical basis, situations in which 
out-of-court statements are generally reliable - where the circum­
stances under which the statements are made, in themselves, pro­
vide a rough substitute for actual "confront[ation]" by the 
defendant at trial. In fact, the Court has gone even further, stating 
that some forms of hearsay are actually better than in-court testi­
mony in that the "same factors that contribute to the statements' 
reliability cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testi­
mony."219 Thus, for example, the Court has upheld under the Con­
frontation Clause the admission as prosecution evidence of 
coconspirators' statements,220 present sense impressions,221 and 
statements made in the course of receiving medical treatment,222 
without regard to the availability of the declarant to testify. For 
other out-of-court statements that are not reliable in their own right 
showing of unavailability. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (upholding admission of 
hearsay under Illinois exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements in the course 
of medical examinations, without a showing of unavailability); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 
94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (repudiating his earlier position in California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149, 172 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); cf. FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing no less than 
twenty-three hearsay exceptions that do not turn upon a showing of unavailability). 
219. See White, 502 U.S. at 355-56; see also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 
(1986) (similarly noting, with respect to coconspirators' statements, that "[e]ven when the 
declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion 
of the evidentiary value of his statements during the course of the conspiracy"). 
220. See Inad� 415 U.S. at 399-400 (upholding application of FED. R. Evm. 
801(d)(2)(E)). 
221. See White, 502 U.S. at 355 (upholding application of Illinois counterpart to FED. R. 
EvID. 803(2)). 
222. See White, 502 U.S. at 355 (upholding application of Illinois counterpart to FED. R. 
Evm. 803(4)). 
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but simply stand as a second-best substitute for in-court testimony, 
the Court has upheld the admission of hearsay, upon a showing by 
the prosecution that the declarant is unavailable.223 The upshot of 
these moves in the Court's recent confrontation jurisprudence has 
been to endorse the constitutional permissibility of the hearsay ex­
ceptions set forth in the current Federal Rules of Evidence - some 
of the most categorical features of both the common law of evi­
dence and current law. 
This development has met with criticism, as one of the very few 
instances in which the Court has tied closely the substance of a con­
stitutional guarantee to the content of ordinary legislation - albeit 
in the form of evidence rules with deep roots in hearsay doctrine 
developed over the centuries at common law. But even under the 
leading alternative view of the Confrontation Clause embraced, in 
various forms, by at least two members of the current Court224 and 
a variety of recent commentary,225 a categorical approach would be 
used. Merely its focus would change. 
This alternative view takes issue with the implicit premise of the 
Court's current approach that the admission of hearsay statements 
as evidence for the prosecution necessarily amounts to the presen­
tation of "witnesses against" the defendant within the meaning of 
the Confrontation Clause. The word "witnesses," in ordinary par­
lance, does not include people who make statements outside of the 
courthouse.226 Under the alternative position, the question simply 
is: What subset of out-of-court statements should be treated as the 
equivalent of actual testimony from "witnesses" in court and, as 
such, must be subject to confrontation by the defense? Although 
the Justices and commentators who embrace this alternative view 
have answered this question with various shadings and subtleties, 
the common and crucial insight is that hearsay should be under­
stood to implicate the Confrontation Clause only when it consists of 
statements that the government itself might generate through coer­
cion or fabrication (such as statements made while the declarant is 
in police custody) or that are otherwise made in a formal, legal con­
text (such as testimony at a grand jury proceeding, which the jury 
223. See lnad� 415 U.S. at 394-95 (explaining rationale for admission of prior testimony 
from an unavailable declarant, upheld earlier in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). 
224. See White, 502 U.S. at 358-66 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.). 
225. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 15, at 125-31; Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The 
Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEo. LJ. 1011 (1998). For a similar view, see also Margaret 
A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a 
Prosecutorial Restraint Mode� 16 MINN. L. REv. 557 (1992). 
226. See AMAR, supra note 15, at 127. 
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might see as the equivalent of actual "witness[ ]" testimony at 
trial).227 
In short, under either the Court's approach or its major compet­
itor, the meaning of the Confrontation Clause centers upon cate­
gorical determinations capable, for the most part, of being made in 
advance of any particular dispute over the admissibility of witness 
testimony. Under either approach, categorization - informed by 
text, experience, and the objectives of the Confrontation Clause -
holds sway. The striking thing is that no one on the Court claims 
that it should apply the Confrontation Clause by focusing upon the 
testimony to be provided by the particular prosecution "witnesses" 
at issue in a given instance and, from there, ascertaining their incul­
patory significance in the specific case at hand. For the Court, the 
question is not, and has never been, whether the incriminatory force 
of the disputed prosecution testimony, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, is such that a right of confrontation might be espe­
cially useful to the defense - even though confrontation might 
raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury. Indeed, in a 
thoughtful recent essay advocating a version of the alternative ap­
proach summarized here, Richard Friedman specifically rejects the 
notion that the Confrontation Clause "should be applied on a case­
by-case basis with an eye to what will assist accurate factfinding in 
the particular case."22s 
Having taken a categorical approach for the right of the defend­
ant to be confronted with the "witnesses against" him, the Court 
should not shy from the same approach for the related right of the 
227. See White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause is 
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testi­
monial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. It was this 
discrete category of testimonial materials that was historically abused by prosecutors as a 
means of depriving criminal defendants of the benefit of the adversary process . . . .  "); accord 
AMAR, supra note 15, at 129 ("[W]e must properly read the word witness to encompass vide­
otapes, transcripts, depositions, and affidavits when prepared for court use and introduced as 
testimony." (italics in original)); id. at 131 (distinguishing between "general out-of-court dec­
larations - one friend talking to another, often even before the government is involved -
and governmentally prepared depositions"); Berger, supra note 225, at 561 ("Hearsay state­
ments procured by agents of the prosecution or police should . . .  stand on a different footing 
[for purposes of the Confrontation Clause] than hearsay created without governmental intru­
sion."); Friedman, supra note 225, at 1026 ("[T]he confrontation right applies only to a subset 
of hearsay declarants, those who are deemed to have made testimonial statements and so 
have acted as witnesses."); id. at 1042-43 (providing examples). 
228. Friedman, supra note 225, at 1028. 1\vo recent commentators do embrace a view 
that would appear to entail case-by-case consideration. Charles Nesson and Yochai Benkler 
would have the right of confrontation depend largely upon whether the prosecution is able to 
come up with corroboration for a given out-of-court statement offered against the defendant. 
See Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational 
Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. RE.v. 149, 173 (1995). 
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defendant to present "witnesses in his favor.'1 In particular, if the 
Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of a categorical ap­
proach with regard to out-of-court statements - even those that 
may be devastatingly incriminating to the defendant - it is hard to 
see why the Court should decry the use of "a priori categories" 
under the Compulsory Process Clause. As one commentator accu­
rately notes, "[t]he danger of mistaken convictions arising from un­
reliable out-of-court evidence is the same whether caused by 
deficiencies in the state's evidence or by deficiencies in the defend­
ant's evidence. "229 
For out-of-court statements by persons not called as actual "wit­
nesses" for the prosecution at trial, it remains true that defense 
counsel may note their absence as a way to shed doubt upon the 
prosecution's case. By contrast, defense counsel certainly could not 
summarize for the jury the substance of the expected testimony 
from a defense witness deemed inadmissible under a generally ap­
plicable evidence rule. But that plainly would not preclude the de­
fense from seeking to use information gleaned from that witness as 
a means by which to identify other, admissible evidence.230 The de­
fense, in short, has a second-best alternative to the excluded de­
fense testimony in the same way that defense commentary about 
the prosecution's reliance upon hearsay stands as a second-best al­
ternative to actual, in-court confrontation of the declarant. That is 
not to say that the second-best alternative to the desired defense 
testimony necessarily will be as good, or even nearly as good, as the 
testimony itself. But the same is true of comments by defense 
counsel to note the absence of a declarant whose out-of-court state­
ments form the crucial incriminatory evidence for the prosecution. 
Such comments are likely to be especially unavailing when the justi­
fication for admitting hearsay as prosecution evidence in the first 
place is that the surrounding circumstances make it more reliable 
than testimony that the declarant might give at trial.231 The Court 
nonetheless has not regarded the prospect of such an imperfect -
perhaps, in a given case, totally ineffective - second-best alterna­
tive to preclude the admission of hearsay as prosecution evidence 
under the Confrontation Clause. The same should hold true for the 
229. Westen, Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 597. 
230. For instance, it apparently had not occurred to defense counsel in Rock to have an 
expert examine the gun used in the disputed shooting until the defendant intimated, after 
undergoing hypnosis, that the gun may have discharged accidentally. See Rock v. Arkansas, 
483 U.S. 44, 47 (1987). 
231. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
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second-best alternative available in lieu of desired defense 
testimony. 
C. Institutional Structure and Related Constitutional 
"Compartments" 
The justifications for an equality-based view of the right to pres­
ent witnesses are not confined simply to the history of common law 
evidence rules or related guarantees of the Sixth Amendment con­
cerning witnesses in criminal trials. Rather, as I contend here, 
structural insights from the core institutional features of the crimi­
nal system strongly support the greater degree of deference that an 
equality-based view would accord to the makers of evidence rules, 
as compared to current law. I explain how these structural insights 
help to distinguish the demand for equal treatment in the present 
context from instances in which the Due Process Clause mandates 
aspects of criminal procedure that tilt the playing field for the pro­
tection of defendants - most prominently, the reasonable doubt 
standard recognized in In re Winship232 and the obligation of the 
prosecution under Brady v. Maryland233 and its progeny to turn 
over exculpatory evidence to the defense. Finally, in keeping with 
my effort to question the growing compartmentalization of the 
Constitution in academic circles, I turn to a conceptually similar 
problem of constitutional law that initially might seem unrelated to 
the rights of criminal defendants. Specifically, I use structural in­
sights to explain how the switch advocated here from an exception­
based to an equality-based view of the right to present witnesses 
avoids a major pitfall attributed to the similar switch in Employ­
ment Division v. Smith234 for the Free Exercise Clause. 
1. Structuring the Making of Rules 
Frederick Schauer has observed that legal rules are significant 
not simply for their substantive content but also for the manner in 
which they reflect upon institutional arrangements.235 This general 
point has garnered far too little attention in connection with the 
making of evidence rules and the right to present witnesses. One 
may explain much about the relationship between rules and rights 
in this area by reference to the core institutional features of the 
232. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
233. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
234. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
235. See SCHAUER, supra note 179, at 158-62. 
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criminal system. As to the admissibility of witness testimony at 
trial, whether for the prosecution or for the defense, the govern­
ment acts in two distinct roles. Arms of the government serve not 
only as the makers of evidence rules (increasingly, legislatures) but 
also as one of the parties that stands to benefit from application of 
those rules (in the government's capacity as prosecutor). There are 
fairly obvious reasons for a democracy to empower government in­
stitutions to delineate not only the ground rules for criminal trials 
but also what constitutes crime itself. In addition, it has long been 
true that prosecutorial power in the criminal sphere resides with 
government officials rather than private persons. When it comes to 
the prosecution of crime, the government essentially has a 
monopoly. 
Although individual agents of the government may be criminal 
defendants in particular instances, the interests of the government 
as a whole - the United States, the State, the People - are sys­
tematically aligned with the prosecution. When combined with 
rulemaking authority in the evidence field, this systematic align­
ment of interest raises a considerable potential for abuse. The con­
cern, in short, is that the government will skew the rules of evidence 
in such a way as to favor itself, as prosecutor. Indeed, this concern 
is all the stronger given that the interests of criminal defendants 
have never - certainly not today - been a cause with great polit­
ical popularity.236 
The beauty of a conception of the right to present witnesses 
rooted in notions of equality is that it may serve as a powerful anti­
dote to the problem of self-dealing while, at the same time, avoid­
ing the prospect of tearing apart the core institutional arrangements 
of the modem criminal system. An equality-based view would hold 
that courts should regard with great suspicion those instances in 
which the government denies certain kinds of testimony to the de­
fense but permits itself to use the same when the testimony happens 
to help the government's own case as prosecutor. By contrast, 
236. Similar concern arises even when the maker of evidence rules is not a politically 
accountable legislature but, instead, a common law court. As one commentator observes: 
Judges and prosecutors are often viewed as team players in the criminal justice arena. 
Many judges are former prosecutors, and their evidentiary rulings are sometimes per­
ceived to favor the government over the defense. Defendants and defense attorneys 
object that, despite the Bill of Rights, the presumption of innocence, and other legal 
protections afforded criminal defendants, the deck is too often stacked against the de­
fense. The fact that state court judges, who handle the bulk of criminal cases, are elected 
by a population increasingly vocal about the need to fight crime contributes to the per­
ception that judges are closer to prosecutors than defendants. 
Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Ex­
panding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 199, 200 (1997). 
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when the government denies a particular type of evidence not only 
to the defense but also to itself, that stance is an exceedingly power­
ful indication that the government genuinely regards the particular 
categorical rule of exclusion as serving a compelling interest - one 
beyond that of simply advantaging itself as prosecutor.237 For even­
handed rules, then, ordinary rationality review should suffice. 
a. Institutional Capabilities and the Legitimacy of the Trial Pro­
cess. An equality-based view would enable the law to make use of 
the institutional advantages of the legislative process as a source of 
evidence reform, without the concomitant risk that the govern­
ment's self-interest will trample upon criminal defendants. As 
Richard Posner has emphasized with respect to constitutional adju­
dication generally, many disputes presently cast in terms of consti­
tutional doctrine turn, in significant part, upon complicated 
empirical judgments about non-legal matters - judgments that 
courts are not well-equipped institutionally to make.238 In the area 
of evidence disputes, the comparative advantage of legislatures in 
the making of empirical judgments is especially pronounced with 
regard to the cutting-edge varieties of witness testimony likely to 
arise in the twenty-first century. The key is to harness the ability of 
legislative bodies to identify and cull through information from the 
pertinent body of expertise - frequently, science. The role of the 
right to present witnesses should be to structure those proceedings 
to ensure that whatever rule the government selects for itself also 
will apply to defendants, absent a compelling justification other-
237. As I explain momentarily, see infra section 11.C.1.b, I take this insight from remarks 
of Akhi1 Amar - albeit directed to a different aspect of the Compulsory Process Clause. 
Outside the realm of evidence law, Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares have advanced a similar 
argument to support the constitutionality of community policing measures, such as gang­
loitering laws designed to reduce crime in predominantly African-American inner-city com­
munities. As they explain: 
The uniformly relentless scrutiny (toward criminal law enforcement] associated with the 
modem [constitutional doctrine] rests on a presumption that communities never share in 
the burdens of law-enforcement techniques that restrict the liberty of African-Ameri­
cans. That assumption made sense before the 1960's civil rights revolution, but makes 
much less sense today, given the political strength of African-Americans and their own 
concern to free themselves from the ravages of inner-city crime. So instead of subjecting 
all law-enforcement techniques to searching scrutiny, courts should now ask whether the 
community itself is sharing in the burden that a particular law imposes on individual 
freedom. If it is, the court should presume that that law does not violate individual 
rights. 
Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 
GEo. L.J. 1153, 1173 (1998) (emphasis added). 
238. See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 21-22 
(1998). 
March 1999] Right to Present Witnesses 1127 
wise. In this manner, institutional arrangements may reinforce, 
rather than threaten, constitutional rights.239 
This institutional point is not just a pragmatic one. It is inti­
mately related, as well, to the role of evidence law and the Constitu­
tion as part of the larger panoply of legal rules that legitimize the 
results of criminal trials in the eyes of the public.240 When a crimi­
nal defendant is unable to use evidence that might call into question 
her guilt, the legitimacy of the trial is undoubtedly reduced. The 
problem of legitimacy, however, is not so simple or one­
dimensional. Longstanding evidence rules of the sort canvassed 
earlier241 routinely keep out witness testimony offered by the de­
fense that might well be outcome determinative in a given criminal 
trial. To say that the social legitimacy of the trial process depends 
upon the defendant being able to put on whatever evidence she 
thinks might raise a reasonable doubt about her guilt is, again, to 
run headlong into the floodgates problem. 
239. This institutional point relates, as well, to the connection between the right to pres­
ent witnesses - as applied to witness testimony that draws upon scientific innovations - and 
the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
{1993). There, construing Rule 702, the Court famously rejected the proposition that the 
admissibility of expert scientific testimony turns exclusively upon the general acceptance of 
the scientific technique used by the expert See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. 
Concurring in Scheffer, Justice Kennedy observed that the per se rule against polygraph 
evidence upheld in that case is in tension with the general thrust of Daubert. See United 
States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1269 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). That is true, insofar 
as Daubert posits an exacting case-by-case evaluation of the support for expert scientific testi­
mony - albeit based upon an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, not upon any 
constitutional imperative. See Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1269 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (ac­
knowledging Daubert's lack of constitutional status). At a deeper level, however, the Court's 
current analytical framework for the right to present witnesses actually replicates the institu­
tional weaknesses of Daubert. As numerous observers have noted, Daubert places the fed­
eral courts in the awkward position of sitting in judgment over heated disputes concerning 
matters on the cutting edge of science. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 
F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (panel op. by Kozinski, J., on remand); Brian Leiter, The 
Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for 
Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 815. As applied to expert scientific 
testimony such as that involved in Scheffer, the Court's "arbitrary or disproportionate" stan­
dard for the right to present witnesses has the distinct potential to entail the same sort of 
second-guessing of other institutions' determinations of reliability. That is, perhaps, not quite 
so troubling when the rulemaking institution consists of some other court, acting pursuant to 
common law powers. It is much more awkward, as an institutional matter, when the 
rulemaking entity is - at least by comparison - better positioned to cull through the scien­
tific debate. 
240. The leading exposition of the role of evidence law in the legitimation of outcomes at 
trial remains Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accepta­
bility of Verdicts, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 1357 (1985). For a provocative earlier comparison of the 
trial process and the performing of a play for an audience, see Milner S. Ball, The Play's the 
Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REv. 
81 (1975). 
241. See supra section I.C.2. 
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The legitimacy of the trial process in the eyes of the body politic 
surely goes beyond the question of whose ox is gored by a particu­
lar evidence rule in a given instance. Legitimacy depends at least as 
much upon a social consensus, in advance of any particular evidence 
dispute, concerning the appropriate institutional framework for the 
formulation of evidence rules and the appropriate substantive re­
strictions upon the rulemaking institutions. That is among the most 
significant lessons of the Legal Process movement, which takes as 
its major enterprise the legitimation of legal outcomes in the face of 
social diversity and disagreement.242 To say that the rules of evi­
dence generally must treat defendants as they treat prosecutors -
as an equality-based reading would hold - is to tie the legitimacy 
of the criminal trial to deeply-ingrained notions of fairness. 
The point is even stronger in modem times, when evidence rules 
increasingly are the products of the democratic process and not 
merely the output of common law courts acting subject to a legisla­
tive override. When a rule treats equally prosecutors and defend­
ants, there is little reason to believe that the political process 
somehow is picking on defendants as part of a get-tough-with-crime 
bandwagon. Rather, legitimacy is a consideration that cuts in a 
number of different directions, particularly when controversial new 
forms of testimony on the cutting edge of science are concerned. In 
that context particularly, there is a considerable downside to the 
admission of witness testimony that has been, say, hypnotically­
enhanced or that discusses the results of a polygraph examination: 
namely, a lingering suspicion by external observers that the out­
come at trial - whether a conviction, an acquittal, or simply a hung 
jury - rests upon evidence that is akin to a Ouija board. The exist­
ence of an evenhanded rule to exclude such evidence stands as a 
powerful indication that society really does believe that the legiti­
macy of trials would be damaged more by the admission of the dis­
puted type of witness testimony - whether by a prosecutor or a 
defendant - than it would be by its exclusion. It is eminently the 
role of public institutions to make precisely these sorts of decisions. 
Indeed, there is no reason to think - much less to compel constitu­
tionally - that the various jurisdictions within this country neces­
sarily will address the same problem in the same way. A diversity 
of policy views is entirely appropriate when the type of testimony in 
question is itself hotly disputed. 
242. A classic statement of this enterprise appears in HENRY M. HART, JR. & .ALBERT M. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 
3-4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., rev. ed. 1994). 
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b. Structure and Due Process. Recognition of the relationship 
between the right to present witnesses and institutional structure 
also serves to clarify a lingering point of doctrinal uncertainty con­
cerning the source of the right itself. Neither the Supreme Court 
nor modem commentators draw upon the Compulsory Process 
Clause alone to support their view of the right as an entitlement to 
exceptions. In its most detailed effort to pinpoint the source of the 
right, the Court in Rock also referred to the Due Process Clause.243 
Likewise, in speaking to the right in passing within a broader dis­
cussion of the Sixth Amendment, Akhil Amar contends that courts 
should understand the Compulsory Process Clause to provide 
equality of process with regard to witness compulsion but that 
courts nonetheless are correct to recognize a free-standing constitu­
tional entitlement for the defense to admit witness testimony based 
upon "a more general Sixth Amendment and due process test of 
innocence protection and truth-seeking."244 Robert Clinton simi­
larly invokes the Due Process Clause in support of his balancing 
test.24s 
There is much confusion here, as a matter both of precedent and 
of first principles: 
i. Precedent. As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court needed to 
invoke notions of fundamental fairness implicit in the guarantee of 
due process in order to apply the provisions of the Bill of Rights to 
the states.246 In this way, the Due Process Clause served simply ­
and quite properly - as a vehicle of incorporation in the Court's 
earliest cases on the right to present witnesses. Insofar as the Court 
relied upon due process exclusively in Chambers, the Court did so 
simply because of the peculiar manner in which the constitutional 
claim in the case was litigated below.247 That does not demonstrate, 
243. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 
(1948)). 
244. AMAR, supra note 15, at 136 & n.213 (citing Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra 
note 13, at 133-36, 156-57, 159, for the proposition that, "unless the evidence is so unreliable, 
in the context of other evidence in the case, that it cannot properly be assessed by the jury 
and the public, a defendant should be able to get it in"). Westen himself, to his credit, argues 
for a more focused inquiry based upon the Compulsory Process Clause specifically. See 
Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 181. 
245. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 803-05. 
246. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
247. As Westen explains: 
[Chambers] made no constitutional objections until he moved, after the jury returned 
the verdict, for a new trial on the ground that the exclusion of his evidence denied him a 
fair trial under the due process clause . . . .  [T]he [Supreme] Court seems to have as­
sumed that the only constitutional question properly before it rested on due process, 
rather than on Chambers' newly advanced confrontation and compulsory process argu­
ments, and that this due process claim was based on the cumulative effect of the trial 
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however, that the Compulsory Process Clause somehow means 
something different when combined with the Due Process Clause, 
and the Court's implicit suggestion to that effect in Rock is a mis­
reading of precedent. Notions of fundamental fairness are relevant 
to impose upon the states the right to present witnesses implicit in 
the Compulsory Process Clause, not somehow to alter the content 
of that guarantee. That, of course, is what incorporation means in 
the criminal context: defendants get rights vis-a-vis the states that 
the Bill of Rights provides against the federal government - noth­
ing less, but also nothing more. 
Apart from precedent, efforts to draw an exception-based view 
from the Due Process Clause are mistaken in principle, and the ex­
planation of that mistake itself relates to the structural insights set 
out above. I :first consider the point by reference to academic com­
mentary and then turn to an illustrative sampling of due process 
case law. 
ii. The Academic Debate. Among commentators, Akhil Amar's 
effort to invoke the Due Process Clause is the most telling, as he 
seeks to distinguish between a decidedly equality-based view of wit­
ness compulsion and an exception-based view of witness admissibil­
ity. Amar starts from the right premise when he speaks of the 
literal compulsion of witnesses. In rhetoric closely akin to that 
deployed here, he states that "when a government chooses to deny 
itself a certain [witness] coercion technique . . .  or even all coercion 
against certain highly valued social relationships of intimacy and 
trust . . .  this self-denial proves that the government really does see 
a 'compelling interest' against compulsion."248 Indeed, \vith regard 
to witness compulsion, Amar appears entirely willing to embrace a 
categorical approach. There does not seem room, in his view, for 
the courts to engage in a case-specific examination to ascertain 
whether the Constitution requires the use of a given compulsion 
technique - one that the government has "chos[en] to deny itself" 
- even when the particular witness sought by the defense might 
well be highly exculpatory. When he comes to the admissibility of 
witness testimony, however, Amar nonetheless invokes due process 
to support an exception-based view.249 
court's rulings [excluding exculpatory hearsay statements and preventing the defense 
from recalling the declarant to the stand) taken together rather than separately. 
Westen, Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 607 n.108. 
248. AMAR, supra note 15, at 133. 
249. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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There are two related problems here. Amar's telling reference 
to "compelling interest[s]" implies that strict scrutiny, when applied 
by a reviewing court, operates as a way to reconstruct the ordinary 
rulemaking process with special weight attached to the protection 
of constitutional rights - weight that the process otherwise might 
be thought disinclined to give to criminal defendants, among other 
persons afforded special constitutional protection. The same rea­
soning would suggest, however, that a rulemaking process supple­
mented by a constitutional demand for equal treatment would not be 
in need of judicial reconstruction. Rather, by Amar's own reason­
ing, a rulemaking process so constrained would determine what in­
terests are compelling enough to warrant the exclusion of evidence 
per se and, with the government bound no less than defendants, 
there would be no structural reason to regard that determination as 
constitutionally suspect. 
More broadly, Amar�s suggestion that at least some (unspeci­
fied) evidence rules might be unconstitutional under his general 
"due process test of innocence protection and truth-seeking" is a 
contention curiously at odds with his overall approach to constitu­
tional interpretation - an approach that is much in keeping with 
my effort here to connect structure and rights. Speaking outside of 
the criminal context to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights as a 
whole, Amar has presented a powerful argument that constitutional 
scholars have long neglected the structural dimensions of the Bill. 
He provocatively contends that one ought to understand the Bill of 
Rights not so much as a series of measures to protect political mi­
norities but, instead, as provisions that actually reinforce the 
structural, and decidedly majoritarian, themes of the original Con­
stitution - in essence, as a way to deploy popular sovereignty as a 
constraint upon the new national government.250 All of this, if any­
thing, reinforces the attractiveness of an equality-based view of the 
right to present witnesses, as it would place in the hands of 
rulemaking institutions the :flexibility to adapt to changing condi­
tions with regard to evidence issues, but would insist that they do 
unto the government itself, as prosecutor, what they would do unto 
criminal defendants. Amar's invocation of the Due Process Clause 
thus, I submit, is an error even on his own terms. 
250. See Amar, supra note 6, at 1132 ("[I]ndividual and minority rights did constitute a 
motif of the Bill of Rights - but not the sole, or even the dominant, motif. A close look at 
the Bill reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with language of rights . . . . The main 
thrust of the Bill was not to downplay organizational structure, but to deploy it; not to im­
pede popular majorities, but to empower them."). 
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m. When Due Process Mandates Inequality. Apart from aca­
demic commentary, the structural insights outlined earlier also dis­
tinguish an equality-based view of the right to present witnesses 
from other aspects of criminal procedure that advantage defendants 
specifically vis-a-vis the prosecution pursuant to a due process man­
date.251 As I explain by way of two leading examples, the cases in 
this line seek to address what are, at bottom, structural problems 
arising from the multiple roles that the government plays in the 
criminal process and the concomitant potential for self-dealing. For 
purposes of due process, the point is not to mandate equal treat­
ment or unequal treatment favoring the defense but, rather, to ad­
dress the structural problems inherent in a government monopoly 
upon law making and criminal enforcement. That unequal treat­
ment is required by due process in some areas is not a command for 
it to be mandated blindly with respect to the admissibility of witness 
testimony as well. For the reasons outlined earlier, an equality­
based view of the right to present witnesses addresses the same 
structural concerns, precisely by imposing a constitutional demand 
for equal treatment. 
Two examples illustrate the point: The Supreme Court, in In re 
Winship, held that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution 
in a proceeding properly characterized as criminal in nature to 
prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.252 This 
standard of proof plainly tilts the playing field substantially in favor 
of criminal defendants, as compared to the usual preponderance 
standard in civil litigation. In Winship, however, the question was 
not so much which standard of proof should govern in criminal 
cases. The Court easily showed that a demand for proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in criminal matters "dates at least from our early 
years as a Nation" - indeed, that "[t]he 'demand for a higher de­
gree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from 
ancient times.' "253 
The real concern, instead, turned upon the systematic incentive 
of the government, in its capacity as law maker, to define narrowly 
what constitutes a "criminal" proceeding, in an effort to exclude 
matters like the juvenile delinquency proceeding at issue in Winship 
251. See generally Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 {1983) (noting in dictum 
that "the Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned 
review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules"). 
252. In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
253. 397 U.S. at 361 (quoting CHARLES T. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 321, at 681 (1954)). 
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itself.254 A narrow construction of the "criminal" category by the 
government as law maker would enable the government, as prose­
cutor, to avoid not just the elevated standard of proof associated for 
centuries therewith but also the panoply of other constitutional pro­
tections - the rights to counsel, to confrontation and, for that mat­
ter, to present witnesses - afforded by the Sixth Amendment 
specifically for criminal trials.255 The due process imperative in 
Winship thus serves to constrain the government from self-dealing 
by positing an independent judicial role to ascertain whether the 
proceeding at issue is properly classified as "criminal." There is 
considerably less need for a similar stance with regard to the admis­
sion of witness testimony, at least when the rulemak.ing process it­
self would operate under a demand for equal treatment. 
Another conspicuously unequal aspect of criminal procedure 
mandated by the Due Process Clause consists of the obligation of 
prosecutors, under Brady v. Maryland, to disclose to defendants 
"favorable" evidence, even though defendants are under no analo­
gous obligation to bring to the attention of prosecutors unfavorable 
evidence.256 As such, Brady is a classic example in which even­
handedness does not pass constitutional muster in the criminal con­
text. Here again, however, the explanation for a constitutional 
mandate systematically to favor the defense stems from the struc­
tural features of the criminal system: specifically, the government's 
role as the administrator of both the courts and the prosecutor's 
office. As a result, unlike attorneys for civil litigants or for criminal 
defendants, prosecutors have an obligation beyond that of zealous 
advocacy. As Barbara Babcock has explained, the central insight 
behind Brady consists of the notion that prosecutors, as agents of 
the same government that administers the court system itself, 
should not be able to assert the defendant's guilt while aware of 
information, unknown to the defense, that tends to suggest inno-
254. Under New York law at the time, the determination of juvenile "delinquency" 
turned upon a finding that the particular juvenile in question had engaged in "an act which 
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult" 397 U.S. at 359. 
255. The civil-criminal distinction is the subject of considerable academic interest and 
ongoing debate. For my synopsis of the recent literature, see Nagareda, supra note 133, at 
1128. 
256. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The Court itself has recognized that 
the Compulsory Process Clause is at least tangentially related to Brady in that the prosecu­
tion is obligated to issue compulsory process only to those witnesses whose testimony is "ma­
terial" to the defense - the same standard that governs the government's obligation to 
disclose favorable evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867-68 
(1982). 
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cence.257 Here, too, inequality - if one can call it that - is neces­
sary to constrain self-dealing by the government in pre-trial 
information gathering in a way that is not needed for rules gov­
erning the admission of witness testimony, at least not when supple­
mented by a demand that those rules themselves accord equal 
treatment. 
In short, due process lends no support to an exception-based 
view of the right to present witnesses; if anything, it reinforces the 
plausibility of an equality-based view. 
2. Exceptions and Equality Elsewhere 
In the context of constitutional law as a whole, the proposition 
that courts should understand the right to present witnesses as a 
right to equal treatment is neither novel nor momentous. Such a 
view, instead, starts to look quite familiar when one considers de­
velopments in two other constitutional contexts that, if anything, 
are even more sensitive and socially contentious than the rights of 
criminal defendants: specifically, race and religion.25s 
Race is the more straightforward illustration, as the constitu­
tional provision in question - the Equal Protection Clause259 -
speaks explicitly in terms of equal treatment. Thus, in Washington 
v. Davis,260 the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a 
law that had a disparate impact upon African Americans. If any­
thing, disparate impact - a claim that necessarily goes to the disad­
vantageous effects of the law upon many persons of a particular 
race - is, in some ways, considerably more troubling than an iso­
lated application that disadvantages a single individual. The line 
drawn by the Court between laws of general applicability (which do 
not trigger strict scrutiny, even upon a showing of disparate impact) 
257. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effec­
tive Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1131, 1134-35 (1982) (emphasizing the Court's 
reference in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), to the distinctive role of the 
prosecutor as " 'the representative . . .  of a sovereignty . . .  whose interest . . .  in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."'). 
258. Outside the realm of individual rights, there are other contexts in which the Court 
has understood constitutional provisions to focus upon equal treatment. Thus, under the so­
called Dormant Co=erce Clause, the Court "treats laws that facially discriminate against 
interstate co=erce and laws that are 'protectionist' in purpose or practical effect as 'virtu­
ally per se invalid."' GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 41, at 297. 
259. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, cl. 1. 
260. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of test to measure the reading com­
prehension, vocabulary, and verbal skills among applicants to police force). In this respect, 
the Equal Protection Clause differs fundamentally from federal statutes, such as Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, understood to permit actions for disparate impact. See 426 U.S. 
at 238-39. 
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and laws that classify by race (which generally will be upheld only 
upon the showing of a compelling governmental interest)261 is 
analogous to the line suggested here. In fact, the justification of­
fered by the Court - the fear that the Equal Protection Clause 
otherwise would run rampant through many familiar government 
programs that might have a disparate impact262 - is simply the an­
alogue, in the race context, of the floodgates problem lurking be­
hind the Scheffer Court's effort to cabin the right to present 
witnesses. 
The religion context is more controversial, though even more 
illuminating for present purposes. The controversy stems, in large 
part, from the lack of any explicit reference to notions of equality 
on the face of the Free Exercise Clause. One might take the decla­
ration that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise" of religion as embodying a constitutional requirement for 
exceptions from generally applicable laws.263 The historical context 
of the Clause, too, remains hotly debated.264 
In Employment Division v. Smith, 265 the Court nonetheless de­
parted dramatically from its previous exception-based view of the 
Clause, regarding the general applicability of an Oregon criminal 
prohibition upon the drug peyote to be essentially conclusive in 
favor of its constitutionality. The comparison with Smith is illumi­
nating, given that several other states actually had recognized an 
exception for religious exercise in their comparable criminal stat­
utes concerning peyote.266 The religious practitioners in Smith -
much like the criminal defendants in both Rock and Scheffer -
happened to have the very considerable misfortune to live in a ju­
risdiction that did not recognize exceptions but, instead, took a cat­
egorical view. In effect, Oregon had adopted a per se rule 
criminalizing peyote, much as Arkansas had excluded hypnotically-
261. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
262. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 ("A rule that a statute designed to serve 
neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or 
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions 
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and 
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to 
the more affluent white."). 
263. See McConnell, supra note 19, at 1115 (contending that this reading "is the more 
obvious and literal meaning" of the constitutional language (italics omitted)). 
264. Compare, e.g., McConnell, supra note 181 (discussing historical support for an 
exception-based view of the Clause) with Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of 
Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992) ( disput­
ing McConnell's account). 
265. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
266. See 494 U.S. at 912 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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enhanced testimony and the President had barred in courts martial 
expert testimony based upon polygraph examinations. In Smith, 
too, the Court referred at some length to the floodgates problem267 
as well as to the institutional inappropriateness of placing the judici­
ary in the position of "determin[ing] the place of a particular belief 
in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim."268 The latter 
concern stands as the rough analogue to the institutional considera­
tions raised earlier with respect to the second-guessing of evidence 
rules that govern complex, cutting-edge forms of witness 
testimony.269 
Not surprisingly, Smith unleashed a torrent of academic com­
mentary,270 and a grand synthesis of that debate is well beyond my 
enterprise here. Regardless of whether one is a Smith-lover, a 
Smith-hater, or neither, it should be common ground that a crucial 
feature of the present context makes an equality-based view of the 
right to present witnesses markedly more palatable than the 
equivalent view of the Free Exercise Clause. In the free exercise 
context, a generally applicable law is one that typically will have 
little bite upon most of the body politic. Simply as a political mat­
ter, the major reason why there are criminal prohibitions upon pe­
yote is that the vast majority of people do not regard that substance 
as part of religious exercise or, for that matter, of any legitimate 
activity. As Michael McConnell starkly observes: 
In a world in which some [religious] beliefs are more prominent than 
others, the political branches will inevitably be more selectively sensi­
tive toward religious injuries. Laws that impinge upon the religious 
practices of larger or more prominent faiths will be noticed and reme­
died. When the laws impinge upon the practice of smaller groups, 
legislators will not even notice, and may not care even if they do 
notice.271 
For the right to present witnesses, by contrast, insistence upon 
general applicability really does have bite in the sense that it genu-
267. See 494 U.S. at 888-89; see also 494 U.S. at 885 ("To make an individual's obligation 
to obey [a generally applicable] law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious 
beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling' - permitting him, by virtue of his 
beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,' . . .  - contradicts both constitutional tradition and 
common sense." (footnote and citation omitted)). 
268. 494 U.S. at 887. 
269. See supra section II.C.1. 
270. For a mere smattering of the rancor over Smith, see supra note 21. On the unsuc­
cessful effort by Congress to switch back to an exception-based view, see supra note 22. 
271. See McConnell, supra note 19, at 1136. Even the Court in Smith acknowledged that 
"[i]t may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a 
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in." Smith, 494 
U.S. at 890. 
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inely constrains the prosecution. It means that the prosecution can­
not admit the specified form of testimony, even though in some 
cases - perhaps many - hypnotically-enhanced testimony, poly­
graph results, or an out-of-court statement contrary to the declar­
ant's penal interest may be exceedingly helpful to the prosecution's 
case. Under such conditions, there is considerably less reason to 
think that the rulemaker somehow is hostile to, or simply unaware 
of, the interests of criminal defendants and all the more reason to 
think that the rule actually amounts to a thoughtful resolution -
not necessarily the only one that might be made - of a contested 
question of admissibility. 
The comparison with the Court's free exercise cases since Smith 
sheds further light upon the constitutional demand for evenhanded­
ness. After Smith, the Court has not focused blindly upon general 
applicability, without regard to the real-world effects of a given law. 
Thus, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hi­
aleah, 212 the Court struck down a prohibition upon animal sacrifice 
that, though ostensibly of general applicability, was "drafted with 
care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacri­
fice. "273 The upshot is that one should not focus simply upon gen­
eral applicability on the face of the law itself, without regard to 
whether that feature of the law makes for evenhandedness in prac­
tical terms or is merely the product of artful draftsmanship. As I 
note by way of example in Part ill,274 this is a lesson that should 
carry over to a demand for evenhandedness under the auspices of 
the right to present witnesses. 
D. Protecting Defendants in Practical Terms 
It is not necessary to take an idyllic view of the rulemaking pro­
cess in order to regard the right to present witnesses as a right to 
equal treatment. To the contrary, as I discuss here, the more skepti­
cal one is that rulemakers - whether legislators or common law 
judges - will consider seriously the interests of criminal defend­
ants, the more attractive an equality-based view becomes. Wholly 
apart from constitutional doctrine, it surely is worthwhile to con­
sider the practical effects of a given constitutional standard over 
272. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
273. 508 U.S. at 543. See also SOS U.S. at 536 ("The [prohibition] excludes almost all 
killings of animals except for religious sacrifice."). 
274. See infra section ill.B.2 (analyzing Rule 412 as a rule that is, at least arguably, gener­
ally applicable on its face but that restricts evidence the admission of which ouly defendants 
are likely to seek). 
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another. I contend here that concern for the protection of criminal 
defendants in practical terms tends to point in favor of the switch 
that I advocate to an equality-based view. At the very least, it is not 
possible to argue for the current exception-based view on the 
ground that it is the more protective of criminal defendants as a 
whole. 
There are four options that a maker of evidence rules realisti­
cally might wish to pursue with regard to a controversial type of 
witness testimony, the admission of which - all readily would 
agree - should not be absolutely mandated: 
Option 1: A discriminatory rule that categorically bars the ad­
mission of the specified type of testimony when offered by the de­
fense but that leaves open the prospect for its admission, on a case­
by-case basis, when offered by the prosecution. 
Option 2: An evenhanded, categorical rule that bars the admis­
. sion of the specified type of testimony when offered by either side. 
Option 3: A rule that leaves open the prospect for admission of 
the specified type of testimony for either side, on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Option 4: A rule that categorically bars the admission of the 
specified type of testimony when offered by the prosecution but 
that leaves open the prospect for its admission, on a case-by-case 
basis, when offered by the defense. (One might call this a reverse 
discrimination rule, insofar as it systematically would favor the de­
fense over the prosecution, rather than vice versa as in Option 1.) 
It is undoubtedly true that, if defendants could write the evi­
dence rules, they would opt uniformly for Option 4 - the reverse 
discrimination rule - for it, in practical terms, would categorically 
restrict the prosecution from admitting the disputed type of witness 
testimony if it incriminated a particular defendant but would leave 
the defense free to argue for admission if the testimony turned out 
to be exculpatory in a given instance. But defendants do not write, 
and have never written, the evidence rules; legislatures and com­
mon law courts do. The upshot of the Supreme Court's decisions 
on the right to present witnesses is to forbid rulemakers from 
choosing either Option 1 or Option 2, at least absent a compelling 
justification. Indeed, Option 1 is completely off the table, as even 
an equality-based view would strike it down. Moreover, under 
either my view or that of the current Court, Options 3 and 4 are 
equally permissible as a constitutional matter, as either would leave 
open the prospect that the disputed type of witness testimony may 
be admitted for the defense on a case-by-case basis. 
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The practical question is: Are defendants as a whole better off 
under the current constitutional regime that leaves open their de­
sired Option 4, also permits Option 3, and essentially forbids Op­
tion 2? Might defendants as a whole actually be better off under an 
equality-based view that would leave open Options 2, 3, and 4? 
There is reason to think so - at the very least, reason to doubt that 
one credibly can defend the current constitutional regime on the 
ground of its practical effect upon defendants generally. 
A world in which rulemakers could not bind both prosecutors 
and defendants to categorical rules for the exclusion of controver­
sial forms of witness testimony might well devolve into a world in 
which categorical rules are never enacted in the first place. In 
particular, if every categorical rule were to remain subject to 
constitutionally-mandated exceptions for defendants in particular 
cases, a rulemaker may well be disinclined to enact categorical rules 
that are, in many - for some rules, most - of their applications, 
highly protective of criminal defendants.275 The rulemaker may 
opt, instead, for an evenhanded, case-by-case approach. 
To translate the point to the framework used here: If the enact­
ment of Option 2 will necessarily amount in practice to Option 4 -
as it would under current law - the rulemaker might not pursue 
Option 2 at all. Instead, it might choose Option 3. If anything, cur­
rent law pushes rulemakers in that direction. In contrast to its ad 
hoc invalidations of categorical rules, the Supreme Court has not 
imposed any substantial constitutional limitations upon the prerog­
ative of rulemakers to select a case-by-case approach to the admis­
sion of witness testimony in lieu of a categorical approach.276 
275. For defendants, the protective applications of a categorical rule are hardly trivial. To 
take one telling illustration, drawn from the circumstances in Rock: The refusal of a 
rulemaker to prohibit categorically all hypnotically-enhanced testimony would be profoundly 
harmful to many defendants, and not just because they would be put to the burden of litigat­
ing the admissibility of such evidence when offered by the prosecution. The most trouble­
some cases of prosecution efforts to admit hypnotically-enhanced testimony center upon 
allegations of sexual abuse - an area that co=entators have long regarded as especially 
susceptible to erroneous convictions and, even more importantly, one in which judges in 
charge of making case-by-case admissibility determinations might be most tempted to afford 
prosecutors more leeway than defendants. 
For an overview of the recent literature on testimony in sexual abuse trials, see Richard 
A. Leo, The Social and Legal Construction of Repressed Memory, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 653 
{1997). See also id. at 663 {identifying hypnosis as among the "specific techniques through 
which recovered memory therapists first create and then validate pseudomemories of 
abuse"). 
276. In the context of cases involving incriminating identification testimony, the Court 
has held that the Due Process Clause places an outer limit upon the ability of prosecutors to 
offer evidence that is extremely unreliable in the sense of creating "a very substantial likeli­
hood of irreparable misidentification." See Si=ons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 
{1968). This residual due process limitation "is a minimal one: only the most tendentious 
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The balancing of Option 2 versus Option 3, in terms o� their 
practical impact upon defendants as a whole, is likely to turn upon 
the particular type of testimony in question. When the testimony is 
such that it tends to be offered more frequently as incriminatory 
evidence by the prosecution, defendants as a whole would be better 
off under an evenhanded, categorical bar (Option 2) than they 
would be if they retained the opportunity to argue on a case-by­
case basis for admission of the same type of testimony in those few 
instances in which it helps the defense (Option 3). For other types 
of witness testimony, the balance may tip the other way, again, 
when one considers the effects upon all defendants. I do not pur­
port to discern an answer to the balancing question that would ap­
ply uniformly to all types of disputed witness testimony. Indeed, no 
answer appears possible. Even empirical research confined to the 
impact of a given evidence rule would be fraught with peril, for the 
reported cases would not include those instances where the rule -
especially, an evenhanded, case-by-case rule - leads defendants or 
prosecutors to plea bargain rather than to take their chances with 
the admissibility issue at trial. For present purposes, nonetheless, 
there are two crucial observations that one can make with confi­
dence, both of which concern the practical consequences of the 
competing constitutional regimes at issue here. 
First, it is not possible to defend the current exception-based 
view of the right to present witnesses on the ground that it makes 
defendants as a whole better off. If anything, there is strong reason 
to doubt that the current regime does so - at the very least, that it 
does so generally - insofar as it gives rulemakers a disincentive to 
enact categorical exclusionary rules that, in many instances, will be 
highly protective of defendants. 
Second, there is a significant respect in which an evenhanded, 
case-by-case approach is always less desirable than a categorical ap­
proach from the standpoint of defendants. In fact, it is a feature 
that should be of special concern to those who would take the most 
skeptical view of the seriousness with which the criminal system re­
gards defendants. A system in which both rulemakers and rule-
and inherently dubious items of [identification] evidence are deemed to run afoul of the due 
process clause." Westen, Future of Confrontation, supra note 218, at 1190; see also id. ("The 
due process clause permits the prosecution to introduce any item of incriminating evidence it 
wishes, unless the evidence is too unreliable for a jury to evaluate rationally."). 
Even if extended beyond the context of identification testimony, such a limitation plainly 
would not prevent an evidence rulemaker from taking the position that a particular contro­
versial form of evidence - that is, one that at least some observers regard as reliable, as is 
true for polygraph evidence and hypnotically-enhanced testimony - may be admissible for 
the prosecution on a case-by-case basis. 
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applying judges - so a skeptic would posit - are neglectful of de­
fendants' interests would be one that would find highly attractive a 
regime of case-by-case admissibility rulings. That way, it would be 
all the easier to tilt the playing field for prosecutors and against 
defendants through a series of particularized rulings, without hav­
ing to say so in any overt or general manner, such as would more 
quickly - and properly - gamer the attention of the public. A 
system of case-by-case rulings, moreover, would enhance the ability 
of prosecutors to exercise their discretion to bring to the fore the 
strongest cases in order to establish favorable precedents on the ad­
missibility issue. It is very hard to imagine that defendants as a 
whole would consider themselves better off in such a world. Yet, 
that is the world that an exception-based view creates in practical 
terms. 
ffi. IMPLICATIONS 
Having set forward the case to reconceive the right to present 
witnesses as a right of equal treatment, I briefly discuss here the 
implications of that view for the Court's existing case law and for 
features of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
A. The Case Law Reconsidered 
An equality-based view would hold that the early cases concern­
ing discriminatory evidence rules - Ferguson and Washington -
were decided correctly, but for the wrong reasons. As Justice 
Harlan counseled in his Washington concurrence,277 the Court 
should have focused upon the discriminatory structure of the rules, 
not upon a free-standing inquiry into arbitrariness. One easily may 
dispose of the Court's two most recent cases as well: The outcome 
in Rock was wrong. Specifically, the per se rule against hypnoti­
cally-enhanced testimony struck down in that case was evenhanded, 
and that stance - in the face of ongoing controversy over the ef­
fects of hypnosis - does not run afoul of constitutional review for 
rationality. By contrast, Scheffer was right in its result, because the 
per se rule against polygraph evidence is, in relevant respects, iden­
tical to the rule in Rock. The Court's reasoning in Scheffer, how­
ever, is a serious disappointment, for it makes none of the right 
analytical points. 
277. See supra note 60. Justice Harlan based his view on the Due Process Clause, 
whereas I rely upon the Compulsory Process Clause and use the Due Process Clause solely as 
a vehicle of incorporation. 
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The most subtly intriguing case is Chambers, which concerned 
Mississippi's refusal to admit statements against penal interest as an 
exception to the rule against hearsay. The question there was 
whether the defense could admit the testimony of third-party wit­
nesses, prepared to recount three out-of-court confessions of a man 
other than the defendant to the shooting of a police officer.278 As I 
explain, the Court erred in striking down Mississippi's hearsay rule, 
at least on the facts presented in Chambers itself.279 There is, how­
ever, reason to doubt the constitutionality of such a rule in other 
situations. 
On its face, at least, the rule in Chambers was as evenhanded as 
one could imagine: Statements against penal interest constituted 
inadmissible hearsay, whether offered by the prosecution or the de­
fense. Upon a determination that the rule is evenhanded, the only 
question under an equality-based view would be whether there ex­
ists a rational basis for treating statements against penal interest 
differently from statements against pecuniary interest, which Mis­
sissippi was prepared to admit - again, for both sides - as an 
exception to the rule against hearsay. Although the question is not 
an easy one - and I would not distinguish between the two sorts of 
statements as a policy matter - the Court ultimately would have 
been hard pressed to deem the state irrational for considering state­
ments against penal interest to carry somewhat greater risks of 
fabrication. 
278. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
279. Westen contends that Chambers is rightly decided, because it would have been con­
stitutionally permissible to admit an out-of-court statement against penal interest as evidence 
for the prosecution - specifically, that the statement would have been sufficiently reliable to 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause, even if the prosecution had not called the declarant as a 
witness at trial. See Westen, Compulsory Process I, supra note 13, at 155 (noting that Dutton 
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), holds "that a spontaneous declaration against penal interest, 
corroborated by independent evidence and made without any apparent motive to mislead, 
could be used against the accused, because its inherent reliability made cross-examination 
unnecessary"). This premise is accurate as a description of the Court's confrontation case 
law. Westen uses it, however, to read Chambers as "stand(ing] for the proposition that evi­
dence that is sufficiently reliable by constitutional standards to be introduced 'against' the 
accused is sufficiently reliable to be introduced 'in his favor."' Id. at 155. 
The question, however, is not whether it would be constitutionally permissible for the 
prosecution to admit the type of testimony in question, had it been inculpatory rather than 
exculpatory. The right question, instead, is whether the system of evidence roles at issue - in 
Chambers, Mississippi evidence law - would have permitted the prosecution to admit the 
disputed type of testimony, had it been inculpatory. It is plain that Mississippi law, at the 
time, considered all statements against penal interest - even statements offered by the pros­
ecution to incriminate the defendant (and the declarant, too) - to be inadmissible hearsay. 
In other words, whatever the outer boundaries of the Constitution might be with regard to 
statements against interest, Mississippi had chosen not to permit the prosecution to go to the 
constitutional limit. Instead, the state had acted evenhandedly to bar statements against pe­
nal interest, regardless of which side wished to admit them. 
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People generally do not say things contrary to their interests un­
less they are true.280 When the disputed out-of-court statements 
implicate the declarant in crime, however, the picture becomes 
murkier. The concern is that those sorts of statements may be, in a 
sense, too contrary to the declarant's interest: They not only are 
unlikely to be made but, given the seriousness of implicating one's 
self in crime, may - if made - be advanced for some ulterior 
motive. 
First, consider when the defense would want to admit state­
ments against penal interest: when out-of-court statements incul­
pate the declarant in crime but nonetheless exculpate the 
defendant, there is a non-trivial concern that the defense may have 
induced the declarant to fabricate the statement in an effort to sow 
doubt about the defendant's guilt in the mind of the jury.281 Now, 
consider when the prosecution would want to admit a statement 
against penal interest: if such a statement is inculpatory to both the 
declarant and the defendant, the concern is that the declarant sim­
ply was seeking to curry favor for herself with the prosecution by 
implicating the defendant as well in criminal activity.282 In fact, one 
does not have to rest upon broad generalizations to support the ra­
tionality of the Mississippi rule: in Chambers, the declarant himself 
took the position at trial, with some plausibility, that his earlier 
statements identifying himself as the shooter were fabrications.283 
Tb.ere was, in short, at least a rational basis to treat differently state­
ments against penal interest - one that resonates with the facts of 
Chambers itself. 
280. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note ("The circumstantial guar­
anty of reliability for declarations against interest is the assumption that persons do not make 
statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are 
true."). 
281. See 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 158, § 804.06[5], at 804-56 (discussing need 
for corroboration of this sort of statement); cf. infra section 111.B.1 (questioning whether it is 
constitutionally permissible for the federal rules to insist upon special indicia of corrobora­
tion where the statement exculpates but not when it inculpates the defendant). 
282. See 5 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 158, § 804.06[6][a], at 804-60 ("Since the 
statements are made by someone subject to criminal prosecution, the possibility exists, espe­
cially when the statement is made while the declarant is in police custody, that the declarant 
sought immunity or hoped to be allowed to plead to a lesser crime in return for providing 
help to the prosecution in obtaining a conviction."). 
283. The declarant McDonald claimed that he had confessed to the shooting at the insti­
gation of a local minister, who "had promised that he would not go to jail and that he would 
share in the proceeds of a lawsuit that Chambers would bring against the [police]." 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 288 (1973). This is not to say that McDonald's ac­
count necessarily was true. Rather, it is simply to note that the particular statements against 
penal interest in Chambers hardly were outside the basic policy argument for the exclusion of 
such evidence. 
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In addition, apart from factual details, it would have been bi­
zarre for the Supreme Court to deem irrational Mississippi's refusal 
to admit statements against penal interest when the Court itself, in 
the decades prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, had embraced 
precisely the same view for purposes of federal criminal trials.284 
Even among the various states, Mississippi's refusal to admit state­
ments against penal interest was not anomalous; rather, it repre­
sented the majority view at the time.2ss 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that an equality-based 
view of the right to present witnesses should look only to the face of 
the particular rule in question. Rather, a variation on the situation 
in Chambers illustrates the probity with which courts should apply 
an equality-based view. The exclusion of statements against penal 
interest would not be an evenhanded rule in some situations, and 
the key to their recognition turns not upon speculation about the 
rulemaker's subjective intent but, instead, upon examination of re­
lated evidence rules. As I now explain, a court would not properly 
characterize as evenhanded a rule of the sort in Chambers in cir­
cumstances where it is possible to characterize the declarant of the 
statement against penal interest as a coconspirator of the 
defendant. 
When offered by the prosecution, out-of-court statements con­
trary to the declarant's penal interest typically will implicate the de­
clarant in the same crime for which the defendant herself is on trial. 
As such, the declarant frequently will consist of someone the prose­
cutor readily may label a coconspirator of the defendant.286 The 
prosecution need not prove the existence of a conspiracy beyond a 
reasonable doubt; indeed, the defense may have plausible grounds 
to deny the existence of a conspiracy. For purposes of admissibility, 
it is enough simply for the prosecutor to present the court with facts 
284. See supra notes 75-77 (discussing the incongruity of the result in Chambers and the 
Court's earlier decision in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913), upholding the ex­
clusion of exculpatory statements against penal interest in federal trials). Donnelly held sway 
within the federal system until the current Rule 804(b)(3) supplanted it by permitting the 
admission of all statements against interest. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299. 
285. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
286. See Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Asser­
tion, and Hearsay, 12 HoFSTRA L. REv. 323, 357 (1984) ("Almost all coconspirator state­
ments . . . assert or at least imply an insider's knowledge on the part of the declarant 
concerning the [criminal] venture, and in other contexts this factor alone has brought [the 
exception for statements against interest provided by] rule 804(b)(3) into play." (citation 
omitted)); see also James Joseph Duane, The Trouble with United States v. Tellier: The Dan­
gers of Hunting for Bootstrappers and Other Mythical Monsters, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 259 
n.149 (1997) ("The overlap between the operation of these two hearsay exceptions is obvi­
ously considerable."). 
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from which a reasonable jury might infer, by a mere preponderance 
of the evidence, that a conspiracy existed.287 
The significance of this point is that the prosecutor then will not 
need to rely upon the hearsay exception for statements against in­
terest. Rather, the law of evidence has long considered statements 
by coconspirators of a party to be outside the rule against hearsay, 
when offered against that party - at least where the statement is 
made "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."288 
This is the position taken not only by the current Federal Rules of 
Evidence,289 but also, more importantly, by Mississippi law at the 
time of Chambers.29° The basic policy rationale is that an out-of­
court statement made by a coconspirator of a party is tantamount 
to a statement from that party herself, essentially on agency princi­
ples.291 This rationale, in turn, explains why the exception is limited 
to the admission of coconspirators' statements against that party. 
The upshot is that the bar upon statements against penal interest in 
Chambers would not be evenhanded where the declarant also is a 
coconspirator, for the prosecution could use another hearsay excep­
tion to admit the statements (when incriminatory), whereas the de­
fense could not (if the testimony were exculpatory).292 
The feature of Chambers itself that makes the application of the 
Mississippi hearsay rules constitutionally permissible is that there 
was no reason whatsoever to think that the declarant in that case 
was a coconspirator of the defendant. By all appearances from the 
Court's opinion, the two men were completely unconnected to one 
another, save for their fateful presence in the same location at the 
time of the disputed shooting. In those circumstances, Mississippi's 
bar upon statements against penal interest is genuinely evenhanded 
- and the Court's holding in Chambers is in error - as the prose­
cution could not have used the coconspirator exception to admit the 
287. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987). 
288. FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2)(E). 
289. FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2)(E). 
290. See McELROY, supra note 77, § 43, at 202. 
291. See FED. R. Evm. 801( d)(2) (removing coconspirators' statements from definition of 
hearsay, along with a "party's own statement," statements by persons "authorized by the 
party to make a statement concerning the subject," and statements by a "party's agent or 
servant"). 
292. The federal rules avoid this problem by making an incriminatory statement admissi­
ble for the prosecution under the coconspirator exception and an exculpatory statement ad­
missible for the defense as a statement against interest. The federal hearsay exception for 
statements against interest encompasses all statements against penal interest. See FED. R. 
Evm. 804(b)(3). But cf. infra section III.B.1 (contending that it is unconstitutional for the 
federal rules to prescribe a heightened standard of corroboration for exculpatory statements 
against interest offered by criminal defendants). 
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declarant's out-of-court statements, had they inculpated rather than 
exculpated the defendant. 
The major point is that a commitment to an equality-based view 
does not counsel blind acceptance of evenhandedness on the face of 
the disputed evidence rule. Rather, the inquiry is a probing and 
subtle one. The significant attraction of such an approach, as com­
pared to current law, lies in its institutional appropriateness. It puts 
the reviewing court in the position not of second-guessing the 
grounds upon which one might regard the disputed form of evi­
dence as problematic but, instead, in the position of analyzing the 
structure and relationship of the evidence rules at issue - a dis­
tinctly lawyerly task, rather than one of an evidence policymaker. 
B. Equal Treatment and the Federal Rules of Evidence 
It should come as no surprise that the Supreme Court hereto­
fore has never invoked the right to present witnesses to strike down 
the application of a federal evidence rule, as distinct from state evi­
dence law. Given the Court's own involvement in the rulemaking 
process at the federal level,293 it is unlikely that the Court would 
give its imprimatur to any rule about which it had serious constitu­
tional reservations. Wholly apart from the Court's involvement, 
moreover, the federal rules typically afford criminal defendants 
greater flexibility with regard to the admission of evidence, insofar 
as they distinguish at all between defendants and prosecutors. 
That, of course, is constitutionally permissible under either an 
exception-based or an equality-based view. Thus, for example, 
criminal defendants retain the option to place their own character 
at issue, whereas the prosecution may use evidence of bad character 
only in response to such a defense.294 
There nonetheless are some significant features of the current 
federal rules that systematically disadvantage defendants vis-a-vis 
prosecutors and that are the product of legislative draftsmanship 
independent from the Court itself. Comparison of these features 
sheds light upon the application, advocated here, of a compelling 
interest test to discriminatory evidence rules. 
1. Rule 804(b)(3) 
The first example returns us to the hearsay exception for state­
ments against interest. Unlike the Mississippi rule in Chambers, 
293. See supra note 178. 
294. See FEo. R. EVID. 404(a). 
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federal Rule 804(b )(3) exempts from the rule against hearsay a 
statement that "so far tended to subject the declarant to . . .  crimi­
nal liability . . .  that a reasonable person in the declarant's position 
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." 
In order to avail themselves of this exception, litigants generally 
would need to show only that it is possible for the fact finder to 
consider the statement contrary to the declarant's interests295 -
hardly a difficult showing to make. 
The last sentence of Rule 804(b )(3), however, places a substan­
tial additional limitation upon the invocation of this exception by 
criminal defendants: "A statement tending to expose the declarant 
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not ad­
missible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement."296 Whether this heightened stan­
dard of corroboration directed specifically at exculpatory evidence 
can survive strict scrutiny is open to considerable doubt. There cer­
tainly is legitimate concern when the defense offers the out-of-court 
statement of an unavailable declarant in an effort not only to incul­
pate the declarant but also to exculpate the defendant. As noted 
above with respect to Chambers, it would not be irrational for a 
rulemaker to exclude statements against penal interest when of­
fered either by the prosecution or the defense.297 But Rule 
804(b )(3) does not apply evenhandedly its demand for "corroborat­
ing circumstances clearly indicat[ing] . . .  trustworthiness."298 
This language in Rule 804(b )(3) was not part of the package 
upon which the Court itself passed in transmitting the original set of 
federal rules to Congress. Rather, the language represents the 
product of the legislative process, wherein the fear was that the de­
fendant herself might seek to corroborate an out-of-court confes-
295. See generally FED. R. Evm. 104(b ). 
296. The precise degree of corroboration required by the rule remains unclear. See Peter 
W. Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitu­
tionality of Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851, 958-59 (1981); cf. 
United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 1982) (reading requirement of 
"clear[ ]" corroboration as codifying the holding in Chambers). 
297. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text. . 
298. Notwithstanding that the text of the rule applies this heightened standard only to 
exculpatory statements offered by the defense, some lower courts have extended it to incul­
patory statements against interest offered by the prosecution in order to avoid unspecified 
"constitutional difficulties." See United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978); 
see also United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420 (7th Cir. 1990) (following Alvarez). The 
seemingly more straightforward alternative would be simply to strike down the heightened 
standard of corroboration applicable to exculpatory statements offered by the defense. For 
an argument that the heightened standard of Rule 804(b )(3) is unconstitutional under the 
Supreme Court's cases on the right to present witnesses, see Tague, supra note 296, at 1000-
11. 
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sion from someone else in an effort to shed doubt upon her own 
guilt.299 In the face of a constitutional demand for a compelling 
governmental interest, however, that policy justification should not 
pass muster.300 Such an out-of-court statement would be transpar­
ently dubious in the sense that the prosecution readily could high­
light its potential for unreliability - especially, if the defendant 
herself happens to be the witness attesting to an out-of-court con­
fession by another, now-unavailable person. In other words, the 
adversarial process itself would serve to guard against the ill­
considered acceptance of such a statement by the jury. 
There is, however, at least one discriminatory feature of the cur­
rent federal rules that likely would survive strict scrutiny. 
2. Rule 412 
By its terms, Rule 412 generally prohibits the admission of evi­
dence concerning the prior sexual "behavior" or "predisposition" of 
"any alleged victim" in "any . . .  criminal proceeding involving al­
leged sexual misconduct."301 Rule 412 thus protects not only the 
victim in a prosecution for rape, among other sexual offenses, but 
also pattern witnesses whom the prosecution might call to testify 
about similar instances of sexual misconduct by the defendant in 
299. Tue House Report explains the rationale for this change: 
[Tue House Committee] believed . . .  that statements . . .  tending to exculpate the ac­
cused are more suspect and so should have their admissibility conditioned upon some 
further provision insuring trustworthiness. Tue [Advisory Committee] proposal in the 
[version of the rule transmitted to Congress by the Supreme Court] to add a require­
ment of simple corroboration was, however, deemed ineffective to accomplish this pur­
pose since the accused's own testimony might suffice while not necessarily increasing the 
reliability of the hearsay statement. Tue Committee settled upon the language 'unless 
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement' as af­
fording a proper standard and degree of discretion. 
H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 16 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7089-90. 
300. If anything, the current preoccupation with "mechanistic[ ]" applications of evidence 
rules, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), may afford defendants too little 
protection against discriminatory rules. For instance, in LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 
(9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Arizona's counterpart to 
Rule 804(b )(3) on the ground that the trial judge's finding of insufficient corroboration was 
not "mechanistic" but, instead, stemmed from "the [defendant's] proffer and the corroborat­
ing and contradicting circumstances" presented in the particular case. 133 F.3d at 1267. This 
analysis completely misses the central point that the rule systematically disfavors defendants 
by subjecting them to a heightened standard of corroboration in the first place. 
301. FED. R. Evm. 412(a). The term "sexual behavior" includes "all activities that in­
volve actual physical conduct, i.e., sexual intercourse and sexual contact, or that imply sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact," such as use of contraceptives, birth of an illegitimate child, or 
diagnosis of venereal disease. The reference to "sexual predisposition" is "designed to ex­
clude evidence that . . . the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the 
factfinder," such as "the alleged victim's mode of dress, speech, or lifestyle." FED. R. Evm. 
412 advisory committee's note. 
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the past.302 Like the heightened standard of corroboration in Rule 
804(b )(3), Rule 412 had its genesis in Congress rather than the 
usual rulemaking process involving the Court.303 
One might try to characterize Rule 412 as evenhanded on its 
face, in that it bars a particular type of evidence without explicit 
reference to the side seeking its admission. The relatively few 
sources to address the issue consider Rule 412 to exclude evidence 
of a victim's lack of sexual "behavior" when offered by the prosecu­
tion.304 That premise is open to doubt, as the words "behavior" and 
"predisposition," when used in ordinary parlance, both imply posi­
tive action or inclination - something that only the defendant 
would wish to raise in an effort to support a defense of consent. 
Even if one were to assume the applicability of Rule 412 to the 
prosecution in extraordinary situations, one cannot plausibly deem 
the rule evenhanded in any realistic sense. It virtually always will 
be the defense that would wish to raise the victim's sexual "behav­
ior" or "predisposition." Not surprisingly, the legislative history of 
Rule 412 reveals no awareness, much less any affirmative desire, 
that the rule should limit the prosecution. Indeed, insofar as a lack 
of evenhandedness in the structure of the rule itself serves as a sur­
rogate for distrust of the rulemaking process, there is reason for 
concern here. If criminal defendants are not an especially palatable 
cause in political terms, defendants in sex cases are an exceedingly 
unpalatable one. Rule 412, in short, is the analogue in the law of 
evidence to the prohibition in Lukumi upon animal sacrifice as part 
of religious exercise.305 Rule 412 focuses upon a particular type of 
evidence, the admission of which will be sought by defendants vir­
tually exclusively. 
302. See FED. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note ("Rule 412 extends to 'pattern' 
witnesses in both criminal and civil cases whose testimony about other instances of sexual 
misconduct by the person accused is otherwise admissible."); cf. FED. R. Evm. 413 & 414 
(deeming admissible evidence of the defendant's "commission" of other offenses of "sexual 
assault" or "child molestation," respectively). 
303. The major features of Rule 412 originally were enacted by Congress in 1978, outside 
the ordinary rulemaking process in which the Court plays a part See FED. R. Evm. 412 note. 
The current text of the rule is, however, the product of the Advisory Committee's effort in 
the early 1990s to "diminish some of the confusion engendered by the original rule and to 
expand the protection afforded alleged victims of sexual misconduct." See FED. R. Evm. 412 
advisory committee's note. 
304. At least one federal district court has stated that Rule 412 bars evidence of the 
victim's lack of sexual "behavior." See Vrrgin Islands v. Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933, 936-37 
(D.V.I. 1986) (construing original version of Rule 412, which referred only to sexual "behav­
ior"); see also 23 CHAru.Es ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETii W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRA.c. 
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5387, at 577 (1980) (asserting, in passing, that Rule 412 excludes 
evidence of the victim's virginity "when offered by the prosecution"). 
305. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text. 
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In his analysis of the right to present witnesses, Peter Westen 
casts significant doubt upon rape shield rules such as Rule 412, con­
tending that evidence of the victim's consent to sex in the past must 
be admitted for the defense as long as "reasonable people could 
differ about [its] probative value."306 In its current form, Rule 412 
seeks to address possible constitutional problems by including an 
explicit exception for instances in which the exclusion of evidence 
concerning the victim's sexual behavior or predisposition "would 
violate the constitutional rights of the defendant."307 A reading 
that would admit such evidence whenever "reasonable people could 
differ" about its probative value would, in all likelihood, require the 
courts to construe the constitutional exception so broadly as to en­
feeble the general prohibition. In particular, such a view would ap­
pear to elevate the right to present witnesses to such a level as to be 
beyond even a compelling justification to the contrary. 
In contrast to the constitutional analysis of Rule 804{b )(3), there 
is good reason to think that Rule 412 should pass strict scrutiny, 
notwithstanding its lack of evenhandedness. The core rationale be­
hind Rule 412 - the government's interest in encouraging the re­
porting of crimes involving sexual misconduct by protecting victims 
in the trial process itself.3°8 - is quite powerful indeed. And the 
federal circuits are on solid ground in turning away constitutional 
challenges to state law equivalents of Rule 412 based upon the right 
to present witnesses.309 At the very least, one can say confidently 
306. Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 13, at 209. For other accounts of the 
constitutional issues surrounding Rule 412 - albeit that take as given the conception of the 
right to present witnesses as an entitlement to exceptions - see, e.g., Harriett R. Galvin, 
Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 
MINN. L. REv. 763, 802-08 (1986); J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim 
Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 556-60 (1980). 
307. FED. R. EVID. 412{b){l)(C). The one example cited by the Advisory Committee to 
illustrate this constitutional exception is Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 {1988). See FED. R. 
EVID. 412 advisory committee's note. Olden did not concern the admission of a third-party 
defense witness but, instead, held that a rape defendant must be permitted to inquire on 
cross-examination into the victim's cohabitation with another man at the time of the incident 
in an effort to show bias. The defense in Olden sought thereby to suggest that the victim had 
fabricated the rape charge in order to account for her consensual sexual intercourse with the 
defendant. See 488 U.S. at 230. As such, Olden sounds in the constitutional right to confron­
tation rather than the right to present witnesses. See 488 U.S. at 232 {describing the trial 
court's denial of the opportunity to impeach for bias through cross-examination as a "Con­
frontation Clause error[ ]"). 
308. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note. 
309. See, e.g., Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 874 {10th Cir. 1997); Stephens v. Miller, 
13 F.3d 998, 1002 {7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 391 {4th Cir. 1991). 
For its part, the Supreme Court has upheld against a facial attack a state law equivalent to the 
requirement of Rule 412{c) that the defense must give notice of its plans to introduce evi­
dence of the victim's prior sexual behavior and that, absent such notice, such evidence shall 
be excluded. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152-53 {1991). 
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that the adversarial process - far from allaying concern over the 
admission of the disputed evidence, as it would for out-of-court 
confessions under Rule 804(b )(3) - actually is the major source of 
the problem. The fundamental insight behind Rule 412 rests upon 
the recognition that subjecting the victim to the adversarial process, 
in itself, will deter the reporting of sex crimes, and the rule focuses 
its exclusionary force only upon the particular class of crimes for 
which that deterrent effect is most pronounced. Here, "reasonable 
people" might very well differ about the probative value of a vic­
tim's sexual "behavior" or "predisposition," but that should not be 
sufficient to justify widespread exceptions to Rule 412 based upon 
the constitutional right to present witµesses.310 Rule 412, in short, 
passes strict scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should reconceive the right to present wit­
nesses as a right to equal treatment rather than an entitlement to 
exceptions from generally applicable evidence rules. Historical 
context, the closely related right to confrontation, structural consid­
erations, analogous constitutional decisions, and sheer practical 
concern for the protection of the defendants as a whole, together, 
form a powerful case for such a shift. An equality-based view of the 
right would provide the Court with ample authority to police situa­
tions in which the rulemaking process has not taken seriously the 
interests of criminal defendants while, at the same time, avoiding 
the endangerment of core, evenhanded principles of evidence law 
that have existed for centuries. In this manner, the Court may 
bridge more amicably the law of evidence and the Constitution. 
310. The analysis presented here would leave undisturbed the application of the constitu­
tional exception in Rule 412(b)(l)(C) based upon the separate guarantee of the Confronta­
tion Clause. See supra note 307 (discussing advisory committee's reference to Olden). 
